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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Shawna Meechan 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Department of Political Science 
 
September 2018 
 
Title: Building Stable Governments in Post-Ethnic Civil War Societies: The Importance 
of Community Policing 
 
 
States recovering from violent ethnic conflict face many challenges in trying to 
rebuild. Primary among these challenges is how to best provide for the security of the 
people. In states that choose democratic regimes, security must be provided by a civilian 
police force. One major challenge in the process of post-ethnic conflict rebuilding is 
addressing any conceptions within the community that the police are biased against 
marginalized groups in society. This is often particularly difficult in post-ethnic conflict 
states where the police have been associated, fairly or not, with one side of the conflict. 
In such situations, how do the police gain the confidence of the community so that 
policing is seen as legitimate and fair?  
This dissertation combines the literature on post-ethnic conflict rebuilding with 
the considerable literature on community policing to argue that implementing community 
policing may be the solution to this problem. Broadly speaking, community policing 
embraces the concept that the work of the police is not separate from the community but 
should be approached as a collaborative partnership between the police and the 
community they serve. This requires community input and active participation in policing 
at every stage from problem identification to idea formation and implementation to 
 v 
 
evaluation and reform. This style of policing builds relationships between the police and 
the community and works to develop community confidence in the police.  
This argument is evaluated through one in-depth study and one initial assessment 
of states that have attempted to implement a form of community policing after ethnic 
conflict: Northern Ireland following their ‘Troubles’ and Kenya after their 2007 post-
election violence respectively. Two specific conclusions arise from this study. First, the 
adaptive nature of community policing enables the police to build community confidence 
through policing practice that is responsive to the needs of the specific communities 
being served. Second, the symbolism surrounding the police has a strong effect on 
individuals’ abilities to acknowledge or accept police reform in post-ethnic conflict 
states. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction 
 How do states recover from violent ethnic conflict? What role does security play 
in this process? In post-ethnic conflict democracies, how do civilian police forces gain 
the confidence of the community? These questions guide this dissertation project. The 
literature on post-conflict rebuilding acknowledges the importance of personal security 
but has a distinct lack of attention to domestic policing and how it is implemented. That 
is, this literature emphasizes the need for individuals in society to feel secure for the state 
to rebuild internal legitimacy and stability after violent ethnic conflict, but the discussion 
of how to provide such security tends to be limited to the make-up of the security: is it 
best provided by international peace-keepers? The military? Civilian police?1 This 
dissertation focuses on post-ethnic conflict democracies where the civilian police will 
ultimately be responsible for ensuring security. This need for civilian policing is justified 
in the literature, as discussed below, but the post-conflict literature tends to stop the 
conversation here. Once the decision has been made as to who will provide security, there 
is little discussion as to how. This leaves important questions unaddressed. Why do 
                                                 
1 Charles T. Call, "Competing Donor Approaches to Post-Conflict Police Reform," Conflict, Security & 
Development 2, no. 01 (2002); Charles T. Call and William D. Stanley, "Protecting the People: Public 
Security Choices after Civil Wars," Global Governance 7, no. 2 (2001); Paul Collier, "Ethnic Civil Wars: 
Securing the Post-Conflict Peace," Harvard International Review 28, no. 4 (Winter) (2007); Chaim 
Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," International Security 20, no. 4 
(1996); Katherine Glassmyer and Nicholas Sambanis, "Rebel: Military Integration and Civil War 
Termination," Journal of Peace Research 45, no. 3 (2008); William D. Stanley and Charles T. Call, 
"Military and Police Reform after Civil War," Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Peace Processes and 
Post-war Reconstruction (2008). 
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certain reforms succeed in building community confidence in the police when others fail? 
Why do certain reforms work in certain post-ethnic conflict cases and not in others?  
 The literature on policing addresses these questions but has not previously been 
connected to the literature on ethnic conflict. There is general agreement in this literature 
that policing reform should be democratic and include a respect for fundamental human 
rights.2 David Bayley even argues that “the elements of democratic police reform are no 
longer problematic.” He elaborates, “Few people would disagree with accountability, 
protection of human rights, and transparency, and most would accept the importance of 
developing a service orientation.”3 However, “outlining the contours of what democratic 
policing is supposed to look like is one thing; translating these into practice on the ground 
in another matter entirely.”4 One subset of this literature suggests that one way to 
translate democratic policing into practice – building community confidence in the 
police, and therefore legitimizing the police and through them, the state – is through 
community policing.5 Community policing can be broadly understood as a philosophy of 
                                                 
2 David H Bayley, Democratizing the Police Abroad: What to Do and How to Do It (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice, 2001); Changing the 
Guard: Developing Democratic Police Abroad (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2006); Marina 
Caparini and Otwin Marenin, "Police Transformation in Central and Eastern Europe: The Challenge of 
Change," in Transforming Police in Central and Eastern Europe: Process and Progress, ed. Marina 
Caparini and Otwin Marenin (Geneva, Switzerland: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed 
Forces, 2004); Philip C Stenning and Clifford D Shearing, "Reforming Police: Opportunities, Drivers, and 
Challenges," Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology 38, no. 2 (2005). 
3 Bayley, Democratizing the Police Abroad: What to Do and How to Do It, 76. 
4 Graham Ellison, "A Blueprint for Democratic Policing Anywhere in the World: Police Reform, Political 
Transition, and Conflict Resolution in Northern Ireland," Police Quarterly 10, no. 3 (2007): 244. 
5 Policing in Israel: Studying Crime Control, Community Policing, and Counterterrorism, (Boca Raton, FL: 
CRC Press, 2016); Linda S Miller and Karen M Hess, Community Policing: Theory and Practice 
(Minneapolis: West Publishing Co, 1994); Robert C Trojanowicz and Bonnie Bucqueroux, Community 
Policing: How to Get Started (Cincinnati, Ohio: Anderson Publishing Co, 1994); Andre Normandeau, 
"Community Policing in Canada: A Review of Some Recent Studies," American Journal of Police 12, no. 1 
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policing “that emphasizes working proactively with citizens to solve crime related 
problems and prevent crime.”6 In this model of policing, citizens are viewed not as 
passive consumers of public safety, but as active participants in helping to provide public 
safety.7 Importantly, community policing is contextual and practical in its application. 
That is, while there are guiding principles and expectations as to what community 
policing looks like, there is no specific formula that can be applied everywhere to 
establish effective democratic policing.8 The theory of community policing is 
purposefully intended to be adaptive to the needs of the specific communities in which it 
is implemented and therefore may provide more direct guidance than the general ideals of 
democratic policing provide. Specifically, as community policing emphasizes the active 
participation of the community in the process of policing, we would expect to see 
community consultation and input at all levels of the policy making process. Community 
consultation should be seen in the problem identification, policy development, decision-
making, and implementation stages of policing. This, it is argued, will build relationships 
between the police and the community that foster confidence in the police.9 
This dissertation combines these two literatures, bringing the logic of community 
policing to the discussion of post-violent ethnic conflict state rebuilding. Specifically, I 
                                                 
(1993); Dennis Rosenbaum and Arthur J Lurigio, "An inside Look at Community Policing Reform: 
Definitions, Organizational Changes, and Evaluation Findings," Crime & Delinquency 40, no. 3 (1994). 
6 Miller and Hess, 16. 
7 Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux. 
8 Ellison. 
9 Bayley, Democratizing the Police Abroad: What to Do and How to Do It; David H Bayley and Robert 
Perito, "Police Corruption: What Past Scandals Teach About Current Challenges," in Special Report 
(Washington, DC: United States Institue of Peace, 2011). 
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perform one in-depth case study and one initial assessment of states that have attempted 
to implement a version of community policing after violent ethnic conflict: Northern 
Ireland and Kenya respectively. This study leads to two important conclusions. First, the 
adaptive nature of community policing enables the police to build community confidence 
through policing practice that is responsive to the needs of the specific communities 
being served. At its most basic level, community policing encourages community 
engagement at all stages of the process of police reform and implementation. As such, if 
done well, community policing will lead to new relationships between police and the 
communities they serve. This is how communities gain confidence in the police – through 
the everyday lived experience of responsive, respectful, adaptive police practice 
encouraged by community policing at its best. The literature on post-conflict security has 
largely ignored issues of implementation of security, and therefore does not do enough to 
highlight the role of the civilian police in post-conflict rebuilding efforts. There is an 
underlying assumption that police practice is important in this literature, but little on what 
good police practice looks like. Therefore, in my case studies, I highlight the degree to 
which the police: (1) consulted with the community at different stages of the reform 
process; (2) identified community needs and developed practices that responded to those 
needs; and (3) identified community concerns and developed practices that respected 
those concerns. To the extent police do all three of those things, they can be considered to 
have ‘good community policing practices,’ and we should expect to see improved levels 
of community confidence in the police sometime thereafter.  
Second, the symbolism surrounding the police has a strong effect on individuals’ 
abilities to acknowledge or accept police reform in post-ethnic conflict states. Symbols 
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themselves do not make people trust the police, but they can often be barriers to trusting 
the police if the symbols surrounding the police have become associated with 
discriminatory or biased behavior. This is especially true in ethnically divided societies 
where symbols are often associated with one culture within society over another. 
Therefore, careful and considered reform of policing symbols is important to open the 
possibility for policing reform to be accepted by disenfranchised communities in post-
ethnic conflict states. In this dissertation, I attempt to highlight the kinds of symbolic 
changes that are likely to be most impactful in post-ethnic conflict states which, 
combined with good community policing practices should lead to improved levels of 
community confidence in the police.  
The remainder of this chapter will lay out my argument in more detail and explore 
how it fits into the larger literature. First, I explore several important concepts that help to 
clarify the scope of this dissertation including how I define state stability and why I 
specifically focus on ethnically based conflict. I then perform a very brief review of the 
literature on post-conflict rebuilding and highlight where I believe this dissertation can 
provide new and important insights. I briefly explain the specific focus this dissertation 
has on policing in post-conflict states that pursue democratic forms of governance before 
reviewing the literature on community policing, identifying both the theoretical 
underpinnings and the expectations of successful community policing.  
After situating this dissertation in the larger literature on post-ethnic conflict 
rebuilding and community policing, the last three sections of this chapter outline the 
methodology used and the data collected to examine my expectations in the cases of 
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Northern Ireland and Kenya. The conclusion of this chapter lays out the structure of the 
remainder of this dissertation. 
Important Concepts 
 As implied above, the motivation for this dissertation comes from the post-ethnic 
conflict literature on building state stability. In this section, I explain how I define state 
stability in this project. Additionally, I briefly justify my choice to focus on ethnic 
conflict as a category distinct from other kinds of conflict.  
State Stability 
For my purposes, stability can be defined as the general acceptance of the 
legitimacy of the state by the populace. That is, the populace generally accepts the state 
in its current form without violent rebellion10 and regardless of their personal feelings 
about the effectiveness of the current government. Put another way, individuals may 
dislike the people or policies of the government but are not generally violently protesting 
the state borders or structure of government. This is a purposefully minimalist definition 
of stability, or what some scholars might call a ‘negative peace.’11 While the absence of 
violence is certainly not a measure of the presence of peace and harmony, this 
dissertation’s primary focus is on how states achieve the conditions under which they 
might pursue other important objectives, like a positive peace or the provision of certain 
state services and functions. 12 Therefore, I am bracketing the initial concept of stability 
                                                 
10 Max Weber, "Objectivity in Social Science and Social Policy," in The Methodology of the Social 
Sciences, ed. Edward A Shils and Henry A Finch (New York: The Free Press, 1949); Kenneth E. Boulding, 
Stable Peace (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1978); TheGlobalEconomy.com, "Political Stability - 
Country Rankings,"  https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/rankings/wb_political_stability/. 
11 Johan Galtung, "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research," Journal of Peace Research 6, no. 3 (1969). 
12 See Melani Cammett and Edmund Malesky, "Power Sharing in Postconflict Societies: Implications for 
Peace and Governance," The Journal of Conflict Resolution 56, no. 6 (2012).; Collier.; and Caroline 
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at a minimalist place where there is not widespread violent contestation of the state’s 
legitimacy. 
I focus on stability over a ten-year period in this dissertation for several reasons. 
First, while I agree with those who caution against using too long a length of time to 
define stability because of the likelihood of new and unrelated variables complicating the 
analysis, 13 I also agree with those who argue that state stability requires more than a 
minimal period of cessation of violence. 14 Additionally, it seems reasonable to assume 
that stability may take some time to ‘set in.’ I also agree with Samuel Huntington15 that 
there is importance associated with elections in democracies as the peaceful transition of 
power is a key marker for stability. Therefore, I want a period that will include at least 
one national election. As most national elections around the world take place somewhere 
on a 3 to 7-year cycle, 10 years should incorporate at least one election. 
Why ethnic violence? 
I focus on conflicts that are specifically delineated along ethnic lines. While most 
political scientists, anthropologists, sociologists, and historians agree that ethnicity is a 
construct based on imagined ties and shared histories,16 most also argue that those 
                                                 
Hartzell, "Explaining the Stability of Negotiated Settlements to Interstate Wars," Journal of Conflict 
Resolutions 43, no. 3 (1999). 
13 Robert Mandel, Global Security Upheaval: Armed Nonstate Groups Usurping State Stability Functions 
(Stanford, California: Stanford Security Studies, and imprint of Stanford University Press, 2013); Boulding. 
14 See Caroline Hartzell, Matthew Hoddie, and Donald Rothchild, "Stabilizing the Peace after Civil War: 
An Investigation of Some Key Variables," International Organization 55, no. 1 (2001): 184.; Karl  
DeRouen Jr., Jenna Lea, and Peter Wallensteen, "The Duration of Civil War Peace Agreements," Conflict 
Management and Peace Science 26, no. 4 (2009). 
15 Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1993), 267. 
16 See Joane Nagel, "Constructing Ethnicity: Creating and Recreating Ethnic Identity and Culture," Social 
Problems 41, no. 1 (1994). This concept is also explained well, though contested as a valuable approach, in 
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identities, imagined or not, have real consequences for the ways in which humans interact 
with the world and each other. Conflicts in which ethnicity is used to identify and 
internally unify opposing sides present special problems that deserve special attention.  
 Several critics of ethnic conflict as a category claim that most if not all ‘ethnic 
conflicts’ are based in economic or other complaints and that ethnicity is simply 
incidental to the true causes of the conflict.17 Others claim that the framework of ethnic 
conflict is simply less useful than other frameworks and should therefore be rejected as a 
primary tool of analysis in evaluating conflict.18  
 Despite the arguments against the usefulness of ethnic conflict as its own 
category, a growing number of scholars recognize and use ethnic conflict as defining a 
distinct set of conflicts. David Horowitz argues that ethnic conflicts “possess certain 
baseline characteristics in common.”19 These include societies that are deeply divided 
along ethnic lines, with relatively large ethnic groups that operate at the center of politics 
rather than on the periphery, and groups are defined by ascriptive differences.20 Scholars 
                                                 
Chris Smaje, "Not Just a Social Construct: Theorizing Race and Ethnicity," Sociology 31, no. 2 (1997); 
Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (New 
York, New York: Verso, 1983). 
17 See Beverly Crawford and Ronnie D. Lipschutz, eds., The Myth of "Ethnic Conflict": Politics, 
Economics, and "Cultural" Violence (Berkeley: International and Area Studies, University of California 
Berkeley, 1998).; John Mueller, "The Banality of "Ethnic War"," International Security 25, no. 1 (2000).; 
Nicholas Sambanis, "Do Ethnic and Nonethnic Civil Wars Have the Same Causes?: A Theoretical and 
Empirical Inquiry," Journal of Conflict Resolutions 45, no. 3 (June) (2001).; Victor Le Vine, 
"Conceptualizing "Ethnicity" and "Ethnic Conflict": A Controversy Revisited," Studies in Comparative 
International Development 32, no. 2 (1997).; and Charles King, "The Myth of Ethnic Warfare," Foreign 
Affairs 80, no. 6 (2001). 
18 Bruce Gilley, "Against the Concept of Ethnic Conflict," Third World Quarterly 25, no. 6 (2004). 
19 Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, 2nd ed. (Berkeley, California: University of California 
Press, 2000; repr., 2nd), 17. 
20 Ibid. 
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such as Clifford Geertz argue that ethnicity and ethnic conflict are not only important, but 
also inevitable as group identification is strong and only becomes reinforced over time.21 
Other scholars such as Anthony Smith have focused on the mobilization of ethnicity as a 
tool for conflict. He argues that ethnic identities in themselves do not create or necessitate 
conflict, but that elites can and have mobilized them to achieve political ends.22 Dozens 
of scholars have contributed to the study of ethnic conflict: its incidence, duration, and 
role in post-ethnic conflict rebuilding.23 Additionally, research centers have been 
established all over the world to further the study of ethnic conflict.24 While there are 
legitimate debates about when and where ethnic tensions should be understood as the 
main motivation in certain conflicts, most experts agree that many important conflicts are 
substantially rooted in ethnic tension and therefore are worth studying as a distinct 
category of conflicts. 
Review of the Literature on Post-Ethnic Conflict Rebuilding 
Since the end of the Cold War, many cases of intrastate violence have resulted in 
the maintenance of existing state borders with a variety of strategies for solving internal 
                                                 
21 Clifford Geertz, Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa (London: 
Free Press of Glencoe, 1963). 
22 Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History (Malden, Mass.: Polity Press, 2001), 54-55. 
23 See Ravi Bhavnani and Dan Miodownik, "Ethnic Polarization, Ethnic Salience, and Civil War," Journal 
of Conflict Resolutions 53, no. 1 (2009).; Collier.; DeRouen Jr., Lea, and Wallensteen.; James D. Fearon 
and David D. Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," American Political Science Review 97, no. 1 
(2003).; Glassmyer and Sambanis.; Caroline Hartzell and Matthew Hoddie, "Institutionalizing Peace: 
Power Sharing and Post-Civil War Conflict Management," American Journal of Political Science 47, no. 2 
(2003).; Stuart J. Kaufman, "Spiraling to Ethnic War: Elites, Masses, and Moscow in Moldova's Civil 
War," International Security 21, no. 2 (1996).; William J. Long and Peter Brecke, War and Reconciliation: 
Reason and Emotion in Conflict Resolution (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2003).; Jose G. Montalvo and 
Marta Reynal-Querol, "Ethnic Polarization, Potential Conflict, and Civil Wars," The American Economic 
Review 95, no. 3 (2005).; among many others. 
24 Some examples include those at the University of Notre Dame, Queen’s University Belfast, Columbia 
University, and the University of Washington to name a few.  
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grievances. This is a significant change from states gaining independence through the end 
of colonialism or the break-up of ethnically diverse states into sovereign nation-states as 
was common in the period between the end of World War II and the end of the Cold War. 
The literature on how these states rebuild after conflict broadly sorts into three categories 
of strategies for rebuilding: ethnic representation in government, community 
reconciliation, and personal security. Each of these contribute to post-ethnic conflict state 
stability in important ways. 
Community Reconciliation  
Many scholars, and a great number of practitioners, emphasize the importance of 
community reconciliation after violent conflict. They argue that ethnic conflict destroys 
relationships between neighbors and creates barriers to trust that must be overcome 
before communities can participate in and support the state. Simply put, if old wounds are 
not addressed and remedied, individuals will be unable to move on and old tensions will 
rise to the surface quickly.25 Within this group, there is debate over what strategies for 
                                                 
25 See Susanne Buckley-Zistel, "We Are Pretending Peace: Local Memory and the Absence of Social 
Transformation and Reconciliation in Rwanda," in After Genocide: Transitional Justice, Post-Conflict 
Reconstruction and Reconciliation in Rwanda and Beyond, ed. Philip Clark and Zachary Kaufman (New 
York, New York: Columbia University Press, 2009).; John Ishiyama and Jeremy Backstrom, 
"Reconciliation and Conceptual Complexity: The Case of Post Conflict Kenya," African and Asian Studies 
10, no. 4 (2011).; J. Nasongo, J. Achoka, and L. Wamocha, "Is Forgiveness and Amnesty a Panacea to 
Kenya's Post-Conflict Crisis?," African Journal of Political Science and International Relations 3, no. 4 
(2009).; Priscilla Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth 
Commissions (New York, NY: Routledge, 2011).; and J. Sarkin, "Promoting Justice, Truth, and 
Reconciliation in Transitional Societies: Evaluation Rwanda's Approach in the New Millennium of Using 
Community Based Gacaca Tribunals to Deal with the Past," International Law FORUM du droit 
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community reconciliation are the most useful 26 and who should be the primary targets of 
reconciliation projects.27 
The extent to which community reconciliation can provide post-conflict stability 
on its own is questioned by many of its most prominent practitioners.28 Some scholars 
imply the importance of other post-conflict rebuilding strategies working in concert with 
reconciliation, even if those interactions are not explicit in the study.29 Community 
reconciliation is perhaps one of the most thoroughly explored categories of explanatory 
emphasis in post-conflict rebuilding. Repairing old and building new relationships after 
conflict is very difficult and therefore very interesting both theoretically and empirically. 
However, it does not seem to offer enough in terms of state stability to be a plausible 
explanation on its own. Individuals who still fear for their safety are not likely to 
participate in community reconciliation procedures fully or willingly, undermining the 
effectiveness of such programs. Security needs to come first.  
                                                 
26 Ifat Moaz, "An Experiment in Peace: Reconciliation-Aimed Workshops of Jewish-Israeli and Palestinian 
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Ethnic Representation in Government 
 Scholars who focus on ethnic representation in government broadly argue that, 
after violent ethnic conflict, minority groups are concerned about having a voice in the 
decisions and direction of government. Therefore, representation must be ensured in 
some way. Representation can be understood as either direct representation, with some 
number of politicians in government coming from minority ethnic groups to ensure the 
physical presence of ethnic diversity, often in the form of power-sharing agreements30 – 
what many scholars call consociationalism.31 Alternatively, some have argued for the 
requirement of representation in votes. That is, executives must receive votes from a 
certain percentage of each ethnic group within a state to be eligible for office – what can 
be called centripetalism.32 This kind of representation, it is argued, incentivizes 
moderation in politicians, as they are required to appeal to multiple groups to be elected, 
rather than catering to one group’s preferences. 
Even some of those who seem to take a side in the argument over 
consociationalism versus centripetalism have ultimately argued that neither solution is 
perfect and may not provide, on its own, stable states in the aftermath of violent ethnic 
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conflict. Horowitz, for example, has promoted centripetalism at various times throughout 
his career33 and in 2014 he explicitly argued that there is no perfect solution.34 Arend 
Lijphart and Adrian Guelke both emphasize political will as crucial to the success of 
consociationalism, implying that these kinds of arrangements often fail.35 What these 
authors seem to argue is that ethnic representation in government cannot explain, in itself, 
post-ethnic conflict state stability. Security, it seems logical to suggest, may be the 
missing link.  
Security 
 The final explanatory emphasis in the post-conflict rebuilding literature centers on 
the importance of personal security. This group of scholars argues the primary concern of 
the average person following violent conflict is their safety.36 Without feelings of 
personal security, it will be impossible for individuals to comfortably participate in 
community reconciliation activities or feel that political representation is meaningful.  
There are two main approaches to ensuring security in a post-conflict setting. The 
first is a militaristic approach that indicates that peace in a post-civil war society can be 
maintained only through the presence of a strong national army or outside military 
                                                 
33 Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict; "Democracy in Divided Societies." 
34 "Ethnic Power Sharing: Three Big Problems." 
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intervention.37 Chaim Kaufmann takes the rather extreme position that there are only 
three possible solutions to ethnic civil war: “with complete victory of one side; by 
temporary suppression of the conflict by third party military occupation; or by the self-
governance of separate communities.”38 Other authors find there are other possible 
solutions to peace-keeping dilemmas in post-civil war societies but agree that militaristic 
peace-keeping forces are the most likely to be successful.39 Still others focus on a 
military peacekeeping force, but with an emphasis on state armies that incorporate rebel 
forces, which they argue should create stability.40   
The other approach to security focuses on civilian police forces. Military 
peacekeeping may be sustainable in the immediate aftermath of a civil war, but there 
must come a time when peacekeeping responsibilities are devolved to the civilian police 
force. If settlements do not address issues of community trust in policing in the long term, 
there is a chance that violence will erupt again when this step is taken. Rama Mani argues 
that when actors in a post-conflict society focus too narrowly on enforcing the ‘rule of 
law’ through a military force, they do so in the interest of short-term peace to the 
detriment of long-term stability.41 Therefore, one important step in reforming the police 
is to de-link it from the military in societies where the two have become intertwined 
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during conflict.42 Many practical problems arise in this process, such as who should be 
recruited to the new police force and how. For instance, if the military is downsized, 
civilian police forces are a natural fit for former members of the military. Should these 
individuals be allowed to join the police force? Mani demonstrates through a thorough 
examination of the El Salvador and Haitian demilitarization of police that while these 
questions are difficult, addressing them at the start of a new government is the best way 
to ensure stable, trusted policing in post-war societies.43  
Similarly, Charles Call and William Stanley argue that policing reform after civil 
war is important and should be addressed in peace agreements to better ensure they are 
carried out in the long term.44 In his many writings on policing in post-civil war societies, 
Call focuses primarily on the structural issues of police reform – whether to integrate 
former combatants, a focus on training and professionalization, and/or the integration of 
human rights – but does not dig much below the surface of these overarching ideas.45 
This is likely because his primary focus is on what, if anything, the international 
community could and should do to help post-conflict states rebuild.46 He concludes, in 
large part, that police reform is important and useful in building medium- and long-term 
security,47 but again he does not address the specific reforms that are most useful. Several 
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other scholars have performed case studies looking at police reform in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina,48 South Africa,49 and Nigeria50 among others that reach much the same 
conclusion.  
In recent years, there has been a larger focus on the role of civilian police forces 
in post-ethnic conflict societies.51 These studies analyze the experiences of policing in 
different ethnically divided societies and highlight the difficulties and some of the 
practical solutions employed in these states. They focus primarily on the widespread 
issue of police corruption.52 These authors argue that the issue of police corruption, 
though problematic everywhere, is a particular challenge in countries emerging from 
violent ethnic conflict.53 In analyzing this problem, they also examine the steps that have 
been taken to combat this issue in different countries around the world and evaluate the 
success or failure of these steps.54  
While the issue of police corruption is undoubtedly a major obstacle to 
communities developing confidence in the police, and therefore developing a sense of 
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personal security, these studies do not do enough to highlight the many other obstacles to 
community confidence in the police that exist in post-ethnic conflict societies such as the 
perception of ethnic favoritism or discrimination,55 histories of police violence,56 and the 
reliance of some communities on paramilitary groups.57 For example, by focusing on 
corruption, these authors emphasize the absence of negative behaviors over the presence 
of positive behaviors in the police and therefore miss an important part of the solution. 
That is, an individual in society is likely to be glad if they no longer experience illegal 
shakedowns by members of the police, but the absence of that obvious corruption will not 
create a sense of confidence in the capability of the police.58 There needs to be an equal 
emphasis on creating new, positive police behavior. Similarly, the focus on corruption 
creates a false narrative of everyone distrusting the police equally. However, in ethnically 
divided societies, it is often the case that the police are associated with the socially 
advantaged group and therefore disadvantaged groups have an additional grievance 
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against the police that is not likely to be alleviated with addressing corruption. These 
authors allow corruption to do too much of the work for community distrust of the police 
to the detriment of other important factors specifically present in ethnically divided 
societies. 
In their assessment of policing after ethnic conflict, Arrick Jackson and Alynna 
Lyon make explicit what many of the authors reviewed so far have been arguing 
implicitly: namely that the police after ethnic conflict require the confidence of the 
community to have legitimacy.59 Police legitimacy, as defined by Ronald Weitzer, is 
“acceptance of the moral authority of a police force and its rights to enforce laws and 
issue commands.”60 Jackson and Lyon make the compelling argument that the police face 
a special challenge in convincing the community that they are trustworthy. However, they 
do not suggest how this is to be done. Instead, they take a rather fatalistic view that, 
especially when large portions of the police force carry over from conflict to post-conflict 
policing, the police will be unable to “overcome their negative past.”61 They argue that 
the police must “generate a viable constituency and prove to the population that they are 
trustworthy and legitimate in upholding the rule of law.”62 However, once again, they do 
not say how this is to be done.  
I argue that none of these studies has dug beneath the surface enough to identify 
not just whether police reform works, but how and why it succeeds or fails. As 
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mentioned, Call argues that the inclusion of a focus on police reform in peace agreements 
increases the likelihood of their long-term success, but he does not go into detail about 
what specific categories of reform should receive focus.63 Jackson and Lyon argue that 
community buy-in is necessary for the police to have legitimacy, but do not explore how 
such buy-in is achieved.64 In her article on police reform in Afghanistan following the 
U.S. intervention in 2001, Tonita Murray specifically identifies what she calls the 
“implementation gap” which “is concerned with such problems as lack of attention to the 
practicalities of implementation, lack of a common view, coordination and the translation 
of policy into practice.”65 She argues that without careful planning of how the 
Afghanistan police were going to put policy into practice, many of the reforms, such as 
training, failed to produce intended results. Murray argues that the international groups 
who helped to set up the new Afghanistan police service did not thoughtfully plan how 
their policy goals would be implemented.  
I am building on this insight – that it is not just written policy, but the practice of 
policing that makes good policing – and arguing further that community policing 
provides the best bridge to span her implementation gap in post-ethnic conflict societies. I 
argue that it is both the advanced planning and the ongoing learning and modifying of the 
implementation of policy that has made the reforms to policing in Northern Ireland 
successful in building community confidence in the police. In other words, I agree with 
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Murray that there needs to be advanced, thoughtful planning to make implementation of 
policy successful, but it is also important to continually evaluate and modify police 
practice to ensure that it is translating policy into practice in the best way. In terms of the 
three primary identifiers of good community policing I mentioned above, this means that 
it is not enough to see the police engage with the community at all stages of police reform 
once, but that consultation and engagement is institutionalized and ongoing. In other 
words, community policing implies ongoing relationships with between the police and 
the community, not a simple one-time consultation.  
Democracy and Civilian Policing 
 One possible reason for the limited literature about civilian policing in the 
aftermath of violent ethnic conflict may be that, in an effort to speak to a broader number 
of cases which include a significant number of authoritarian and hybrid regimes, scholars 
have treated post-conflict security as one broad category as opposed to breaking it down 
into its various forms more specifically. As mentioned above, some scholars have argued 
that personal security is the most important guarantee for individuals in the aftermath of 
violent conflict.66 For some of these scholars, any competent force including the military 
or an existing police force can provide security, or, in some cases, it is argued that outside 
forces such as United Nations Peacekeepers would be the preferred force to ensure 
unbiased protection of all citizens.67 These arguments are compelling especially when 
applied to specific cases where the history of violence in the state has been extreme, such 
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as in Rwanda following the 1994 genocide or Columbia following their decades-long 
violent civil war. Another reason these arguments may be so prominent is that the 
literature on post-conflict rebuilding would mostly be categorized as international 
relations literature. This field of political science tends to focus on the proximate causes 
and solutions to conflict, as opposed to the long-term solutions. Scholars who emphasize 
the need for long-term solutions to post-conflict security often also acknowledge that the 
immediate need for security may be met in a number of different ways as laid out in the 
literature.68 
However, in the context of states that choose to pursue democratic forms of 
government in the aftermath of violent ethnic conflict it is important to examine what 
these long-term solutions look like. In authoritarian states, domestic security can be, and 
often is, provided by a military security force. Such forces do not require the confidence 
of the communities they serve to be effective. That is, with the authority and backing of 
the government, military police forces can use any means required to maintain order, 
with or without the consent or approval of the community. However, most scholars agree 
that democracy requires the guarantee of certain civil rights and liberties.69 This requires 
democratic states to develop policing that is necessarily more restrained than in 
authoritarian regimes. That is, if citizens in democratic states are entitled to certain 
limitations on government interference, then governments are not able to force 
compliance through military rule. Therefore, as mentioned above, there must come a time 
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after conflict when the responsibilities of policing devolve to a civilian police force. If 
issues of policing are not addressed at the time of a peace agreement or other end to 
violence, it is likely that violence will resume when such transitions do take place.70 
Thus, it is important to not only understand the role of security in post-ethnic conflict 
states, but to specifically address how security will be provided by a civilian police force 
and what reforms should be addressed in this process. 
It should be noted that the definition of democratic governance used here leans 
toward the more liberal or substantive definitions of democracy as opposed to limited or 
procedural definitions. The debate over what the definition of democracy is and should be 
is ongoing in the field and is much too rich to be adequately reviewed here.71 However, it 
is worth noting that not all scholars agree on the necessary attributes a democratic regime 
must have. Some scholars argue for a minimalistic definition of democracy in which 
there are regular free and fair elections, most individuals are allowed to vote, and there 
are some guarantees for civil liberties such as freedom of expression and access to 
sources of information (such as freedom of the press).72 There are many reasons to use 
this procedural definition of democracy in political science. Maybe the most important 
reason is that broader definitions increase the number of cases that fit the description of 
democracy and therefore provide a larger sample size when making comparisons and 
drawing conclusions.  
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On the other hand, some scholars choose to use more liberal or substantive 
definitions of democracy. Such definitions imply that democracy is not just about certain 
procedures and rights, but that there is a depth or strength to such rights that can be 
measured and should be considered when determining how democratic a state is. 
Scholars that use substantive definitions tend to argue that democracies can always 
deepen or become more democratic. Substantive definitions of democracy often include 
elements such as the level of participation in civil society, measures of equity and 
equality among minority populations, and accountability of government institutions 
among other traits.73 
For the purposes of this dissertation, I adopt a definition of democracy that might 
be called ‘procedural plus.’ This falls somewhat short of what Coppedge et al define as 
‘liberal democracy’ which seems to imply expansive and well-protected civil liberties.74 
Because I am focused on the state immediately post-ethnic conflict, I do not want to 
severely limit the range of relevant cases by only looking at cases of deep democracies 
with extensive civil rights and liberties. However, it is important that there be at least one 
additional criteria on top of the procedural definition of democracy for security to be able 
to contribute to state stability post-conflict. Specifically, democracy in this case requires 
legal or administrative accountability. This is to say that there is legal recourse for 
individuals in the community to report bad behavior, in this case of police officers, and 
reasonably expect that the complaint will be taken seriously, adjudicated fairly, and 
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appropriate action taken where justified. The justification for this additional requirement 
is simple: for the community to trust that security provided by the police after conflict 
will be fair and unbiased, they must also be confident that the state has the mechanisms to 
address and correct bad behavior when it arises. In other words, marginalized 
communities are unlikely to accept that reform of how policing is delivered is indicative 
of real rather than superficial change unless they also trust that deviations from reform 
will be addressed and corrected.  
Without making any normative judgements as to what is the ‘best’ form of 
government in a post-ethnic conflict state, this dissertation concentrates on the special 
problems associated with providing security through a civilian police force in post-ethnic 
conflict states pursuing democratic forms of governance using a ‘procedural plus’ 
definition of democracy. In these cases, how do police earn the confidence of the 
community following violent ethnic conflict?  
Community Policing 
Previous sections identified where the literature on post-ethnic conflict rebuilding 
has fallen short in identifying how security is provided by the civilian police. There is a 
separate literature, however, that addresses the issue of building community confidence 
in the police through specific reforms: the literature on community policing. Community 
policing can generally be understood as an institutional change in the delivery of policing 
that works to build positive relationships between the community and the police, 
changing negative perceptions and increasing police legitimacy through the integration of 
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community input into policing at every stage.75 Using the literature on community 
policing, I am able to develop a set of expectations that I can use to evaluate how (or how 
much) community policing was implemented in my cases, and whether practices 
associated with community policing increased levels of trust with citizens, thereby 
enhancing state stability. In this section, I will briefly review the literature on community 
policing to identify expectations regarding what kinds of police practices we should see 
in places where community policing has been fully implemented.  
Defining Community Policing 
 Community policing was largely developed theoretically and practically in the 
late 1980s through the 1990s. The purpose of community policing, or almost any policing 
reform, is to improve the quality and efficiency of the police. Community policing, in 
particular, does this in part through a focus on building better relationships between the 
police and the communities they serve.76 This is particularly important after ethnic 
conflict. As Gemma Celador argues, “In most, if not all, war-torn societies (from intra-
state conflict) the police were, prior to and/or during the conflict period, politically 
biased, militarized, corrupt, ethnically (or group) divided, disrespectful of human rights 
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and inefficient at ensuring the security of all citizens.”77 This creates a condition in which 
post-conflict policing specifically must address issues of community confidence in the 
post-conflict police as socially disadvantaged communities are likely to be skeptical of 
the police in general and socially advantaged groups will be distrustful of changes to the 
police they see as capitulating to the demands of former combatants.78 Importantly, the 
specific practices the police employ when they interact with the community, often in 
moments of extreme emotion and with physical interventions, have concrete importance 
in whether the community accepts the police as legitimate. In the context of this 
dissertation, this relates directly to the post-conflict literature’s focus on security as 
important for post-conflict stability. As Robert Gimode highlights, “the police force is the 
most apparent manifestation of the state,”79 and therefore community interactions with 
the police after conflict will affect how communities interpret the policies and prejudices 
of a post-conflict state. The ways in which police policy translates into policing 
procedure matter significantly in how the community interprets the role and intentions of 
the police. This is to say that the lived experience of interactions with the police are how 
communities learn to interpret the police, and, especially after violent ethnic conflict 
these interactions are how people learn to change their perceptions of the police. When 
community policing is implemented well, we would expect to see changes in public 
attitudes toward the police. This may be measured differently in different societies 
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depending on the resources available. For example, in Northern Ireland they have been 
conducting at least yearly public surveys on perceptions of the police that we can use to 
track changes in public confidence in the police.  
To get to the outcome of increased community confidence in the police, we must 
also understand how community policing is practiced and what it looks like. In their 
article on the definition of community policing, Joanne Ziembo-Vogl and Devere Woods, 
Jr. provide a thorough history of the different definitions that emerged in academia and in 
practice through this period. They present these ideas as competing definitions; however, 
we can view these differing definitions as emphasizing different aspects of a set of related 
practices to suit the authors’ immediate purposes. In this way, we can see this 
conversation as developing a set of expectations for community policing as opposed to 
definitions in conflict. I draw on all these authors to develop some specific expectations 
about both what community policing looks like in practice, and the outcomes we would 
expect to see if community policing is implemented well.  
The academic definitions of community policing Ziembo-Vogl and Woods 
discuss include those that focus on action – “proactive consultation”80 and 
“cooperation.”81 Other definitions focus on community policing as a philosophy of 
proactive, as opposed to reactive, policing.82 These definitions assert that community 
policing, then, will include institutionalized ways for the community to interact with the 
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police in a forum that is intended to produce conversation and cooperation between the 
police and the community. This might include regular meetings in which the community 
and police identify issues of primary concerns for the community and discuss solutions, 
as happened in Chicago with the Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS) 
program.83 Alternatively, this could look like more official groups where the community 
selects representatives to meet with the police regularly for consultation like the District 
Policing Partnerships (DPPs) in Northern Ireland.  
Some scholars instead identify common themes of community policing such as an 
emphasis on improving and increasing police-community contacts and decentralization of 
the police,84 or simply stating the overarching premise of better connecting with the 
community.85 Working from these definitions, community policing should include some 
institutional reorganization of the police that decentralizes decision making powers, 
allowing officers in the field to have some discretion in how best to implement police 
policy. It should also include specific efforts to build new relationships between officers 
and the community. This might look like a reorganization of the police to focus around 
community policing teams with other forms of policing supporting the community teams, 
as happened in Northern Ireland. Or this might include the physical relocation of police 
officer housing to the neighborhoods where the officers serve so that they are physically a 
part of the community they work in, as was recommended in Kenya.  
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Practitioners, Ziembo-Vogl and Woods note, have had an equally difficult time 
finding consensus on what community policing is exactly.86 These definitions vary from 
a focus on the geographically-based method of policing,87 to a philosophy of community 
input in policing,88 to simply policing in the public eye.89 These definitions argue that 
community policing teams will have specified, geographically bound areas where they 
work to build relationships with the community through input like that described above.  
Ziembo-Vogl and Woods choose to focus on Robert Trojanowicz and the work he 
began before his death in surveying community police officers to define what they 
thought they were doing when implementing community policing.90 With this project in 
mind, they begin from his more encompassing definition of community policing as “…a 
philosophy of full-service, personalized policing where the same office patrols and work 
in the same area on a permanent basis, from a decentralized place, working in a proactive 
partnership with citizens to identify and solve problems.”91  
This conversation about community policing has continued for more than 20 
years following the height of academic interrogation of the subject. Though these and 
many other authors emphasize different features of community policing to some degree, 
they all share a central thought that community policing is collaborative, adaptive, and 
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emphasizes specialized knowledge of the communities the police serve gained through 
experience and cooperation. Together this literature has produced a widely-recognized set 
of interrelated guidelines for how to build effective trust-based policing. One such 
guideline is that policing must be context specific.92 That is, there is an underlying 
assumption that different communities have different needs and expectations of the 
police. To deliver on good community policing, then, the police must not only consult 
with the community, but invest time and resources in developing experiential knowledge 
of how people in different communities receive or interpret police behavior. This requires 
police decentralization, community cooperation, and generally more contact between the 
police and the communities they serve.93  
Some authors, specifically Trojanowicz, have given very specific prescriptions for 
how community policing should best be delivered. He argues that specific officers should 
be stationed permanently in the same positions in the same neighborhoods to develop the 
necessary relationships needed for good community policing.94 While this might produce 
the desired results of officers having deep knowledge of the community, it does not seem 
a realistic recommendation for all police services and may in fact lead to some undesired 
outcomes. For example, what happens if one or a few officers develop poor relationships 
with the community? Keeping them permanently in their positions may work to entrench 
negative perceptions of the police rather than improving community confidence. 
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Similarly, this recommendation also does not account for the natural rotation that will 
exist in the police. By this I mean that police officers, like any other person, will want to 
move up in their jobs, will physically move occasionally, or may seek change in their 
work life for many other reasons. The stipulation that an officer stay permanently in their 
job is an unrealistic expectation to put on officers that is not put on many, if any, other 
professionals. What Trojanowicz is implying, though, is that permanence of officers is 
one way to operationalize police knowing the context of and the people in their 
community.  
Drawing on all these authors, I emphasize an understanding of community 
policing that focuses on community consultation and engagement in every stage of 
policing. Specifically, I agree with Gary Cordner that since “community policing means 
many things to many people,” it is most useful to focus on the elements of community 
policing in “the Philosophical Dimension, the Strategic Dimension, and the 
Programmatic Dimension.”95 In other words, police organizations that engage in 
community policing will include community engagement in the development of their 
overarching policing philosophy, in the development of their policing strategies, in their 
implementation of their policing programs, and in the ongoing evaluation and alteration 
of policing.  
Theoretical Underpinnings 
There are three literatures that can be identified as contributing the theoretical 
underpinnings of community policing: pragmatism, practice theory, and political 
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symbolism. In each of these literatures, one can identify important aspects of community 
policing which help to develop the expectations of how community policing should be 
practiced.  
Pragmatism 
To develop expectations about what kinds of community policing reforms and 
practices are more likely to increase community confidence in the police, I draw insights 
from pragmatist theories of institutional change. In the pragmatist literature, John Dewey 
develops his concept of ‘habit.’ Habit, he argues, is an “acquired predisposition to ways 
or modes of response.”96 Habit, he further explains, is informed by prior experiences and 
activities, but is also dynamic and changing. In other words, while habit is in part a result 
of past experiences, it is also ‘projective’ or anticipatory of future behavior. Put another 
way, habit is lived and changing, not static. He emphasizes that habits are not routine by 
definition, but instead are always slightly different based on the combination of situation, 
skill, and rule.97 That is, routine or the exact response to every similar situation is not 
habit, but the breakdown of habit that has been separated from learning and skill. As 
Charles Sabel put it, “Dewey stressed… the mutual dependence of individuals and 
institutions, and the way the stunting of the one impoverished the other. Institutions and 
individuals thus had to change together or not at all.”98 Gerald Berk and Dennis Galvan 
use Dewey’s ‘habit’ to develop what they call ‘creative syncretism,’ an explanation of 
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institutional change that emphasizes the agency of actors within institutions in forming 
and reforming the rules of said institutions through habit.99  
Dewey’s idea of ‘habit’ can help to understand some of the principles of 
community policing. In community policing, there is an understanding that the institution 
of policing can and should be dynamic and changing in response to the needs of the 
community. As with Dewey’s ‘habit,’ this implies that the development of routine in 
policing without dynamic learning and changing is not a good institutional development, 
but a breakdown in habit. In other words, community policing understood through the 
literature on pragmatism should always be dynamic and responsive while also drawing on 
experience to inform best practice. It should show us learning and continual adjustment 
based on experience and learned will. It should be slightly different in its application in 
every situation and will lead to different practices in different contexts. Deweyian 
pragmatism argues that this is the best possible outcome. Institutions, like the police, will 
function best when designed in such a way to “reduce the chance of organizational habits 
congealing into limited routines” and to “detect and dis-entrench routines that have 
become obstructive.”100 Community policing is built to do just that.  
Practice Theory 
Another literature that provides some theoretical underpinnings for community 
policing, and which is related to but distinct from pragmatism, is practice theory. 
Bourdieu develops his theory of practice using the concept of habitus – the embodied, 
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internalized history – that “is the active presence of the whole past of which it is the 
product. ”101 He argues that  
Practices cannot be deduced either from the present conditions which may seem 
to have provoked them or from the past conditions which have produced the 
habitus, the durable principle of their production. They can therefore only be 
accounted for by relating the social conditions in which the habitus that generated 
them was constituted, to the social conditions in which it is implemented.102 
 
In other words, Bourdieu is arguing that practice is not just the result of social 
conditioning and historical experience, but the combination of that history with the 
context of the specific social conditions in which that practice takes place. The habitus 
both informs and is shaped by practice.  
He says, “Understanding ritual practice is not a question of decoding the internal 
logic of a symbolism but of restoring its practical necessity by relating it to the real 
conditions of its genesis, that is, to the conditions in which it functions.”103 He uses this 
logic to argue that we must look beyond the simple logic of structures, and instead focus 
on the power relations present at the origin of the structure and therefore implicit in their 
design. This is a subtle, though important difference from Dewey’s ‘habit.’ Where habit 
for Dewey is a combination of prior experience and intentional creative action in 
response to context, habitus for Bourdieu is more an explanation of the internalization of 
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adjustments in action in response to context. In other words, habit is intentionally creative 
where habitus is responsive to creative changes.104 
Many other political scientists employ the theory of practice in their work. 
Vincent Pouliot uses Bourdieu’s theory of practice in his discussion of international 
security, arguing that interstate peace becomes possible in and through the practice of 
diplomacy. That is, “the contingent alignment between the practitioners’ dispositions (the 
stock of background knowledge accumulated through experience) and their positions in 
the field of international security (defined by evolving rules of the game and stocks of 
valued resources” is what makes possible the idea of diplomacy as the commonsensical 
practice for international peace.105 James Scott makes an argument for the importance of 
practice in his description of metis or specialized knowledge gained through 
experience.106 He argues that the activities of the state often tend to ignore metis in an 
effort to make generalized rules. While generalized rules have value in a society, they fail 
to recognize the importance of experientially acquired, specialty knowledge. This concept 
of specialized knowledge leading to ideal practice in localized contexts is particularly 
relevant to the argument made in this dissertation. 
Practice theory helps to explain how police gain specialized knowledge through 
community policing. That is, when decision-making is decentralized, officers build 
relationships and communicate regularly with the community, and those communications 
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inform future behavior, community police officers develop the specialized knowledge 
required to perform good community policing. This is particularly important in moments 
of high tension where there may be a tendency among both police and communities to 
revert to ‘muscle memory’ in their handling of situations.107 Practice theory helps us to 
understand how police learn to combat the urge to revert to ‘old’ tactics that were the 
source of some portion of the distrust in the police during conflict through community 
policing.  Instead, the police actively engage with Dewey’s pragmatic notion of ‘habit,’ 
employing new strategies to build confidence in the police.  
Symbolism 
The literature on political symbolism is also useful in understanding community 
policing. According to Mayer Zald, symbols use in politics is usually understood in one 
of two ways: as a part of the history of ideas and “the interaction of social and cultural 
systems,”108 or as a reflection of the social arrangement used to justify and reify that 
arrangement.109 Rozann Rothman makes the argument that humans have a natural desire 
to order the world around them and they do so, in part, through creating symbols and 
imbuing them with meaning. She argues, “symbols function as vehicles of 
communication and the means to strengthen group cohesion.”110 Susanne Langer argues 
that symbols are “vehicles for the conception of objects” and it is the conceptions, not the 
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symbols themselves that evoke meaning.111 Symbols are both flexible and consistent in 
their meaning, possessing the same level of contradiction as the political world in which 
they operate.112 Therefore, symbols can be manipulated and change in their meaning over 
time. One obvious example of such manipulation is the swastika. The swastika was first a 
symbol of peace and harmony in many ancient cultures around the world before it was 
coopted by Adolf Hitler and the Nazi Party.113 Now, for most people in the modern 
world, the swastika is now a symbol of hate, violence, and genocide. The manipulation of 
this symbol is one example of the dual flexibility and consistency of symbols.  
The difficulty in developing an explicit model of symbols and their importance to 
politics is that the meaning of a symbol is implicit in nature. As Dan Sperber argues, 
“symbolic interpretation is not a matter of decoding, but an improvisation that rests on an 
implicit knowledge and obeys unconscious rules.”114 In this way, it is only possible to 
know that a symbol is important to a community, but not necessarily what that specific 
important is, because that symbol is likely to carry multiple, implicit meanings. 
Community policing, which as has been asserted is necessarily context specific and 
reflective of both the Dewey’s habit and Bourdeau’s habitus, is a system in which we 
would expect symbolic change to take into consideration the multiple meanings of 
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symbols and to result in new police symbols that are inclusive of all of society, or at least 
culturally neutral. 
The symbolism surrounding the police after ethnic conflict strongly affects the 
ability for people and communities to change their perceptions of the police in both 
positive and negative ways. The police are associated with a great deal of symbolism 
from their uniforms, badges, and emblems to the equipment they carry to the buildings in 
which they are located. Such symbols help to give the police a sense of belonging and 
purpose, and work to distinguish the police from the rest of the community in which they 
serve when they are on duty. As members of society who straddle the divide between 
civilians and the government,115 the symbolism of the police helps to distinguish the 
special role they play – for them and for the community. When police symbolism 
becomes associated with perceived bias or bigotry, the symbolism of the police becomes 
a barrier to some or all portions of the community. This is not to say that simply changing 
the name, uniform, badge, or other symbols associated with the police will automatically 
create community confidence in the police, but that such symbolic change opens the 
intellectual space to see the police as a new or reformed institution and gives the changes 
in police practice described below a chance to be effective. 
Importantly, any change to police symbols must also be mindful of communities 
who aligned themselves with the police during conflict. In some cases, one or more 
groups within a society see the police as ‘on their side’ or simply as allies. For these 
groups and for many members of the police force itself, changes in the symbolism of the 
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police may be perceived as disrespectful of those who served and sacrificed during 
conflict. Further, making even symbolic changes to the police can be perceived as 
placating or capitulating to the demands of those recently (and often currently) seen as 
enemies. It is necessary to consider the concerns of these groups when making changes to 
police symbols after violent ethnic conflict to prevent unintentional barriers being formed 
between the reformed police and these groups. 
Expectations: What Community Policing Looks Like 
The understanding of community policing presented here, and its theoretical 
underpinnings lead me to two sets of expectations that we should see when community 
policing is applied in post-ethnic conflict societies. First, symbolism will be extremely 
important in opening the possibility for disadvantaged communities to build confidence 
in the police after ethnic conflict. Second, we should see concrete changes in police 
institutions and practice that incorporate community input throughout the process of 
policy development and implementation.  
Symbolism 
My first set of expectations is based on the idea that symbolism is important to the 
success of community policing. More concretely, with respect to symbolic change, 
community policing implies three specific outcomes. First, because of the consultative 
aspect of community policing, we would expect to see evaluation of the symbols of the 
police with community input. Such evaluations will help to identify the extent to which 
certain symbols need to be changed. For example, does the design of the police badge 
contain symbols that are associated with one part of the community and not the other? 
Would the community, in general, prefer a new completely culturally neutral symbol? Or 
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would they prefer a more inclusive design with multiple ethnic groups represented? The 
context specific nature of symbolic importance combined with the ethos of community 
participation in community policing requires that we see some sort of formal community 
input in symbolic evaluation.  
Second, we would expect to see movement toward symbolic representations of 
openness in the police. That is, since community policing requires contact and 
relationship building with the community, we should see some of the physical barriers to 
connection represented in the police to be reduced. For example, during conflict it is 
common for police to militarize in appearance, wearing body armor, driving reinforced 
vehicles, and building high walls or adding barbed wire to police stations. The 
implementation of community policing implies that these physical barriers between the 
police and the community will be reduced as quickly as can be done safely. More 
specifically, we should see patrol officers shifting to less bulky and militarized uniforms, 
see a shift from visually armored cars to less conspicuous vehicles, and see a shift in the 
construction and retrofitting of police buildings to be more integrated in the community 
and less foreboding for those who need to enter them. Importantly, these are all high-cost 
and long-term changes. Therefore, while we likely will not see immediate symbolic 
changes of this kind, we would expect to see an official plan for such changes and 
incremental steps in that direction over time.  
Third, employing community policing in ethnically divided societies also implies 
addressing issues of representation in the police. That is, if one portion of the community 
literally cannot see themselves represented in the police force, it will be difficult to accept 
any other symbolic changes as genuine. Therefore, in addition to the symbolic changes 
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discussed above, community policing in post-ethnic conflict societies will involve a 
scheme for increasing inclusiveness in the make-up of the police. This could be seen in a 
recruitment scheme meant to advantage recruits from underrepresented groups, a quota 
system in new hires, encouraged early retirement of officers, and/or programs for 
additional mentoring for existing minority-representing police officers so they can move 
up in the organizational structure of the police. Some or all of these elements should be 
present to increase the symbolic representation of the police.  
Practice 
 The second set of expectations that community policing presents revolve around 
the changes to the institutions and practices of policing. Community policing posits that 
perceptions of the police will change positively if there is a shift toward a police-
community partnership at all stages of the policy creation and implementation process. 
There are three broad areas of change that we would expect to see when community 
policing is enacted.  
 First, we would expect to see some sort of training or reorientation of the police 
toward this new philosophy of community policing. Simply rearranging the 
organizational structure of the police to reflect community policing ideals will not, in 
itself, change policing behaviors. There needs to be buy-in from the police themselves if 
they are going to properly execute the ideals of community policing. Therefore, we 
would expect to see some sort of training of the police to orient themselves to community 
policing. This could be new training program for all police or an overhaul of the initial 
cadet training programs that includes an emphasis on human rights in policing and 
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building positive relationships with the community. A lack of such training will likely 
result in no or minimal increased community confidence in the police. 
 Second, we would expect to see the involvement of members of the community in 
each stage of the policy making process. This includes the early stages of identifying 
problems, to developing ideas for solutions, to deciding which ideas to try, to the 
implementation of those ideas. Importantly, we would also expect to see continuing 
conversation and consultation as ideas are tried and revised to reflect the needs of the 
community and effective policing. We should expect to see this orientation toward 
partnership in both the institutions of the police and in the day-to-day practices of 
individual police officers on the ground. More concretely, this means that community 
policing requires institutionalized community input and participation in the initial 
evaluation of the police (in Northern Ireland through the Independent Commission on 
Policing or in Kenya through the National Taskforce on Police Reforms). We should also 
see a program or institution set up to facilitate ongoing community input in policing like 
was established in the Chicago CAPS program. Finally, we should be able to identify 
individual officers who have developed good relationships with individuals in the 
community shown through regular contact, whether by phone or email or in person.  
 Third, we would expect to see decentralization of the police, giving community 
officers more autonomy in determining how best to handle policing in their communities. 
More importantly, though, we would see that autonomy lead to changes in police practice 
given the differing needs of different communities. That is, even in a relatively small 
society, different neighborhoods will have different dynamics and needs. We would 
expect to see different communities develop slightly different ways of policing in 
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reaction to the needs of the community. For example, if there is a certain festival or 
holiday that is celebrate each year, the celebrations may be more or less contentious in 
different neighborhoods and the police, in consultation with the community, will develop 
different ways of addressing the issues. An example we will look at more closely in later 
chapters involves the different ways the police in Northern Ireland have developed for 
policing the contentious parades season in different neighborhoods. Community policing 
implies we should find several examples like this where the police have developed 
strategies with the community to reduce tension and crime that is slightly different than 
communities with different needs or concerns.  
Community Policing Theory Simplified 
 All the expectations I have laid out so far address what sorts of changes in 
practice and symbols community policing encourages. However, the primary purpose of 
community policing is that it is intended to create community confidence in the police 
through the changes explained above. Therefore, the most crucial expectation generated 
by the community policing literature is that we should see a positive change in 
community attitudes toward the police as community policing is implemented. Put 
another way, the changes to symbols and police practice laid out above may be 
considered my independent variables and community confidence in the police is my 
dependent variable. I am examining the plausibility of this theory using case comparisons 
to see if implementing community policing correctly actually does increase community 
confidence in the police.  
This requires some minor qualifications, however. Specifically, understanding 
that it takes time for communities to build confidence in the police, especially after 
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violent ethnic conflict, changes in the public’s level of confidence in the police would 
likely be slow, taking several years, and subject to fits and starts in reaction to important 
events in the community. That is, while this study attempts to isolate the important effects 
of community policing in post-ethnic conflict communities, it is important to 
acknowledge that these changes do not happen in isolation and that changes in 
community confidence in the police (my dependent variable) are likely to be affected by 
outside forces, otherwise unaccounted for in the theory of community policing. Such 
forces might include important political events that may, at least temporarily, result in 
large shifts in community confidence in the police. Ultimately, however, if community 
policing theory is correct, then we should see an increase in community confidence in the 
police over time. As already discussed above, I focus on the 10-year period following the 
implementation of community policing in my cases studies.  
Methods 
 To test these expectations, I perform one in-depth case study and one initial 
assessment of a second case, or shadow case. The primary case I focus on is the 
experience of Northern Ireland following the period of prolonged ethnic violence known 
as the ‘Troubles.’ I follow the underlying ethno-cultural tensions that led to the outbreak 
of violence and the extremely painful 30-plus years of fighting of the Troubles. I then 
scrutinize the implementation of the 1998 Belfast/Good Friday peace agreement (the 
Agreement) and show the special role played by the police in rebuilding the Northern 
Irish state over the next thirteen years. I end my initial examination in 2011, the ten-year 
anniversary of the implementation of the re-vamped Police Service of Northern Ireland 
(PSNI). I show how the nearly polar opposite perceptions of the police as protectors in 
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the Protestant/Unionist/Loyalist (PUL) community and aggressors in the 
Catholic/Nationalist/Republican (CNR) community were at the forefront of the initial 
outbreak of violence during the Troubles. These tensions were therefore necessary to 
address in the Agreement and became one of the most important tests for the relative 
success of the Agreement and acceptance of the Northern Irish state after the Troubles, 
especially in the CNR community. In this longitudinal study, I use historical accounts, 
official state data and statistics, survey data, journalistic accounts, and interviews to 
develop the complicated story of the police in Northern Ireland. I highlight survey data 
on community perceptions of the police to track changes in those perceptions from 
various demographic constituencies within Northern Ireland from the last years of the 
Troubles beginning in 1997 through 2011. In addition, I use interviews conducted with 
police officers and civilians in Northern Ireland to supplement these statistics with 
explanations of why these changes have occurred. 
 The second case, or shadow case, is an initial investigation of similar dynamics in 
the very different context of Kenya in the aftermath of the post-2007 election violence. 
Following this election, more than 1,000 people were killed, tens of thousands were 
injured, and hundreds of thousands were displaced.116 In the Kenyan case, the violence 
led to a peace agreement in which a temporary power-sharing government was installed 
until a new constitution could be written. Like Northern Ireland, the Kenyan agreement 
prioritized the reformation of police institutions and led to major changes to the structure 
and functioning of the police under the new 2010 constitution. While further intensive 
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field research is necessary for a full comparative analysis of these cases, the initial 
examination of the Kenyan case presents important and interesting insights that help to 
define the scope conditions of my argument. Specifically, while the process of evaluation 
and implementation of police reform in Kenya looked remarkably like that in Northern 
Ireland on the surface, closer examination shows that Kenya did not implement 
community policing as claimed. A first look at why this happened helps to develop 
additional qualifications that better define where community policing can effectively be 
employed to build community confidence in the police.  
 The remainder of this section identifies and justifies the primary methodological 
tools used in this dissertation. I also justify my case selection of Northern Ireland and 
Kenya.  
Process Tracing 
I am interested in the causal mechanisms at work in developing community 
confidence in the police after violent ethnic conflict. As discussed above, many scholars 
have identified post-conflict security as a necessary element of post-conflict state 
stability, but little has been done to explain the mechanisms through which this is done. I 
utilize process tracing to examine the mechanisms at work in implementing community 
policing in Northern Ireland and Kenya. George and Bennett argue, “Process tracing is an 
indispensable tool for theory testing and theory developments not only because it 
generates numerous observations within a case, but because these observations must be 
linked in particular ways to constitute and explanations of the case.”117 Process tracing is 
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defined as “the analysis of evidence on processes, sequences, and conjunctures of events 
within a case for the purposes of either developing or testing hypotheses about causal 
mechanisms that might causally explain the case.”118 It does this by looking at things 
such as the “…intentions, expectations, information, small-group and bureaucratic 
decision-making dynamics, coalition dynamics, [and] strategic interaction” that make up 
the complex processes that lead to observed outcomes.119 
Case Selection 
 A case is understood in this dissertation in the sense of George and Bennett where 
“a case is an instance of a class of events,”120 as opposed to a “phenomenon for which we 
report and interpret only a single measure on any pertinent variable.”121 For this 
dissertation, a ‘class of events’ can be understood as “a phenomenon of scientific 
interest… that the investigator chooses to study with the aim of developing theory … 
regarding the causes of similarities or differences among” cases.122 In this way, case 
studies may be understood as either a comparison of observations within a single case or 
a comparison across a small number of cases. I therefore term my study of Northern 
Ireland as a single case study containing multiple within-case observations. 
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My primary focus on Northern Ireland has several justifications. First, Northern 
Ireland is both academically123 and practically124 held up as an exemplar case in the study 
of post-ethnic conflict rebuilding. This type of justification may be termed 
‘idiographic.’125 This is to say that some cases are intrinsically important for their 
historical significance or their personal importance for the group or actors involved. 
Though these types of cases are not often chosen for the purpose of creating generalizable 
conclusions, they can provide insights of broader significance.126 Northern Ireland has 
been held up as an important case for several reasons. As a part of the Agreement that 
officially ended the Troubles of Northern Ireland, the parties agreed that issues of 
policing reform needed to be addressed, though the specifics of those reforms were left 
up to future discussion. It was recommended that a working group should be formed to 
examine the police and make recommendations for future reform.127 This group, called 
the Independent Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland and composed of experts 
from all over the world including at least two notable experts in community policing, 
produced a report which included many observations of the position and perception of the 
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police in Northern Ireland and made 175 recommendations for reform, almost all of 
which were implemented in whole or in part.128 This model for assessing the police in the 
aftermath of ethnic violence has been implemented by many other countries following 
their own experiences with ethnic conflict.129 Additionally, individuals involved in the 
Northern Ireland transition have been invited to share their experiences and advice in 
many parts of the world including Chicago, Illinois, USA,130 Israel,131 and Kenya132 
among many others. That Northern Ireland has been held up as an example of how to 
successfully reform the police in ethnically divided societies makes the examination and 
deeper understanding of the mechanisms at work there valuable in its own right. It is also 
important to ensure that when actors from Northern Ireland pass on their own 
experiences, there is an understanding of how the specific successes of Northern Ireland 
can translate into general advice for other societies.  
 Second, Northern Ireland is a state that has experienced ample external pressure 
and assistance to succeed in their transition from violence. Understanding how and where 
they struggled and succeeded in their police reforms under a ‘best case’ scenario of 
economic prosperity and considerable investment from the United Kingdom, the United 
States, and the European Union is useful in highlighting the most important and most 
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difficult aspects of reform. Other states that experience far less or no international support 
and pressure to succeed will have all the more trouble successfully creating post-conflict 
stability. In these states, it will be all the more necessary to reform the police and to 
concentrate on those areas of policing that are most helpful in building community 
confidence in the police if they are to have any chance of success. That is, if Northern 
Ireland struggled to develop community confidence in the police even in a situation 
where they had external support and external pressure to succeed, then we are likely to 
identify areas of reform that will be universally (or nearly so) difficult. 
 Third, Northern Ireland has the ability to provide ample new evidence that is not 
readily available elsewhere. Northern Ireland had more than ten years of experience 
under the reformed police force when I began this project. This longevity provided a 
sufficient amount of data to make some reasonable conclusions in the development of the 
arguments forwarded in this project. Other states that have had similar lengths of time to 
implement police reform are slightly more difficult to obtain information on. For 
example, in South Africa, the reforms to the police after the end of Apartheid have been 
monitored, but as of 2014, they had yet to implement a measurement for ‘customer 
satisfaction.’133 So while there is some data available on efficiency measures within the 
police, they do not have ample historical data on community perceptions of the police. 
Also, because Northern Ireland has been held up as an example for many years, the 
police service is open to and comfortable with outside scholars’ inquiries and was 
therefore more than willing to cooperate in my research. I was able to get access to 
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interview police officers at varying levels of power in two different cities and multiple 
different station locations. I was also able to speak with community members with 
varying levels of involvement with the police over the years. This access is much more 
difficult to get in other countries where they are still struggling to reform the police after 
conflict or live in fear that reforms already enacted will be endangered if researchers 
probe them too soon. This was certainly the case in Kenya when I attempted to arrange 
approved research of the police and the reforms enacted since the end of the 2007 
election violence in late 2016 and early 2017. The attitude among those I was able to 
speak with was that the government was likely to be reticent to grant approval for my 
research in fear that the reforms would not hold through the (then) upcoming election. As 
John Gerring points out, within-case evidence is important not just for its abundance, but 
for its usefulness for the project.134 While I might be able to obtain some interviews in 
other similar cases, I have reason to believe the quality of the evidence that I was able to 
obtain in Northern Ireland is high.   
Shadow Case Selection 
In addition to the in-depth examination of Northern Ireland, I employ Kenya as a 
shadow case. It is difficult to find a definition of ‘shadow cases’ in the political science 
literature but is generally seen as a case that is used in a more informal fashion to 
compare to the primary cases.135 Many scholars use shadow cases throughout their case 
studies to provide brief evidence of similar or opposing dynamics to the case under 
examination. For example, in Theda Skocpol’s seminal work on social revolutions, she 
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uses shadow cases to highlight the special case of successful social revolutions and how 
they differ from other similar cases of failed social revolutions. Specifically, she 
discusses how Prussia faced a societal political conflict, but adapted to the pressures 
rather than revolting against them.136 She uses this shadow case to identify and separate 
the specific features of the set of cases her theory applies to and where it might fail in its 
explanatory power. She also argues her theory applies to states that are (and have always 
been) independent of colonial rule and so do not apply in other cases of revolution such 
as Mexico, Bolivia, and Cuba.137 The use of shadow cases provides important insights in 
many cases studies, even though they are rarely specifically acknowledged for their 
importance.138  
Like other scholars, I make reference to several ‘shadow cases’ throughout this 
project. However, I also deliberately explore one such shadow case in more detail – 
Kenya. If, as Gerring and Lee Cojocaru (2016) suggest, shadow cases are only useful to 
“provide brief points of comparison for the case(s) of primary interest,”139 then Kenya 
falls somewhere between a ‘shadow case’ and a direct comparison. However, for the 
purposes of this paper, I call Kenya a shadow case to clarify that I do not intend to 
present it as a direct comparison but want to highlight for the reader the importance of a 
future in-depth comparison with such an unlikely candidate.  
                                                 
136 Skocpol. Theda, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, & China 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press 1979), 110. 
137 George and Bennett, 120; David Collier and James Mahoney, "Research Note - Insights and Pitfalls: 
Selection Bias in Qualitative Research," World Politics 49, no. 1 (1996): 81. 
138 Hillel Soifer, "Shadow Cases in Comparative Politics," (Temple University, 2017). 
139 John Gerring and Lee Cojocaru, "Selecting Cases for Intensive Analysis: A Diversity of Goals and 
Methods," Sociological Methods & Research 45, no. 3 (2016): 407. 
53 
 
I chose Kenya to fill this role for several reasons. At first glance, Kenya makes a 
good candidate for a ‘most different systems’ design, also referred to as Mill’s ‘method 
of agreement.’140 Northern Ireland and Kenya are two very different states that have 
suffered violent ethnic civil conflict. Northern Ireland is economically advanced with 
high levels of foreign investment, while Kenya is working to develop its economy. They 
have very different political, geographic, historical, and demographic conditions. 
Northern Ireland is a part of the United Kingdom, while Kenya is an independent former 
colony of Great Britain. Northern Ireland is located in the geographical north and is a part 
of Europe, while Kenya is located south of the equator in continental Africa. While both 
countries have diverse populations, Northern Ireland has two primary ethnic affiliations 
and Kenya has 23 officially recognized tribes with as many as 70 separately identifiable 
groups. The duration of conflict was also different, with Northern Ireland’s Troubles 
lasting approximately thirty years and Kenya’s 2008 election violence only several 
months. Additionally, these periods of violence ended more than ten years apart. 
Northern Ireland’s Belfast/Good Friday Agreement was signed in 1998 and Kenya’s 
violence ended in early 2009.   
Despite these differences, Northern Ireland and Kenya share two important 
similarities that make their comparison informative. First, both chose to implement 
democratically based power-sharing governments following their respective periods of 
violence. Second, both Northern Ireland and Kenya implemented policing reforms which 
were promotes as forms of community policing. These similar outcomes under the 
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seemingly completely different conditions of Northern Ireland and Kenya made Kenya a 
great candidate for initial comparison.  
In addition to presenting as a good ‘most different systems’ case, Kenya provides 
an interesting comparison because Kenyans explicitly looked to Northern Ireland with 
respect to police reform to inform their own transition. Both states specifically called on 
experts in community policing to help with the evaluation of the police, and the many 
recommendations for change look remarkably similar in both cases. This not only 
highlights the importance of Northern Ireland and an exemplar case, but also allows for 
an examination of how the lessons of Northern Ireland have been translated to other 
societies in similar periods of transition. By examining how Kenya followed and/or 
veered away from the Northern Ireland example, we get a first look at the policy 
implications of the Northern Ireland experience for other post-ethnic conflict states.  
It is important to highlight, however, the infeasibility of a true comparative 
analysis at this time. The intensive fieldwork required to do a direct comparison with 
Northern Ireland was not possible for me in the timeframe of my dissertation project. 
However, a solid understanding of a second case helps to highlight where the specificity 
and generalizability of the Northern Ireland case separate. In other words, examining the 
Kenya case may also help to define the scope conditions of my argument. If Kenya was 
unsuccessful in implementing community policing given the explicit reference to 
Northern Ireland’s process in their own reforms, what conditions in Kenya may have 
made it more difficult for community policing to be implemented? A first look at the 
Kenyan case may help to identify these conditions, and therefore clarify the applicability 
of my argument. 
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Data 
 Gerring argues, “if a case is to add to our knowledge of a subject it must provide 
new evidence – evidence that is presumably not available – or not easily available.”141 It 
is important, therefore, to discuss the nature of the new evidence provided in this study. 
Much of the evidence I provide in the later chapters of this project comes from historical 
texts, journalistic accounts, and publicly available survey data. However, I provide new 
and important pieces of evidence from original interviews conducted over the course of 
three years and three different trips to Northern Ireland.  
Interviews 
 Interviews allow scholars an unequaled ability to “achieve a level of dynamism or 
fluidity of interaction with those whose behavior they hope to understand.”142 Interviews 
allow us to develop a deeper understanding of process, context, competing interpretations 
of events, and produce more complete accounts to explain and understand events.143 
Interviews can be structured in many different ways, but there are two prevailing 
approaches that political scientists seem to take. More positivist scholars attempt to ask 
impartial questions looking for unbiased data that can use as evidence in an analysis. 
Interpretivist scholars, on the other hand, tend to emphasize the subjective nature of an 
interview and use the technique to identify possibly competing formulations of the 
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‘truth.’144 Like many other scholars, my interviews fall somewhere between these two 
extremes. I conducted semi-structured interviews of police officers and civilians, asking a 
general set of questions aimed at understanding how attitudes toward the PSNI changed 
over the first ten years of its existence. In this way, while the guiding questions were 
always the same, I allowed the interviewees to guide me to what they felt was the most 
important information. Ontologically, I argue this is the best way to obtain the 
information I am seeking because I cannot assume that I will know a priori what the 
important data will be, but I can guide the conversation toward the topics I am most 
interested in unpacking.  
My sampling strategy was guided in part by the policies and procedures of 
conducting research with the PSNI. Namely, I was required to obtain permission from the 
Evidence Based Policing Group panel of the PSNI to conduct my interviews with 
officers. From there, the PSNI contacted several officers in charge of neighborhood 
policing districts throughout the two main cities in which I performed my research – 
Derry and Belfast. These officers were mostly very generous with their time and with 
assisting to set up additional interviews with officers under their command. This process 
could easily have lent itself to bias on behalf of the officers interviewed. Naturally, the 
PSNI would want to send me to interview the ‘best’ officers who are least likely to have 
negative views of their work or the PSNI in general. However, I found that I still 
managed to get a representative sample of officers by conducting the additional 
interviews with the officers under the command of those to whom I was originally sent. 
                                                 
144 Kapiszewski, MacLean, and Read, 191. 
57 
 
Of the 20 interviews I was able to conduct with the police, 9 were from Derry and 11 
from Belfast, 14 were men and 6 women, 10 identified as PUL and 7 as CNR while 3 
chose not to identify, and years of service in the police varied with 2 officers under 10 
years of service, 9 between 10 and 19 years, and 9 with more than 20 years with the 
police in Northern Ireland. The police were asked a set of specific questions about if, 
how, and when they experienced changes in attitude from the public and what effect, if 
any, did specific events such as changes in police policy and important political moments 
had on their relationships with the community.  
In conducting interviews with community members, I was also constrained in my 
ability to use random sampling techniques for two reasons. First, Northern Ireland is a 
culture in which news largely travels through social interaction. Therefore, a fair number 
of the community interviews I was able to conduct were with people who had heard 
about the work I was doing from friends or connections in the community. The nature of 
this kind of communication often meant that I was asked to interview specific people 
rather than my asking them. Second, the sensitive nature of discussing the police and 
police reform also put subjects in danger of revealing information that could be 
considered criminal. Because of this I was careful to not specifically seek out individuals 
known or suspected to be criminals for fear their discussions with me could put them in 
legal or physical jeopardy. That said, I was able to conduct a small number of interviews 
with community members who were happy to share their thoughts with me. My questions 
for this group focused on the experiences of these individuals and their understanding of 
their communities’ attitudes toward the police over time. Again, I specifically asked 
questions about if, how, and when their attitudes toward the police changed over time. In 
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most cases, my questions led the interviewees to take the conversation in their own 
direction. In every case, I made sure all my base questions were answered, but allowed 
the interviewee to guide the conversation where they felt appropriate in each case.  
This semi-structured form of interviewing provided a lot of information that was 
comparable across interviewees, but also allowed for natural variation in experience and 
interpretation of events. This process provided the bulk of my new evidence. They also 
were the primary information source for the development of my arguments.  
Conclusion 
 In this chapter I justified my focus on community policing in post ethnic conflict 
societies by identifying what I see as a hole in the literature on post-ethnic conflict 
governance. The current literature tends to focus on larger questions of providing security 
and whether that security should be provided by military forces or civilian police. Even 
those who have looked specifically at policing have primarily concentrated on what 
international organizations and donor countries can or should so to assist in building 
police forces. There is little in this literature that explores the difficult questions of how 
civilian police forces gain the confidence of the communities they serve after violent 
ethnic conflict. The literature on community policing, however, does address the difficult 
question on how to provide policing in ethnically divided societies. This dissertation 
attempts to bring these two literatures together to explore the how community policing 
might work to engender community confidence in the police in post-violent ethnic 
conflict societies. I will do this through an in-depth case study of community policing in 
Northern Ireland following the ‘Troubles’ and a second, brief case study of community 
policing in Kenya after their 2007 election violence. 
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 The remainder of my dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter II, I provide 
the reader with the minimal historical background necessary to understanding the conflict 
in Northern Ireland and the deep ethnic entrenchment associated with the organizing 
structures of society, and especially the police, in the years leading up to and including 
the Troubles. In this chapter, I also describe the level and prevalence of the violence 
experienced during the Troubles and where things stood in 2011 to provide a base 
understanding for how significantly things have changed since the end of the Troubles. In 
Chapter III, I introduce the Independent Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland 
and their report, which included 175 recommendations for reforming the police. In this 
chapter, I focus on how community policing was implemented in Northern Ireland 
through symbolic reform. This chapter highlights that community policing in post-ethnic 
conflict societies requires thinking broadly about the police and the many ways in which 
the police are presented in society. While reforming practice is vital, symbolism carries a 
lot of weight and requires attention to ensure people will give practical reforms a chance. 
In Chapter IV, I focus on how community policing was implemented in Northern Ireland 
through police practice. Specifically, I identify how the PSNI embraced the consultative 
aspect of community policing by continuously engaging the community in forming police 
policy and its implementation. I also identify how the changes in practice that resulted 
from this process helped to build community confidence in the police. Having thoroughly 
explored these insights in Chapters III and IV, Chapter V is where I perform an initial 
exploration of the case of Kenya and develop the additional criteria for the usefulness of 
the insights gleaned from the Northern Ireland case. Finally, in Chapter VI, I explore the 
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strengths and weaknesses of these insights and discuss other cases where they may be 
applied and refined in future research.  
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CHAPTER II 
ETHNICITY AND POLICING IN NORTHERN IRELAND 
Introduction 
 Northern Ireland, like many other deeply divided societies, has a long history of 
ethnic entrenchment and accusations of biased policing. The historical make-up and 
association of the police with the state created specific issues that made reform of the 
police particularly important in the process of recovery from violent ethnic conflict. In 
this chapter I give a brief overview of the history of ethnic division in Northern Irish 
society and the police to provide the reader with a contextual understanding of where the 
police stood in regard to the community up to, during, and just after the Troubles. I give 
special attention to the level of violence during the Troubles, the role of the police during 
that time, and the state of community confidence in the police at the end of the Troubles. 
It is important to note that I do not intend, nor could I reasonably fit in this dissertation a 
complete history of Northern Ireland. Instead, my intention is to provide the reader with 
the minimal knowledge necessary to understanding the special role that the police play in 
Northern Ireland and the difficult task that was building community confidence in the 
police after the Troubles.  
Historical setting  
The development of sectarian tensions in Ireland can be traced back to the 12th 
century Norman invasion of the island that led to more than 800 years of English rule. 
Throughout this period, there was ever-present tension between the majority ethnically 
Irish population and the minority ethnically British settlers who had displaced the native 
Irish that manifest in numerous rebellions. Ireland has demonstrated a deeply entrenched 
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reluctance to accept the authority of the British state and a greater willingness historically 
to challenge that authority with force when necessary.  
 Possibly due in part to this continuous state of violent rebellion, several attempts 
were made to enact Home Rule in Ireland in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Home 
Rule in Ireland was intended to allow for the local Irish gentry (at that time primarily the 
descendants of Protestant, British transplants to the island) to form an independent Irish 
Parliament within the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. While many thought 
this a sufficient solution to the problem of English interference in Ireland’s affairs, many 
others insisted on total independence from Great Britain. In 1914, the UK Parliament 
passed the Third Home Rule Act, but suspended its implementation due to the onset of 
the First World War. This was a time of great political turmoil in Ireland with political 
alliances fracturing over the role of the Irish in the war effort and the morality of 
continuing to fight for independence from Britain during the war. During this time, a 
small group of rebels led the famous 1916 Easter Rising in Dublin. The rebels were 
soundly defeated by the British army and were later tried and executed for treason. 
However, the force and brutality used by the British forces to suppress the rebellion, as 
well as the executions backfired and led to an increased support for the rebels and their 
political agenda. In the general elections of December 1918, Sinn Féin, the political party 
associated with the rebels, won three-quarters of all parliamentary seats in Ireland and in 
January of 1919 declared Ireland’s independence from Great Britain. However, while 
Sinn Féin won the majority of seats, the Unionists had won a majority of seats in four of 
the nine northern counties of Ulster. When Sinn Féin declared an all independent Ireland, 
the Unionists in Ulster declared their continued allegiance to Britain. This led to the 
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outbreak of the Irish War of Independence that ended with the Anglo-Irish Treaty in 
December 1921. The Treaty codified the partitioning of Ireland with six of the counties 
of Ulster in the north becoming Northern Ireland and remaining a part of the United 
Kingdom and the 26 remaining counties becoming the Irish Free State, eventually the 
Republic of Ireland.  
 The Anglo-Irish Treaty had several contentious points that caused a rift in the 
fighting force of the Irish Free State, the Irish Republican Army (IRA). First, the 
codification of the six northern counties as a separate entity from the rest of Ireland with 
the ability to opt-in to remain in the United Kingdom (which it did immediately) was an 
unacceptable compromise to many who insisted on a whole free Ireland. Secondly, the 
Treaty did not grant true and full independence in Ireland, but rather set up the Irish Free 
State as an autonomous dominion of the British Empire with the monarch as the official 
head of state, in the same vein as modern-day Canada and Australia. This arrangement 
would require members of the new Irish parliament to take a loyalty oath to the British 
Empire and would allow the British to maintain certain strategic ports in Ireland with the 
Royal Navy. These and other issues led to a split in the IRA, with the ‘republicans’ under 
the leadership of Michael Collins arguing that this was the best deal that the Irish could 
hope for and, while imperfect, would allow for the possibility of true independence in 
time. The ‘nationalists’ led by Éamon de Valera found these compromises unacceptable 
and wanted to continuing fighting until there was true independence and freedom for the 
whole island of Ireland as one nation. These disagreements led to the outbreak of the Irish 
Civil War in June 1922.  
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 In addition to, and separate from, the Civil War, there was intercommunal 
violence and fighting in Northern Ireland and significant violence against the police in 
Belfast. The partition of the island was completed with the delineation of the border by a 
border commission and an amendment to the Anglo-Irish Treaty in 1925. The partition 
left a majority Unionist community, mostly Protestant and of British descent, who 
strongly preferred to remain a part of the United Kingdom with a significant Nationalist 
minority, mostly Catholic of Irish descent, (approximately 33.5%)145 who strongly 
desired a united Ireland inclusive of the six counties in Northern Ireland. While the legal 
status of Northern Ireland remains as a part of the United Kingdom, the Irish Constitution 
states that “the national territory consists of the whole island of Ireland”146 and 
reunification has remained a stated goal of the Republic of Ireland.  
 The politics of 1925 through to the start of the Troubles in the 1960s were 
relatively stable, if deeply discriminatory. It is widely accepted, with a few notable 
objections, that the Unionist/Protestant majority systematically discriminated against 
Nationalists/Catholics.147 This discrimination came in the form of employment practices, 
political disenfranchisement, and gerrymandering. The Protestant majority controlled 
several of the most profitable industries in Northern Ireland and practiced employment 
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discrimination, keeping Catholics (even Unionist or non-politically affiliated Catholics) 
out of certain industries and/or unable to advance within those industries. Additionally, 
housing laws kept Catholics out of certain neighborhoods and unable to purchase their 
own property. Further, enfranchisement was limited to those who were property owners 
or primary tenants, a practice abolished in England in the 1940s, but which continued in 
Northern Ireland until 1969. Finally, for those few Catholics who were able to get around 
these major roadblocks, gerrymandering and the suspension of proportional 
representation in 1929 meant that Unionists were overrepresented in political office and 
Nationalists/Catholics were unable to use the political system to address any of the real or 
perceived prejudices they suffered. While these tensions were never far from the surface, 
Northern Ireland remained relatively peaceful in the interim between 1925 and the 1960s 
with a few bursts of relatively contained and short-lived violence.  
The Troubles  
A combination of the above-mentioned discrimination with the economic decline 
of the 1950s and 1960s and the influence of other civil rights movements around the 
world led to organized resistance by many Catholics in Northern Ireland in which they 
sought “more equitable access to political power, social provision and cultural 
recognition.”148 The civil rights movement in Northern Ireland was modeled on the 
nonviolent tactics used by the African American civil rights movement in the United 
States and the black rights movement in South Africa. In the early years of the 
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movement, leaders focused on non-violent resistance mostly in the form of letter writing 
and lobbying, followed later by parades and marches. 
Many assign the official start of the Troubles to the deployment of British soldiers 
to Northern Ireland to help restore order in Derry/Londonderry in August 1969 during the 
‘Battle of the Bogside,’149 though this start date is disputed. While originally seen by 
many Catholics as an acknowledgement of the inadequate policing providing by the 
Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), the use of British soldiers to control the Catholic 
community came to be seen as a continuation of centuries of Irish oppression at the hands 
of the British. The leaders of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) capitalized 
on this shift in public perceptions, co-opting the non-violent civil rights movement and 
capitalizing on its well-organized structure to turn the attention toward the violent 
struggle for reunification of Northern Ireland with the Republic as the only solution to the 
problems of Catholics in the north.  
Over the nearly thirty years of the Troubles, there were many notable incidents in 
which large numbers of individuals were killed or injured, or in which prominent figures 
were hurt or killed. The above-mentioned ‘Battle of the Bogside’ resulted in at least eight 
deaths and many hundreds of injuries.150 The violent events of ‘Bloody Sunday’ in 
January 1972, where the British Army opened fire on unarmed civilians protesting 
internment and led to the deaths of 14 and many more injuries, have been well-
documented in history and remain a difficult subject in Northern Ireland nearly fifty years 
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later. In July of that same year, the PIRA escalated their ongoing bombing campaign, 
setting off 22 bombs outside shops in the center of Belfast, killing nine and injuring more 
than 100 on what has come to be known as ‘Bloody Friday.’151 While there are many 
more well publicized individual incidents of violence and clashes between the 
Catholic/Nationalist/Republican (CNR) community and the Protestant/Unionist/Loyalist 
(PUL) community and/or the police, it is more important for the purposes of this project 
to understand the day-to-day experiences of those living in Northern Ireland during the 
Troubles. In the remainder of this section, I will give a general overview of the state of 
the violence. In the next section, I will specifically look at the role of the police both in 
who they targeted with violence and who targeted them.  
 From 1969 through to the signing of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement (‘the 
Agreement’) in 1998, more than 3,400 people were killed specifically as a result of the 
conflict while many thousands more were injured. Some violence continued after the 
signing of the Agreement, however. Therefore, I include in my assessment of the 
violence the 3,623 deaths from 2771 individual incidents of violence from 1969 through 
2001.152 For the number and type of incidents, as well as the number of injuries that did 
not result in death, I am relying on data provided by the Police Service of Northern 
Ireland (PSNI), and some data found on the Conflict Archive on the Internet (CAIN), a 
comprehensive collection of data and writings about the conflict in Northern Ireland.  
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The levels of violence varied through the Troubles with the fewest deaths 
occurring in 1995 (nine deaths) and the most in 1972 (480 deaths).153 The number of 
deaths is itself horrific, but it is also important to understand the dynamics of who was 
killed and who was doing the killing. Over the course of this period, 1586 Catholics and 
1299 Protestants who lived in Northern Ireland154 were killed.155 While the largest 
majority of fatalities were classified as ‘other non-combatants’ or people who did not fit 
into the many specific categories of non-combatants specified in the database (more than 
1720), servicemen in the British Army and RUC had a significant amount of deaths 
(817), as did individuals affiliated with paramilitary groups both Republican and Loyalist 
(670).156 On the other hand, it was primarily the paramilitary groups responsible for those 
deaths with 2013 deaths attributed to Republican paramilitary groups and 1018 deaths 
attributed to Loyalist paramilitary groups. The security services, however, were also 
responsible for a significant number of deaths at 378.157 
 In addition to the many deaths reported, many thousands of people were injured in 
the many incidents of violence during the Troubles. While some data is missing from the 
early years of the conflict, particularly on civilian injuries, more than 46,000 people are 
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known to have been injured as a result of the conflict.158 Considering the number of well-
known violent clashes that occurred in the first few years of the conflict where civilian 
injury data is missing, we can comfortably assume that this number underestimates the 
total of injuries by at least several hundred. These deaths and injuries were the result of 
more than 36,000 shootings, 15,925 bombs, and 2,200 incendiary devices between 1969 
and 2001.159  
 It is also important to note that the daily experiences of violence in Northern 
Ireland varied largely based on the socio-economic status of individuals. While anyone 
could be affected by a random bomb placed in or near a shop in a city center, the 
experiences of those who were wealthier and lived in nicer neighborhoods tended to be 
very separate and far less violent than those who were working class and lived in working 
class neighborhoods.160 For example, one civilian I interviewed who was born in the late 
1970s and therefore was raised entirely during the Troubles explained that, as his family 
was relatively wealthy and lived in an upper-class Protestant neighborhood, he had very 
little memory of being affected by the Troubles or the resulting violence.161 Conversely, 
another citizen of about the same age stated that his childhood had been entirely shaped 
by the violence of the Troubles because he had grown up in a working-class Catholic 
neighborhood in the town of Portadown, where sectarian violence was an everyday 
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occurrence.162 These varied experiences were echoed in many of the interviews I 
conducted. Those who were relatively well off, were less affected by the Troubles and 
tend to have fewer specific memories of violence or interactions with the police during 
the Troubles while those who were poorer or working-class had many and visceral 
memories of their experiences. The number of deaths attributed to the Troubles also 
clearly demonstrate this extreme difference in experience based on physical location. 
Belfast, where the significant majority of deaths in Northern Ireland occurred, can be 
broadly divided into four areas. In North and West Belfast there were a combined 1282 
deaths between 1969 and 2001, where the more affluent neighborhood of South Belfast 
only had 189 total deaths and East Belfast counted only 139 deaths. Importantly, what 
these disparities tell us is that different neighborhoods have different experiences with 
and needs from the police, even in a geographically small country like Northern Ireland.  
Policing in Northern Ireland before and during the Troubles 
 It is important to understand the history of the relationship between the police and 
the community they serve in Northern Ireland to fully understand why any changes in 
that relationship would have a profound effect on the success or failure of post-conflict 
rebuilding.  
The legal partitioning of the island effectively disbanded the previous police force 
in Ireland and created two separate forces, the Garda Síochána in the south and the RUC 
in the north. The initial force of the RUC, which formally came into being in June of 
1922, was significantly different from the other police forces in the United Kingdom. The 
RUC was “insulated from British traditions of minimum fore, ‘policing by consent’ of the 
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public, and political independence.”163 The new forced was armed, large (having far more 
police per capita than any other part of the United Kingdom), and notoriously biased 
against the Catholic community. While Catholic/Nationalist opinions of the police varied 
over time from supportive, to full on contempt, extreme Republicans always refused to 
accept the RUC as legitimate.164 
One of the many complaints the CNR community had about the RUC was the 
drastic underrepresentation of Catholics on the force. In 1922, the force consisted of 
approximately 2,000 men, of which over 500 were Roman Catholic by 1925. While this 
is a significant portion, it was still less than the proportion of Roman Catholics living in 
Northern Ireland at the time and was a forbearer of the continued problems the RUC 
would have with recruiting from that community.165 This problem was exacerbated by 
the fact that Republican leaders discouraged young Catholic men from entering the force 
and the IRA targeted those who disregarded these urgings.166 This disparity in 
representation within the police remained an issue throughout the history of the RUC 
despite numerous reports throughout the years that indicated that the RUC needed more 
officers that were Catholic. Many of these reports implied, or in some cases outright 
stated, that the Catholic community itself was to blame for this lack of representation due 
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to the extreme social pressure within that community to stay away from the policing 
profession.167  
Undoubtedly, this was a significant deterrent to young Catholic officers joining 
the force, but it should also be noted that the culture and make-up of the force was 
unwelcoming to the minority Catholic community. For example, in 1923, a special 
Orange Lodge (a branch of the Masonic-style brotherhood committed to promoting 
Protestant dominance in all areas) was formed for constables in the RUC and the Home 
Affairs minister attended the first meeting.168 This was a significant break in tradition 
from the police in Ireland in the 19th Century, which had prohibited police membership in 
the Orange Order or the Catholic Association.169 The RUC was also supported by the 
Ulster Special Constabulary (also referred to as the “B-Specials), a part-time armed corps 
comprised almost exclusively of Ulster Protestants. This open embracement of the 
concept of Protestant supremacism served as evidence for the CNR community that the 
RUC did not intend to serve them and was also a deterrent to joining the force.  
The events of the Troubles created even more animosity between the CNR 
community and the RUC. Within a few months after the ‘Battle of the Bogside’ and the 
introduction of the British Army on the streets of Northern Ireland to assist the police, the 
then head of the RUC resigned and was replaced by the former Commissioner of the City 
of London Police, Sir Arthur Young. Within a year of this change, the size of the RUC 
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had also changed drastically, increasing to a force of 4,000 regular officers and a new 
reserve of 1,500.170 In 1976, the RUC re-established the policy of police as primary 
enforcers of the law with the British Army only present for additional support and back 
up. In practice this meant the police took the lead role in all patrols with army personnel 
coming in behind, rather than taking the lead, for example. This also meant, however, 
that the RUC were regularly outfitted with weapons and re-enforced vehicles that 
appeared very militaristic.171 So while the goal may have been to reduce the need for 
military assistance in policing, the result was that the RUC themselves became more 
militarized and arguably drove a bigger wedge between the police and the CNR 
community.  
The Battle of the Bogside and many of the other famous incidents of violence 
between Catholic and Protestant communities also demonstrate what the CNR 
community saw as unfair and biased policing practices. During the early civil rights 
marches of the late 1960s, the RUC was often unresponsive to requests from the 
marchers for police protection. The RUC also often refused to interfere when Loyalist 
counter-demonstrators became violent toward the protestors, and were even accused of 
inciting violence against demonstrators themselves.172 The many incidents of clashes 
between Republican and Loyalist demonstrators in the late 1960s along with the 
perceived bias of the police, which varied from indifference to accusations of collusion 
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with Loyalists, led to a deep deterioration in the relationship between the RUC and the 
CNR community.173 
The wedge between the RUC and the CNR community was mirrored by the sense 
of pride and ownership in the RUC felt by the PUL community. Many in this community 
saw the RUC as ‘our police,’ and many working-class Protestants saw a career in the 
RUC as both honorable and a rite of passage for young Protestant men. Many in the PUL 
community praised the RUC and blamed the need to resort to violence to control riots on 
a lack of officers, as opposed to any bias in the police.174 The direct contrast in how the 
two communities felt about the police made it extremely difficult to even discuss the 
reforms that some Nationalists insisted were necessary for the RUC to build a better 
relationship with the CNR community. An investigation in 1969 led to the production of 
a document deeply critical of the RUC and its structure claiming that “any police force, 
military in appearance and equipment, is less acceptable to minority and moderate 
opinion than if it is clearly civilian in character.”175 The report, known as the Hunt 
Report, made a series of recommendations for reforming the RUC including 
demilitarizing the police and working to improve community relations. While some of 
these recommendations were adopted in theory, little changed in the execution of 
policing in practice except that the force doubled in size thanks to the creation of a new 
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reserve force.176 Importantly, much of the PUL community saw any changes to the RUC 
as a rebuke of the police, decreasing the morale of officers and jeopardizing the security 
of the PUL community simply to appease the CNR community.177 The reaction to these 
suggested changes toward the beginning of the Troubles would be the precursor of 
reactions to come in the reform of the RUC after the Troubles.  
 Despite the differing opinions between the PUL and CNR communities about 
why it was so, there was a clear pattern, especially at the beginning of the Troubles, of 
police and security forces using more deadly force against Catholics. In the first 
documented year of the conflict, 1969, of the 10 Catholics killed, seven of them were 
killed by the RUC whereas of the seven Protestants killed, only two were killed by the 
British Army and none by the RUC.178 This trend continued into the early 1970s where 
substantially more Catholics were killed than Protestants, and the majority of Catholics 
killed were victims of government security forces (usually the British Army or the RUC). 
By 2001, the security forces had together killed 317 Catholics compared to 45 
Protestants.179 Not surprisingly, then, in 1970 Republican paramilitary groups (primarily 
consisting of the PIRA, but others as well), developed a strategy for targeted violence. 
They chose to specifically target violence against members of the security forces and 
economic centers seen to support the oppressive policies of the state.180  
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Peace Agreement 
The official end date of the Troubles is disputed, but for the most part it is agreed 
that the signing of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement (‘Agreement’)181 in 1998 
constitutes the official end despite periodic acts of violence that have continued ever 
since.182 The Agreement was divided into three ‘strands’ dealing with different aspects of 
the conflict. Strand One addressed the democratic institutions of Northern Ireland. Within 
this Strand some of the subsections addressed the issues of rights safeguards, equality of 
opportunity, decommissioning, security, policing and justice, and prisoners in addition to 
specifically addressing issues with the assembly and political representation. Strand Two 
discussed the North/South Ministerial Council and addressed the issues of necessary 
cooperation between the institutions of Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. 
Finally, Strand Three addressed the British-Irish Council and the British-Irish 
Intergovernmental Conference to institutionalize continued conversation and cooperation 
between the British and Irish governments over the future of Northern Ireland.  
In accordance with the provisions in Strand One, the Independent Commission on 
Policing for Northern Ireland (‘Commission’) was formed with Conservative politician 
Chris Patten as its head. The Commission was to “inquire into policing in Northern 
Ireland, consult widely, and make proposals for future policing structures and 
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arrangements, including the police force composition, recruitment, training, culture, ethos 
and symbols.”183  The proposals made by the Commission aimed “to create a police 
service that would be effective, operate in partnership with the community, cooperate 
with the Garda Síochána” – the police force of the Republic of Ireland – “and other police 
forces, and be accountable both to the law and the community which it was to serve.”184 
On September 9, 1999, the Commission released its official report (usually called the 
‘Patten Report’) and made several important recommendations. These recommendations 
included but were not limited to renaming the RUC the Police Service of Northern 
Ireland (PSNI), creating a new policing board and district policing boards to ensure 
community input and police accountability, creating a Police Ombudsman and 
Complaints Tribunal, changing the symbols of the police force, instituting a 50/50 
recruitment policy for new officers from the Catholic and Protestant communities, 
instituting a new code of ethics and oath of office which would include a strong emphasis 
on human rights, and an emphasis on community policing, among many others.185 Most, 
though not all, of the recommendations of the Patten Report were adopted and the PSNI 
officially replaced the RUC on 3 November 2001. 
Results 
 The specifics of the process of implementation of the Patten Report’s many 
recommendations will be addressed in detail in the next two chapters. Before exploring 
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how this was done and why implementation succeeded or failed, it is worth briefly 
exploring the ‘outcome’ that has made Northern Ireland a model for other post-conflict 
societies. Specifically, Northern Ireland has been successful at building community 
confidence in the new PSNI according to survey data that has been regularly collected for 
many years. The data from these surveys has been used as evidence of the success of 
policing reform in Northern Ireland and, therefore deserves some attention here.  
 In 2001, the Northern Ireland Policing Board was established as a result of the 
recommendations of the Patten Report. As a part of their statutory duties, the Policing 
Board began to collect information on, among other things, public attitudes toward the 
police and specific police institutions. The Northern Ireland Statistics and Research 
Agency conducts several nationwide omnibus surveys annually to collect data for 
different clients including the Policing Board and provides it to the Policing Board to 
collate and distribute. As a result, we have consistent data starting from October of 2001, 
six months after the PSNI officially replaced the RUC, on public attitudes toward the 
police broken down by age, sex, and religious affiliation. Prior to 2001, the Northern 
Ireland Life and Times Survey provides similar though slightly different data on public 
attitudes toward the police that is helpful in providing a baseline for how attitudes toward 
the police varied among the communities of Northern Ireland at the end of the Troubles.  
 According to the 1998 Northern Ireland life and Times Survey, there was a 
significant difference in how Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland felt about the 
police. In response to the question, “In general, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with 
the way police in Northern Ireland do their job?” the responses broke down as shown in 
Table 1. 
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Table 1. Community Attitudes toward the RUC, 1998 
186 
While the responses to this question show that most Catholics were at least indifferent, 
and at most deeply dissatisfied with the RUC in 1998, the results for a different question 
provide an even starker picture of the state of policing at the end of the Troubles. 
Illustrated in Table 2, the same survey also asked individual’s opinions about what should 
happen to the RUC. Specifically, the survey asked, “There has been a lot of discussion 
recently about reforming the RUC. Do you yourself think that the RUC should: Be 
disbanded, Be reformed but not disbanded, Should stay just as it is now, Don’t know, or 
Refuse/unwilling to answer.” This data shows the deep community divide over the state 
of the police in Northern Ireland. More than 80 percent of Catholics thought the RUC 
need to be disbanded or reformed while 60 percent of Protestants wanted the RUC to 
remain unchanged. 
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Table 2. Community Attitudes on RUC Reform, 1998 
187 
 With the implementation of most of the recommendations of the Patten Report, 
those in favor of disbandment and reform won the debate. Beginning with the first 
Omnibus Survey after the implementation of the new PSNI, the questions became 
slightly more specific and targeted to get an understanding of how the communities of 
Northern Ireland felt about the PSNI as a whole, the specific officers working in their 
neighborhoods, and certain institutions of the PSNI. Again, later chapters will address 
some of the specific changes in attitude over time, but it is worth looking at the general 
attitude toward the police at three points in time: October 2001, January 2012, and April 
2017. I include this last date to give a brief preview of how policing in Northern Ireland 
has gone in the first five years after the official end of this study in 2011, a point I will 
expand on in the conclusion of this dissertation.  
 Table 3 give the responses to the question, “Do you think that the Police Service 
of Northern Ireland does a good job or a poor job in Northern Ireland as a whole?” for the 
surveys conducted in October 2001, January 2012, and April 2017. This table shows us a 
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significant shift in the Catholic community perceptions of the police in the first ten years 
of the service. We can see that Catholics who rate the service as very/fairly good jumped 
from 52% in 2001 to 63% in 2012. Maybe even more interesting is the drop in Catholics 
who rated the police very/fairly poor from 25% in 2001 to 12% in 2012. Yet, while we 
see this large shift in the Catholic community’s perception of the police, we do not see a 
corresponding negative shift in the Protestant community’s perceptions of the police as 
one might expect given the history described above. It is also worth a brief mention that 
in the five years after the initial investigation period, both Catholic and Protestant 
community perceptions of the police increaed dramatically taking the overall approval 
rating of the PSNI from a fairly consistent 69% in the first ten years to a striking 78% in 
its fifteenth year. I will explore a few possible reasons for this additional shift in positive 
perceptions in the conclusion chapter. 
Table 3. Community Confidence in the Police, longitudinal 
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Rating (%) Survey Year (Month) 
 2001 (Oct)188 2012 (Jan)189 2017 (Apr)190 
 C P Tot C P Tot C P Tot 
Very/fairly good 52 72 69 63 73 69 76 84 78 
Neither good nor bad 20 10 14 23 16 19 15 11 14 
Very/fairly poor 25 7 15 12 11 11 9 4 6 
No answer/DK/refusal 2 1 2 1 0 1 0 1 1 
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Conclusion 
 This chapter has provided a brief overview of a small number of important 
moments in Northern Irish history that contributed to the period of extreme violence this 
dissertation is examining. It is important to note that for the sake of space and clarity, I 
have not included many other important events that some may argue contributed just as 
much, if not more to the ending of the Troubles and the ultimate focus on police reform. 
Specifically, I did not make reference here to the St. Andrew’s Agreement which not only 
identified policing reform as important for peace in Northern Ireland, but also led to the 
production of a report on policing in Northern Ireland that was referenced by the 
Independent Commission on Policing Reform when they performed their analysis of 
policing in Northern Ireland.  
I chose to keep the historical background in this chapter minimal for several 
reasons. First, there is simply too much information that could be included, and any 
selection of some events will inevitably be criticized by some who think I have left out an 
important event. For this reason, I have included the least historical background 
information possible to make this dissertation comprehensible to those with little or no 
previous knowledge of the Northern Ireland situation without including every single 
event that affected the outcome of the Troubles. Second, though St. Andrew’s absolutely 
shaped what the final Belfast/Good Friday Agreement would look like, including the 
focus on policing reform, it was not the final document that was used to guide the post-
Troubles rebuilding process. It is interesting, but not absolutely necessary to know the 
history of St. Andrew’s to understand how the Agreement was implemented. Finally, this 
dissertation is focused on the process of police reform after the signing of the Agreement. 
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So, while including more background information would help to highlight how Northern 
Ireland came to focus on community policing, it does not tell us about how it was 
implemented and why it worked.  
This chapter has also demonstrated the integral role that the police force has 
played in Northern Ireland throughout their history and shown how the police have been 
directly linked to the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of its citizens. In a democratic 
state, the police function to provide security for all regardless of ethnic affiliation, de-
escalate volatile situations, deter crime, and protect civil rights. When these duties are 
performed to the best of each officer’s abilities, citizens “are ready to identify and to 
support the police because the institution has both attained legitimacy in the eyes of the 
public and won its confidence.”191 However, when the police fail in these duties, they 
lose the confidence of the public and jeopardize the legitimacy of the state. When this 
happens, it is important to identify how to move forward in the aftermath of ethnic 
conflict to build community confidence in the police and therefore acceptance of the 
legitimacy of the state. As was discussed in the previous chapter, Northern Ireland did 
this through the implementation of community policing. In the following chapters, I will 
detail the specific ways in which Northern Ireland implemented community policing and 
why it was successful in building community confidence in the police. 
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CHAPTER III 
IMPLEMENTING COMMUNITY POLICING: SYMBOLISM  
Introduction 
The conventional account of how Northern Ireland recovered from the Troubles 
following the signing of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement (‘the Agreement’) goes 
something like the following. Politically, a parliament was established with a power-
sharing executive with a First Minister from the majority ethno-political identity group 
and a Deputy First Minister from the dominant minority ethno-political group. In this 
arrangement, the executive cabinet positions would be distributed based on the 
proportionate share of votes each political party received and the political determination 
of the First and Deputy First Ministers as to which positions went to each party. In 
addition to these political arrangements, a commission was established to evaluate the 
role of the police in Northern Ireland and make suggestions for improving community 
confidence in the police. Finally, several initiatives aimed at community reconciliation 
and cross-community relationship building received state and external funding. The 
combination of these changes over time, common wisdom says, created a relatively stable 
and prosperous Northern Ireland.  
The common wisdom described here is not wrong, but it is incomplete. Like a 
Cliffs Notes version of a complicated novel, this story gives you the major plot points 
without the nuanced details of how events unfolded and all the ways in which each step 
of the process might have gone wrong, and sometimes did. This story does not capture 
the importance of specific changes made to policing that were a part of the larger process 
of political and social reform and were vital to the success of the political transition. The 
common wisdom laid out above misses the details of the process of rebuilding and leaves 
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out the fact that, even with these big ‘plot points’ things could have turned out differently 
if it were not for the specific focus on community policing that guided police reform.  
In this and the following chapter, I focus on how community policing was 
implemented in Northern Ireland and how the successes and failures of community 
policing translated in community confidence in the police. Specifically, I highlight the 
reforms enacted after the evaluation of the police conducted by the Independent 
Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland (the ‘Commission’) and the publication of 
their subsequent report (the ‘Patten Report’). The implementation of community policing 
in the context of the Patten Report indeed did produce the outcomes I argued in Chapter I 
of this dissertation would be present in the case of good community policing: symbolic 
change and changes in police practice. In this chapter, I will focus on the changes to 
police symbolism that were made and how the process and outcomes of those changes 
were consistent with the principles of community policing.  
As discussed in Chapter I of this dissertation, the principles of community 
policing lead us to several expectations regarding symbolism that we should see when 
community policing is implemented well. Specifically, community policing implies that 
the community will be engaged in the evaluation of police symbols to determine what, if 
any, change will be necessary to build community confidence in the police. We should 
also see the reduction of physical barriers between the police and the community 
including demilitarized uniforms, vehicles, and buildings. The implementation of 
community policing in ethnically divided societies also requires attention to the 
representativeness of the police. We would expect to see efforts to ensure that members 
of minority and marginalized communities are represented in the police.  If all of this is 
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done well, then the theory of community policing predicts that we will see an increase in 
community confidence in the police over time.  
This chapter will discuss how symbolic changes to the police in response to the 
recommendations of the Patten Report were undertaken and how, though often left out of 
the explicit conversation about community policing, the process and outcome of symbolic 
changes in Northern Ireland engaged the principles of community policing as much as 
did changes to police practice.  
The Patten Report 
 The Belfast/Good Friday Agreement acknowledged that a new beginning for the 
police was necessary if peace was to be maintained in Northern Ireland.192 Even this 
statement was a major concession for Unionists who felt the RUC was the only thing that 
kept the country from complete chaos and destruction during the Troubles. This was also 
a concession for Nationalists who felt that the RUC had been at best complicit and at 
worst a willing accomplice in the discrimination and violence the Catholic community 
experienced during and before the Troubles. However, the parties to the Agreement were 
able to compile a list of necessary attributes the police would need if they were to achieve 
widespread cross-community support. This list included,  
Structures and arrangements … such that the police service is professional, 
effective and efficient, fair and impartial, free from partisan control; accountable 
both under the law for its actions and to the community it serves; representative of 
the society it polices, and operates within a coherent and cooperative criminal 
justice system which conforms with human rights norms.193  
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Despite the specificity of these, and other, requirements from the Agreement, the 
participants delegated the job of developing the explicit recommendations that gave the 
means through which these goals were to be achieved to the commission that was to be 
created as a result of the Agreement – the Independent Commission on Policing for 
Northern Ireland.  
 The Commission was set up shortly after the signing of the Agreement on 3 June 
1998, was chaired by the Right Honorable Christopher Patten, and consisted of seven 
additional members with a variety of expertise in policing, knowledge of Northern 
Ireland, and academic understanding of important concepts such as policing with the 
community and administrative issues of policing.194 The members of the Commission, 
though small in number themselves, set the initial tone for the turn toward community 
policing in Northern Ireland. Dr. Gerald W. Lynch, for example, was president of John 
Jay College of Criminal Justice in New York where he created a course called ‘Human 
Dignity and the Police.’ This course, which was taught to police officers in more than 31 
different countries in its first four years, focused on engaging the community and 
bettering relationships between the police and the communities they serve.195 Another 
member, Professor Clifford Shearing, is considered a pioneer in community policing, 
developing the idea of ‘nodal policing’ where the police work with many partners to 
ensure a community conception of policing as a joint activity between the police and the 
                                                 
194 Rea and Masefield, 29, 44. 
195 Gerald W. Lynch, "Police Training in Human Dignity," in Policing in Centrral Europe: Comparing 
Firsthand Knowledge with Experience from the West, ed. Milan Pagon (Ljubljana, Slovenia: College of 
Police and Security Studies, 1996). 
88 
 
community.196 In addition to reaching out to and visiting other police departments 
throughout the world, the Commission also solicited and accepted public comments from 
anyone with an interest in the reform of the police in Northern Ireland and held open 
forums in each of the 26 District Council areas of Northern Ireland. In all, these meetings 
were attended by more than 10,000 people and the Commission accepted approximately 
2,500 written submissions.197 The Commission engaged the principles of community 
policing from the beginning, not just by soliciting input and participation from the 
community in these first stages of problem identification and idea formation, but in its 
continued reference to what Professor Shearing called the ‘golden thread’ of their mission 
– the concept that policing came from not just the formal institution of the police, but 
from “the mobilization of a network of capacities and knowledges located within [a] 
variety of institutional nodes.”198 The final report produced by the Commission, 
commonly referred to as the Patten Report in reference to the esteemed chair, included 
175 specific recommendations and had significant sections on human rights, 
accountability, and policing with the community.  
Naming the Problem 
As one government official described it, many people in the PUL community see 
everything that has happened since the passage of the Agreement entirely as a loss. 
According to this thought process, any gain for the CNR community must, by its very 
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nature, mean a loss for the PUL community.199 Nowhere was this attitude more apparent 
than in the changes made to the police in Northern Ireland. As previous chapters have 
laid out, the RUC was perceived to be a police force of and for the PUL community in 
Northern Ireland. That is to say that the large majority of police officers in the RUC were 
Protestant (upwards of 97% at times),200 members of the PUL community felt that the 
police were ‘their police’ and often expected the RUC to be a given career path for PUL 
boys.201 The CNR community, on the other hand, felt unfairly targeted and discriminated 
against by the RUC.202 This perception was amplified by the symbolism associated with 
the RUC. The name Royal Ulster Constabulary invoked the monarchy of Great Britain, 
emphasizing ties to Britain and the Crown that were at best irritants and at worst direct 
insults to the Irish-identifying CNR community. In addition to the name of the police, the 
uniform, emblem, and flag also carried many symbols that associated the RUC with 
Britain. The emblem of the RUC, as depicted in Figure 1 below, was composed of a 
crown on top of a harp. For many in the PUL community, this symbolized continuity and 
sacrifice. However, many in the CNR community viewed this symbol as a representation 
of the Crown asserting its authority over Ireland and created a barrier to both direct 
interactions with the police and recruitment to their ranks.203 
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Figure 1. RUC Emblem 
 According to the Patten Report, the name, symbols, and uniform of the police 
became so politicized over time that the CNR community took “the position that the 
name is symbolic of a relationship between the police and unionism and the British 
state.”204 Further, the Patten Report stated, a “new beginning cannot be achieved unless 
the reality that part of the community feels unable to identify with the present name and 
symbols associated with the police is addressed.”205 Yet, even with a general 
understanding that a large minority of the community could not or would not ever be 
comfortable with the police under the name and symbols of the RUC, the specific 
recommendations206 to change these polarizing symbols were extremely difficult to 
implement. 
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 The Patten Report also made recommendations to change the composition of the 
police, stating, “the parties to the Agreement believe it essential that the police service 
should be ‘representative of the society it polices.’”207 The Patten Report further 
elucidated the ways in which the RUC was not representative of the community. For 
example, approximately 8% of RUC officers were Roman Catholic while more than 40% 
of Northern Ireland identified as Roman Catholic.208 The Patten Report went on to state 
that “real community policing is impossible if the composition of the police service bears 
little relationship to the composition of the community as a whole.”209 It is important to 
acknowledge that while the Patten Report notes other underrepresented groups in the 
officer corps including women, ethnic minorities, gay and lesbian officers, and people 
from ‘working class’ backgrounds, the recommendations of the Report focused primarily 
on correcting the imbalance between the PUL and CNR officers as this problem was seen 
as ‘a case apart’210 that could and should be addressed through recruitment and 
composition goals. The goal of altering the composition of the police was not to create a 
system where “Catholics police Catholics and Protestants police Protestants,” but rather 
to create a system that was more “efficient and effective” – a result that required a 
sufficiently representative force that was able to garner strong ties between the police and 
the communities they serve.211 
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The last set of symbolic changes suggested in the Patten Report addressed the physical 
barriers that existed between the police and the community. The ‘security situation’ 
created by the Troubles had led to a militarization of the RUC in both action and 
appearance. For example, by the end of the Troubles it was standard policy for officers to 
wear ‘bomb jackets’ when performing public order policing to protect them from the real 
possibility of explosive devices being used against them. Figure 2 below identifies a list 
of weapons regularly employed against the police in public order situations according to 
the research conducted by the Commission and reported in the Patten Report.  
212 
Figure 2: Weapons Used Against the Police during the Troubles 
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Not surprisingly, bomb jackets were large and bulky and themselves put a large barrier 
between the police and he community. The police were also armed with guns, a situation 
unique to Northern Ireland in the United Kingdom at the time. Figure 3 below provides 
an example of how officers appeared in public order situations. Acknowledging that the 
‘peaceful’ situation that was promoted by the Agreement had not yet been achieved at the 
time of the writing of the Patten Report, the Commission recommended that, as soon as 
was safe and practicable, the police should disarm.213 
214 
Figure 3. An armed officer polices a Loyalist parade 
Similarly, it became standard practice in some areas for the police to use armored 
land rovers like the one shown in Figure 4 not just for public order policing, but also for 
regular patrols. These vehicles look more like army tanks than police vans and reinforced 
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the idea that the police were an extension of the military as opposed to a separate, civilian 
force. Therefore, the Patten Report recommended limiting the use of these vehicles to 
high danger policing situations and eventually moving the land rovers out of regular 
stations entirely to be stored for use in extremely dangerous situations only.215  
216 
Figure 4. PSNI Land Rover 
 In addition to these mobile barriers, police stations were also reinforced and 
barricaded during the Troubles in response to the specific targeting of the police by 
(primarily republican) paramilitary groups.217 These buildings did not appear inviting to 
the community, but rather presented themselves as more like military barracks with some 
combination of high walls, barred or no windows, and barbed wire as can be seen in 
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Figure 5 and Figure 6 below. The intention of these architectural changes was to keep the 
people inside the stations safe, but also resulted in keeping the community out.  
218 
Figure 5. Strand Road Station, Derry 
 
219 
Figure 6. Donegall Pass Station, Belfast 
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 In the Patten Report, the Commission argued, “A new policing style based on 
community partnerships calls for a new style of police station, accessible and welcoming 
to the public.”220 While acknowledging that it would be foolish to assume that the police 
were no longer under threat of attack after the signing of the Agreement, the Commission 
argued that it was possible to provide safe and secure police stations that did not look like 
fortresses. Therefore, they recommended that new police buildings be built to look more 
like normal buildings. They should be approachable and visible from the street, though 
they should also have enhanced security features that could be activated if and when 
necessary.221 In addition, they recommended that as existing police stations were 
updated, they should prioritize making the stations more welcoming to visitors.222 
From Patten Report to Implementation 
The many recommendations of the Commission presented in Patten Report fell 
into a variety of categories including human rights, police accountability, policing with 
the community, policing in a peaceful society, public order policing, management and 
personnel in the police, restructuring and reducing the police force, composition and 
recruitment of the police, training and education, culture and symbols, and cooperation 
with other police services. Predictably, the Patten Report was controversial in its findings 
and provoked a variety of responses. The British government generally supported the 
recommendations of the report and committed to working toward their implementation. 
The CNR community felt the recommendations did not go far enough in assessing the 
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actions of the RUC during and before the Troubles and that the Commission should have 
drawn explicit conclusions about the rights and wrongs committed by the RUC during 
that time. The PUL community, on the other hand, was disappointed and offended by 
many of the recommendations claiming that the Patten Report should have explicitly 
honored the 301 RUC members who had been killed during the Troubles and that it 
specifically dishonored this sacrifice by suggesting that the symbols and name of the 
police should be changed.223 Despite the strength and diversity of opinion about the 
Patten Report, the British government undertook to pass a law in Parliament that would 
implement the Patten Report’s recommendations for the police in Northern Ireland. The 
Police (Northern Ireland) Act 2000 was adopted on 23 November 2000.224 
Among the Patten Report’s many recommendations that addressed symbolic or 
demographic issues, some were direct and explicit while others remained vague, to be 
worked out by others after the publication of the Patten Report. Some of the specific 
suggestions for changing the symbols associated with the police included changing the 
name from the Royal Ulster Constabulary to the Northern Ireland Police Service 
(eventually changed to Police Service of Northern Ireland so as not to be confused with 
the Northern Ireland Prison System), discontinuing the tradition of flying the British 
Union Jack flag over police buildings,225 and instituting a new recruitment system 
designed to increase the representativeness of the police.226 Some of the vague directions 
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that came without specific suggestions for implementation included adopting “a new 
badge and symbols which are entirely free from any association with either the British or 
Irish states” and adopting “a new, more practical style of uniform” for police officers.227 
While the more direct recommendations surrounding the demographic composition of the 
police carried their own significant political hurdles to implementation, the suggestions to 
develop new symbols and uniforms required extensive consultation with all parts of the 
community on top of political difficulties. This required the active engagement of 
political actors from across the spectrum, many of whom had political incentives to 
refuse to participate in the process of redesigning the ‘new’ police service.  
Before discussing the process by which some of the important decisions were 
made around the symbols of the PSNI, it is worth digressing a little to acknowledge that 
these negotiations and changes were happening in the larger context of implementing the 
whole of the Agreement. While debates over if and how to implement the 
recommendations from the Patten Report were going on, the same people were also 
debating the progress of decommissioning the weapons of paramilitaries and setting up 
the devolved Northern Irish government as well as the cross-border political 
arrangements. All of this was happening while these participants were trying to maintain 
the support of their constituents and address the needs of the victims of the Troubles. It is 
not surprising in this context that the attempt to de-politicize the police was itself a 
political minefield where those involved had to navigate the many different views and 
deeply held beliefs of the communities in Northern Ireland.  
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One example which helps to illustrate this complicated dynamic can be found in 
the talks held between the British and Irish governments and three major political parties 
including the UUP (the more moderate major PUL representing party), the SDLP (the 
moderate primarily CNR representing party), and Sinn Féin (the extremist CNR party) in 
the summer of 2001. These talks, held over several months at Weston Park in England 
resulted in some agreement between the parties on the issues of “policing, normalisation, 
the stability of institutions and decommissioning.”228 While these talks were considered 
successful and produced some agreement on several fronts, the British and Irish 
governments were forced to accept that despite many hours of negotiations, Sinn Féin 
would not be able to endorse the new police service at that stage.229 Despite the 
disappointment surrounding Sinn Féin’s inability to commit to supporting the new 
policing arrangements, the Weston Park talks did result in the promise of political 
representatives from the SDLP on the new Policing Board (which will be discussed in 
greater detail below) as well as the encouragement for representatives of the CNR 
community to apply for independent positions on the board.230  
The Weston Park talks illustrate an important point about the restructuring of the 
police not taking place in a political vacuum, but in the complicated and muddy terrain of 
trying to rebuild a functioning devolved government with positive relations with both 
Britain and Ireland. In attempting to highlight the role that the police played in helping to 
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build state stability after the Troubles, I never want to ignore the greater context in which 
police reform was occurring. Police reforms were developed and implemented 
simultaneously with other important changes to the political arrangements of Northern 
Ireland, which makes it entirely likely that these other events shaded the community 
confidence in the police in ways that are hard to separate from the police reforms 
themselves. It is also important, however, to acknowledge the reverse: that the 
importance of the police is woven through many of the other threads of the peace process 
and the success (or failure) at each step of the process of implementation of the new PSNI 
was a reflection of the broader process as a whole. Yet, unlike the implementation of 
other parts of the Agreement (specifically the political elements), the reform of policing 
managed to maintain a mostly positive trajectory throughout the transition from the 
Troubles to peace. This makes the exploration of the success of police reform in Northern 
Ireland unique among the other post-conflict projects.  
Making the Leap 
Despite the many obstacles and through incredibly hard political work, the first 
steps toward building the new police service were taken with the establishment of the 
Northern Ireland Policing Board (the ‘Board’) in 2001. This Board was composed of nine 
independent (non-political) members from the community and ten members nominated 
by political parties. The first composition of the board did not include any members from 
Sinn Féin as they had refused to formally endorse the new policing scheme at that point. 
The Northern Ireland Secretary of State selected the independent members of the board 
from applicants from across the community, deliberately chosen to be diverse in both 
experience and demographics.  
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Badges and Emblems 
The Board held its first meeting on 7 November 2001. Among many other duties, 
the Board was tasked with developing the new flag and emblem for the PSNI. The issue 
of the name change had been settled through legislation prior to the establishment of the 
Board, but the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 2000 left the regulation of the emblem and 
flag to the Secretary of State who was required to consult with the Board before making 
such regulations.231 In effect, this placed the onus on the Board to develop the new 
emblem and flag since they were, at the time, the most representative body with the 
authority to undertake this task.  
The process of developing the new PSNI emblem and flag got a jump-start before 
the Board was first assembled. Given that the members of the Board were announced in 
late September 2001 and the official title change from RUC to the PSNI was to occur in 
November, government Ministers had secretly commissioned preliminary submissions 
for the emblem redesign for the Board to be able to work with immediately in the hopes 
that a decision might be reached quickly.232 Some of the submissions were published by 
the BBC and are shown in Figure 7 below.  
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233 
Figure 7: PSNI emblem submissions 
Unfortunately, the intentional neutrality of all the proposed designs that had been 
developed before the Board assembled were met with reactions ranging from extreme 
indifference to strong criticism. Ian Paisley Jr., a political member of the Board 
representing the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), argued in a BBC interview that the 
directive from the Patten Report that the new emblem refrain from any overtly Irish or 
British symbols resulted in a meaningless design to which no one in the community could 
relate.234 At the same time, Gerry Kelly of Sinn Féin complained that the government 
should have already dealt with this issue when it decided on the name change. At the time 
the proposed new emblems were released to the public in mid-November 2001, PSNI 
officers were serving in RUC uniforms and the new class of recruits had already been 
admitted, also without new uniforms. Kelly argued that this issue should have already 
                                                 
233 "Unionists Reject Police Badge Design,"   BBC News World Edition (2001), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/northern_ireland/1664681.stm. 
234 Ibid. 
103 
 
been dealt with and showed impatience for the implementation of the Patten Report 
recommendations in whole.235   
The Board responded to these reactions by forming an ad hoc committee tasked 
with addressing the new emblem and flag as quickly as possible. Within two weeks of the 
formation of the ad hoc committee, they presented a new proposal to the full Board, 
which included a new emblem design that: 
Explores the notion of inclusiveness and parity with the simple stylistic 
representation of a variety of symbols that reflect our diversity, our aspirations, 
and our desire to mutually respect and protect difference through policing.236 
 
The design, as shown in Figure 8 below, was that of a sunburst with a star in the middle, 
which provided space for six equally spaced, and equally sized symbols between the 
points of the star. These symbols included an olive branch, a harp, a torch, the scales of 
justice, a shamrock leaf, and a crown. The center of the star was filled in with the cross of 
St. Patrick.237 
 The emblem presented by the ad hoc committee technically violated the 
recommendation of the Patten Report to remove all symbols associated with either the 
British or Irish communities. However, it embraced the spirit of giving equal prominence 
to the cultural heritage of both the CNR and PUL communities in Northern Ireland while 
also emphasizing the ideas of peace and justice that the PSNI were meant to ensure. 
Many members of the Board said the design would not have been their first choice, but 
according the Board Chairman Desmond Rea, they all agreed that it was an acceptable 
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compromise and unanimously recommend the emblem to the Secretary of State.238 The 
progress on the emblem also accelerated progress on the new uniforms for the PSNI, 
which would be ready by the time the first group of PSNI recruits finished their training 
and entered the force in spring of 2002. 
239 
Figure 8: PSNI emblem as adopted 
Representation 
 To address the issues of demographic composition in the police, the Patten Report 
made several recommendations with the explicit goal of reaching approximately 30% 
CNR representation in the police within 10 years, a balance which the Commission had 
been advised was necessary “to ensure that a minority does not find itself submerged 
within a majority organizational culture.”240 First, acknowledging the anticipated 
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transition to a peaceful society in Northern Ireland, the Patten Report recommended a 
considerable reduction in the total number of officers in the new police force over the 
course of approximately ten years.241 This reduction in numbers was to coincide with an 
increase in representation from the CNR community. To forward these goals 
simultaneously, a voluntary early retirement scheme was suggested to allow those RUC 
officers who so wished the opportunity to leave the service with generous benefits, which 
would happen in concert with the institution of a 50% Protestant and 50% Catholic 
recruitment scheme for new police cadets (‘50:50 recruitment’).242 
 It is important to note that the burden of changing the culture of the police was not 
placed entirely on the shoulders of the PUL community, though it was interpreted that 
way by many in Northern Ireland at the time. The Patten Report included several 
recommendations that instructed the CNR community to lift the social sanctions around 
Catholics becoming police officers. For example, the Patten Report recommended that 
the Gaelic Athletic Association (GAA) repeal its Rule 21, which prohibited members of 
the police from being members of the Association.243 The GAA was an important social 
organization within the CNR community and exclusion from this group would amount to 
ostracism from the whole community. The Patten Report also called on community 
leaders to “remove all discouragements to members of their communities applying to join 
the police and make it a priority to encourage them to apply.”244 Since few social barriers 
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existed to joining the police in PUL communities, and many young PUL boys were 
groomed from an early age to assume they would join the RUC, these instructions were 
specifically for the CNR community, which had a history of intimidating any Catholic 
who joined the RUC. Despite these pointed instructions to the CNR community, the 
changes to the emblem and recruitment strategies in the new police service were far more 
visible and therefore garnered the bulk of the attention in the community during the 
transition from the RUC to the PSNI. 
Physical Barriers 
While much of the other symbolic change had deadlines for completion, the 
changes to the arms, uniforms, vehicles, and buildings of the police were slower for 
several reasons. First, the capital investment in changing buildings, vehicles, and 
uniforms for thousands of officers is high and money had to be prioritized. For example, 
changes and updates to police stations were addressed as money came available and 
physical updates were necessary. Similarly, new patrol cars were purchased as old cars 
needed replacing, but the PSNI did not junk perfectly well functioning vehicles. 
Understandably, these updates were slow and gradual over the years, yet there is certainly 
evidence that the changes that have been made have followed the recommendations of 
the Patten Report. The photograph below of police stations in Coleraine (Figure 9) and 
Belfast (Figure 10) are examples of the new, more approachable buildings in which the 
PSNI has invested. In these photos one can see the clear emblem of the PSNI with the 
name of the station. Additionally, both stations have pedestrian entrances easily visible 
from the street and neither has obvious signs of reinforcement such as barbed wire or 
barred windows.  
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Figure 9. Coleraine Police Station 
 
246 
Figure 10. Musgrave Police Station, Belfast 
                                                 
245 "Portrush: 15 Arrested over Drugs Offences,"   BBC News (2014), https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-
northern-ireland-30616424. 
246  
108 
 
 In addition to the changes to the buildings, the PSNI also made moves to reduce 
the militarized nature of their public order uniforms as seen in Figure 11 below. 
Whenever possible, they wear their regular uniforms with ‘stab vests’ which are a less 
bulky protective vest that allow officers more freedom of movement and are also less 
imposing for the public. One officer said that the switch from bulletproof bomb vests to 
the stab vests was a step toward what he called “community standard policing.” He felt 
this signaled the demilitarization of the police to the community and the police alike.247 
248 
Figure 11. Police keep the peace at a Loyalist parade 
Community Reaction 
As discussed above, the PUL community had a strong affinity for and attachment 
to the RUC. Before and during the Troubles, the RUC was seen as a Protestant force for 
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the Protestant people,249 but according to a PUL community leader, “it’s not a Protestant 
service anymore.”250 As a result of the Patten Report recommendations and the changes 
that were made to the service since the end of the Troubles, there developed an attitude 
within the PUL community that the police are no longer ‘their’ service, according to one 
prominent PUL community leader.251 This transition began with the changes to the name, 
emblem, flag, and uniforms of the police. A large and vocal portion of the PUL 
community argued that changing these symbols was a sign of disrespect to those RUC 
officers who had fought and lost their lives in the course of the Troubles.252 Others felt 
that, by changing the symbols associated with the RUC and downplaying the connection 
to Britain, the CNR community had ‘won’ and that they were being rewarded for years of 
violence against the police.253 Despite these strong objections, political leaders in the 
PUL community actively participated in the processes described above, and so had a 
stake in the new symbols that were adopted for the police.  
The Commission was deeply aware of the possibility that this would be the 
reaction of the PUL community and acknowledged as much in the Patten Report.254 
However, they were also insistent that to move forward and transform the RUC into a 
police service that the whole community could support, their recommendations should be 
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adopted. In other words, the primary target of these changes was not the PUL 
community, but the CNR community. As was explicitly stated in the Patten Report, the 
RUC was not representative of the community it served, and it was specifically under-
representative of the CNR community. To some extent, then, the changes to the symbols 
of the police were not aimed at appeasing the PUL community, but at convincing the 
CNR community that the police service and policing in Northern Ireland under the PSNI 
was going to be different that it had been under the RUC. These symbolic changes were a 
first step in that direction.  
The question is, then, how successful these changes were in convincing the CNR 
community to give the PSNI a chance. How would we know? Many have highlighted 
survey data as evidence of increased openness to the police in the CNR community. As 
mentioned in Chapter 2, more than 80% of Catholics thought the RUC should be 
reformed or disbanded in 1998, and in October of 2001, shortly after the PSNI officially 
replaced the RUC, 52% of Catholics thought the PSNI was doing a fairly/very good job. 
Others have looked to politician and party leadership for evidence. Without doubt, Sinn 
Féin remained publicly skeptical, refusing to actively participate in the Policing Board or 
any of the political institutions around the police. However, the SDLP also represented 
part of the CNR community, though a much smaller portion than Sinn Féin, and did 
actively participate in policing reform. Others still have referenced community 
participation in the process in the police reform process. Members of the CNR 
community acting as individuals did participate in the process as members of the Policing 
Board and in the newly formed District Policing Partnerships (which will be discussed in 
greater detail in the next chapter).   
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Beyond participation on the Board and other community-based initiatives pursued 
by the PSNI, the CNR community showed signs of a new willingness to engage with the 
police that had not been present under the RUC. The Police (Northern Ireland) Act 1998 
instructed the Police Authority to obtain views of the community on policing. This duty 
was passed onto the Police Board when it was formed. Unfortunately, the surveys that 
have been used to assess community views on the police are only available, then, from 
October of 2001. However, as was discussed in the previous chapter, some older surveys 
give us similar information that can be used to measure changes in community 
confidence in the police since the end of the Troubles. For example, the 1998 Northern 
Ireland Life and Times Survey asked, “In general, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you 
with the way the police in Northern Ireland do their job?” The disparity in the responses 
from Catholic and Protestant respondents were stark. While 77 percent of Protestant 
respondents were either ‘quite’ or ‘very’ satisfied, only 42 percent of Catholics agreed. 
Similarly, 28 percent of Catholics were ‘not very’ or ‘not at all’ satisfied while only 10 
percent of Protestants agreed.255 In the April 2002 Northern Ireland Omnibus survey, 
conducted shortly after the official adoption of the new symbols and uniforms, the most 
similar question, “Do you think that the Police Service of Northern Ireland does a good 
job or a poor job in Northern Ireland as a whole?” was answered very differently. A 
similar 74 percent of Protestants thought the PSNI did a ‘very/fairly good’ job while 54 
percent of Catholics agreed – a 12 percent jump from 1998 and a 2 percent jump from the 
same survey question sixth months earlier in October 2001. Similarly, while 10 percent 
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of Protestants found the PSNI to do a ‘very/fairly poor’ job, only 20 percent of Catholics 
agreed – an 8 percent drop from 1998 and a 5 percent drop from October 2001.256 
While the results seen in these surveys cannot in whole be attributed to the 
specific success of symbolic changes, they are one indication that members of the CNR 
community reacted to the changes with more open attitudes and a willingness to give the 
PSNI a chance. There had not been time to implement in full all the changes in police 
practice that would come with the new PSNI before the October 2001 survey was 
conducted, but there was a clear shift in the CNR community’s attitudes toward the 
police. That the CNR community specifically saw the symbolic changes as important was 
reflected in the interviews I conducted with both community members and police 
officers. One officer pointed out that the new PSNI uniforms were less militarized than 
the RUC uniforms and that, he felt, made it more possible to interact with the community 
‘on a human level.’ A he put it,  
we were able to de-militarize. We were able to do away with the army. We were 
able to do away with armored cars... People were using not bullet-proof vests, but 
they were wearing stab vests. And so, there was a, a reduction in … the armed 
aspect of it. More to, more community standard policing. And that was making 
real inroads, that people we saw … where the real focus was on about servicing 
the community. 257 
His experience was that the community found him more approachable and that, even 
when a community member approached him in anger, they were able to have a 
conversation rather than a physical confrontation, which the more militarized RUC 
uniform seemed to encourage.  
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Similarly, a different officer stated that, even though he was personally against the 
name change, which he felt was disrespectful to those RUC officers who had come 
before him, it was clearly important. As a Catholic, he saw how the attitude among his 
own friends and family changed with the adoption of the PSNI name and that it was 
worth ‘swallowing the pill’ of bad feelings among the police to get the buy-in from the 
CNR community.258 One community leader who specifically works with current and 
former dissidents mentioned that the name change was vitally important for those 
members of the CNR community who had been arrested or harassed by the RUC.259 
Another community leader who has worked with many former prisoners agreed that the 
symbolic changes, and specifically the reduction of explicitly British symbolism in the 
police, had created the opening she needed to be able to get those former prisoners to be 
open to the possibility of a new start with the PSNI.260  
Interestingly, the issue of representation in the police service was probably the 
most frustrating for the police officers and community members with which I spoke. 
While each of them acknowledged that 50:50 recruitment has been successful in 
changing the face of the police service, almost all said something to the effect of ‘it could 
have been done better.’ For officers, there was a frustration with the idea that it was even 
necessary. Many officers did not see themselves as either part of the PUL or CNR 
community during the Troubles, but as a part of a separate community with its own 
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identity and its own history: that of the police.261 This was echoed by one civilian I spoke 
with who is related to an officer who was active in the RUC during the Troubles who felt 
that she too had a stronger affiliation with other police families than she had with her 
religious or political community.262  
That said, despite the feelings of the officers themselves, the community in 
general did and still does see real or perceived community affiliations of officers and 
those perceptions influence how open the community is to accept the police service as a 
whole. For example, one officer who did not want to record his interview discussed the 
role of representation in the force rather reluctantly. In his mind, it does not and should 
not matter how each individual officer identifies, but it is still important to have 
representation on the force. In further conversation it became clear that he resented that 
some people in the community treat him differently depending on which community they 
assume he identifies with, but he also understood the need for the community to see 
people ‘like themselves’ in the force. He acknowledged this by specifically pointing out 
how proud he was that the PSNI had significantly increased female representation in the 
service.263 Similarly, one community member I spoke with was particularly critical of the 
idea of ‘diversity for diversity’s sake’ but also forced himself to admit that the 
homogeneity of the RUC had been a barrier for him and other Catholics he knew to 
interacting with the police. So, while he was not personally a fan of 50:50 recruitment as 
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a policy, he agreed that the better representativeness of the PSNI was helpful for 
changing the attitudes of many in the CNR community toward the police.264  
This point of view was reflected again and again with the officers and civilians I 
interviewed. Most officers, including those who readily admitted that they had been 
accepted into the police under and possibly as a result of the 50:50 recruitment scheme, 
felt that merit should be the only consideration for acceptance or promotion within the 
police.265 Members of the CNR community argued that 50:50 would not have been 
necessary if the RUC had made an effort all along to not be exclusionary and sought out 
qualified CNR cadets. Members of the PUL community thought 50:50 recruitment 
amounted to discrimination against qualified PUL applicants to the police. In all, almost 
no one I spoke with liked 50:50 recruitment as a concept, and yet all accepted that it had 
been successful in achieving the aim of 30 percent CNR representation within the PSNI 
in the goal of 10 years. As one government official said, the reality was that from his 
point of view, 50:50 recruitment “had a profound effect on how policing was received” 
within the communities of Northern Ireland.266 
One additional point on how the community reacted to all the symbolic changes 
to the police instituted in 2001 is that the most extreme reactions may have only occurred 
in areas with greater diversity. Some of the officers were serving in more rural and more 
homogenous (usually favoring PUL) areas during this time. In one officer’s experience, 
he said the community he served barely registered the changes. He was serving in a 
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predominately PUL community in 2001 and mentioned that he did not notice any change 
in the attitudes of the community nor their relationships with the police.267 The same was 
true for another officer who was a civilian at the time of the change from RUC to PSNI 
and lived in a different, primarily PUL community outside of Derry city. He also said that 
the changes were not noticeable in his area and the community barely reacted.268  
This isolation may account for the negligible change in the PUL community’s 
attitudes toward the police mentioned at the beginning of this section. According to 
census data from 2001, 66 percent of people in Northern Ireland lived in areas that were 
either 99 percent Protestant or 99 percent Catholic.269 It seems reasonable that members 
of the PUL community who lived primarily among other PUL and who did not regularly 
interact with many members of the CNR community could ignore what seemed like huge 
changes to the police because they did not feel the effects of those changes.  
It is also worth exploring why there was not a more negative reaction to these 
changes from the PUL community. In areas where the police were only called on to 
manage normal police duties, as opposed to those associated with security during the 
Troubles, it seems likely that the community members would have less emotional 
reactions to the police altogether. That is, these PUL community members likely had 
weaker ties to the police both during and after the Troubles than those in neighborhoods 
where they regularly called on the police for protection. Therefore, the majority of the 
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PUL community living in nearly exclusively PUL neighborhoods had muted if any 
reaction at all to the symbolic changes that were so deeply important to the CNR 
community. This is not to say that some members of the PUL community were not 
deeply frustrated with these changes, and some did take them very personally. However, 
the weaker overall PUL reaction to the symbolic changes of the police make sense in this 
context. 
Continuing Baby Steps 
 The story of the symbolic changes to the police in Northern Ireland, though highly 
concentrated in the early years following the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement, continued 
throughout the first ten years of the new PSNI. The slow de-militarization of the uniforms 
and equipment of the PSNI continually altered the relationships it had with the 
community. Additionally, and importantly, political changes had a large impact on the 
success of the PSNI breaking through to larger segments of the CNR community, those 
that had stubbornly refused to participate in the new policing process and those who had 
been too afraid to support it openly.  
 As discussed in earlier, the de-militarization of police uniforms played a 
significant role in opening the space for dialogue, especially in CNR communities. This 
change was significant because, during the Troubles, the police and the military were 
seen as one entity. As one officer explained, 
I first came here in 1990, so I’ve experienced a different society, a different brand 
of policing, a different way of policing and it was purely focused on security. … 
Our stations were all mortar-proofed, the vehicles we drove about were armored, 
the patrol tactics we were using was probably preventing police officers being 
attacked. We were patrolling with military.270 
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Every visual representation of the police was associated with war. Even when the 
uniforms were initially changed to differentiate from the old militarized RUC, much of 
the armored equipment and gear remained. In some areas, the transition away from 
ballistic vests and armored land rovers was much slower, but in many areas, this began to 
relax as the years passed and good relationships developed between the police and the 
communities they served.271 As one officer put it, “Places where we couldn’t have taken 
armored cars in at a time without coming under attack. These guys are walking. They’re 
on bikes.”272 
The importance of maintaining this separation from the military continued to 
influence the success of gaining the confidence of the community. One civilian in Belfast 
noted that, though his heavily CNR community has made huge strides in learning to trust 
the police, a police initiative in the neighborhood several years ago was given the title 
‘Operation’ which immediately put up barriers for those who thought it sounded more 
like a military endeavor than a police initiative.273 The purpose of the exercise, he said, 
was lost to the immediate wall erected when members of his CNR community began to 
associate it with the military.  
The success of the continued changes to the uniform and equipment of the PSNI 
after the first big change in 2001 is difficult to measure through anything other than 
interviews. While much progress has been made, it has been scattered and uneven in its 
distribution. For example, I visited one police station in a part of Belfast that had some 
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success in following the Patten Report recommendation to “have the appearance of 
ordinary buildings”274 while a different station across town still had the appearance of a 
fortress with high walls and barbed wire. One station in Derry city had a parking lot full 
of armored vehicles that resemble what people in the United States think of as S.W.A.T. 
vehicles with protective grills and covered wheels and another station had what looked 
like normal sedans. The disparity in when certain communities experience the changes in 
police appearance means that it is difficult to capture the success or failure of these 
changes in anything like a national survey. However, it seems clear from the interviews I 
conducted that both the police and the communities they serve agree that the fewer 
physical barriers between police and civilians, the more likely it is that dialogue can 
replace confrontation.  
In addition to the slow trickle of de-militarized equipment and uniforms, a highly 
important event also contributed to a major shift in the CNR community’s attitude toward 
the PSNI. At its Ard Fheis (the term used for the annual political party conference where 
they decide their platform for the year) in January of 2007, Sinn Féin decided to back the 
PSNI and participate fully in policing in Northern Ireland. While this move was more 
than just symbolic in that Sinn Féin took positions on the Policing Board and actively 
promoted the PSNI within the CNR community, the symbolism was hugely important as 
well. As one civilian interviewee said, it was not just that Sinn Féin’s support for policing 
gave people permission to trust the police, but it also took away a barrier for those who 
wanted to participate with policing. They were no longer going against their own 
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community to do it.275 More than this, it gave people permission to have relationships 
with police officers that before had been taboo. One officer told this story about a 
Catholic friend of his.  
I had a friend who was raised in a really, really hard part of the city; a really 
hard line Nationalist, Republican community. His family were very, very 
Republican. And we had to keep our friendship a secret. You know, unfortunately 
he died, but at the same time, I know that after Sinn Féin agreed with the policing 
process his family were much more open towards me and much more welcoming 
towards me. They were very, very open.276  
 
 The police I interviewed with one notable exception all praised Sinn Féin signing 
onto policing as a major breakthrough in working with the community. One officer was 
told by multiple community members with whom he interacted for the first time “Sinn 
Féin has told me it’s okay to call the police now.”277 Another said that without a doubt 
Sinn Féin signing onto policing and the Policing Board made the biggest difference for 
his relationship with the community.278 One officer even commented that now police are 
judged by the community on their performance, and they only got this chance because of 
Sinn Féin signing on to policing.279 Only one officer I spoke with disagreed with the 
symbolic importance of this political move by Sinn Féin. He contended that the move 
was essentially superficial as, in his experience, Sinn Féin had already been supporting 
the police in practice for several years.280 However, the community members I spoke 
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with, once again, were nearly universal in their assessment that Sinn Féin’s endorsement 
of the police made a huge difference in building community confidence in the police. 
This seems to be reflected in the survey data once again. As of October 2006, the last 
Omnibus survey conducted before the Sinn Féin endorsement, 51 percent of Catholics 
surveyed rated the overall performance of the PSNI as ‘very/fairly good’ while 21 
percent rated it ‘very/fairly poor.’ Just six months later and after the endorsement, 61 
percent rated the performance of the PSNI as ‘very/fairly good’ and only 13 percent as 
‘very/fairly poor.’281 This significant change in attitude speaks to the weight of this move 
within the CNR community. 
The importance of Sinn Féin’s endorsement was mentioned repeatedly in 
interviews. One interviewee claimed Sinn Féin signing on to policing was the single most 
important step for the post-Troubles rebuilding process. According to her, up until Sinn 
Féin signed on, there was not and would not be full community support for the police. 
Sinn Féin’s endorsement also gave support to the accountability mechanisms that had 
been set up as a result of the Patten Report. Maybe most importantly, senior politicians 
who had been openly and loudly skeptical of the PSNI began to tell people to report 
crimes to the police.282 For one community advocate who works to build relationships 
between the police and the community, the move by Sinn Féin opened doors and was a 
huge step forward in community relations,283 and for another individual, his support for 
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both the PSNI and Sinn Féin were linked. He chose to join the party and support the 
PSNI when Sinn Féin got on board.284 
Conclusion 
The tightrope walk associated with the symbolic changes to the police in the first 
ten years of the PSNI has been unfortunately underplayed in the general story that is told 
about Northern Ireland’s post-Troubles rebuilding. The difficulty in creating the space for 
members of the CNR community to be open to a ‘new’ police while not completely 
alienating the PUL community has been under-appreciated for the impact that the success 
of these changes had. The Independent Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland 
payed special attention to the history and cultural diversity of Northern Ireland and 
recommended changes that were aimed at removing any barriers to community 
confidence in the police. The symbolic changes to the name, uniform, flag and emblem, 
and representation in the police were all difficult, contested, and ultimately successful. In 
the first ten years of the new Police Service of Northern Ireland, these changes resulted in 
an increase in officers from the CNR community from 8 percent of the service in 2001 to 
30 percent of the service in 2011.285 Additionally, there was a considerable drop in the 
number of CNR identifying people who thought the PSNI was doing a ‘very/fairly’ poor 
job around the two times highlighted here when major symbolic changes were instituted 
– from 25 percent in October of 2001 to 20 percent in April 2002 after the adoption of the 
changes to the name, uniform, flag and emblem; and from 21 percent in October of 2006 
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down to 13 percent in April 2007 following Sinn Féin’s endorsement of policing.286 
Importantly, this data shows that there was growing CNR confidence in the PSNI that 
happened without a corresponding fall in PUL support. This shows that, despite concerns 
at the outset of symbolic police reform, changes in community confidence in the police 
were not a ‘zero sum game.’ The symbolic rebranding that came with the implementation 
of community policing in Northern Ireland worked to increase CNR community 
confidence without alienating the PUL community.  
While these symbolic changes did not happen in a vacuum, but in concert with 
other important changes in Northern Ireland, this chapter has demonstrated the specific 
importance of the symbols of the police in either turning off portions of the community or 
opening up the space for creating new relationships community members that felt 
alienated from or persecuted by the police during the course of ethnic conflict. Had post-
Troubles Northern Ireland not taken the steps to overhaul the police and their image 
within the CNR community, it is difficult to imagine that an un-altered RUC would have 
been successful in obtaining the confidence of the CNR community. Though many in 
both the police and the larger community remained skeptical of the changes, the general 
consensus I found was that the symbolic changes were important and necessary to make 
room for the changes of perception that followed.  
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CHAPTER IV 
IMPLEMENTING COMMUNITY POLICING: PRACTICE  
 
“Policies themselves probably wouldn’t be different; maybe how they’re 
interpreted, maybe.”287 
 
It’s always a “wait and see” approach to deciding to trust. The implementation of 
any policy doesn’t engender trust, it’s watching and experiencing how these 
policies are executed.288 
Introduction 
At the official launch of the new PSNI emblem on 26 March 2002, Assistant 
Chief Constable Alan McQuillan stated that, while the new uniforms and emblem that 
had been adopted for the PSNI would be the most visual change to the police, they had 
also been working for more than two years on the underlying structure and make-up of 
the police. These less visible changes intended to address police accountability and 
refocus on the role of the police in protecting and promoting human rights were just as 
important as the visible change in uniform, if not more so.289  
As discussed in Chapter I of this dissertation, the principles of community 
policing lead us to a set of expectations of what changes in police practice we should see 
when community policing is implemented well. Specifically, community policing implies 
that the community will be engaged in all stages of police reform from problem 
identification to idea formation to implementation and review. We should also see some 
sort of training or reorientation of police officers toward the new concepts and principles 
of community policing. Additionally, the implementation of community policing should 
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lead to decentralized decision-making systems that give more autonomy to individual 
officers to adapt policing in certain neighborhoods to the needs of those communities. 
This should produce policing that is consistent in its overarching policy of working with 
the community, but with slight variations in how policing is practiced based on the 
differing needs of the community. Finally, if all of this is done well, then the theory of 
community policing also predicts that we will see an increase in community confidence 
in the police over time.  
In this chapter, I will focus on the changes in police policy and practice that were 
made in reaction to the Patten Report and how the process and outcomes of those changes 
reflected the principles of community policing. I will highlight the difficulties faced in 
this process and how ongoing community input and engagement in the process of reform 
led to the eventual positive outcomes seen in Northern Ireland. 
The Patten Report 
  As outlined in the previous chapter, the Independent Commission on Policing for 
Northern Ireland was established after the signing of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement 
to evaluate the RUC and develop a set of recommendations for the reform of the police in 
Northern Ireland. The Commission produced the Patten Report with 175 
recommendations for police reform covering a wide range of topics. The last chapter 
focused on those recommendations that addressed what I have termed ‘symbolic change,’ 
or those changes that could be seen in the physical representation of the police from their 
ethnic representation, to their badges and uniforms, to the vehicles and equipment they 
use, and the physical buildings in which they work.  
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 In addition to these changes, the Patten Report also made many recommendations 
about how policing should be delivered in Northern Ireland. Specifically, the 
Commission made explicit that the PSNI should be focused on delivering policing with 
an emphasis on human rights, accountability, and policing with the community. 
Proponents of community policing would argue that these are three dimensions of 
community policing as opposed to separate areas of focus. In other words, community 
policing done well requires a respect for human rights, accountability of the police, and a 
focus on community-police partnerships. The following sections break these 
recommendations up based on the three expectations of community policing outlined 
above. 
Retraining the Police 
In the significant section on human rights, the Commission stated, “We cannot 
emphasize too strongly that human rights are not an impediment to effective policing but, 
on the contrary, vital to its achievement.”290 Without accusing the RUC of failing to 
consider human rights in the course of policing, the Patten Report emphasized the need to 
make human rights to basis of the new PSNI and made seven recommendations 
specifically aimed at this goal. One suggestion was to replace the controversial oath 
sworn by officers of the RUC, which included swearing allegiance to the Queen, to a 
more neutral oath that explicitly referenced the importance of human rights in policing. 
The old oath was,  
I... swear by Almighty God that I will well and truly serve our Sovereign Lady the 
Queen in the office of (rank) without favour of affection, malice or ill-will; that I 
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will to the best of my power cause the peace to be kept and preserved and that I 
will prevent to the best of my power all offences against the same; and that, while 
I shall continue to hold the said office, I will faithfully, according to law, to the 
best of my skill and knowledge, discharge all the duties of the said office and all 
such duties as may be attached to said office by law and that I do not now belong 
to and that I will not, while I shall hold the said office, belong to any association, 
society, or confederacy formed for or engaged in any seditious purpose, or any 
purpose tending to disturb the public peace, or in any way disloyal to our 
Sovereign Lady the Queen and that I will not, while I shall hold the said office, 
engage or take part in the furthering of any such purpose, or take or administer, or 
assist or be present at or consent to the administering of, any oath or engagement 
binding myself or any other person to engage in any such purpose.291 
 
The suggested text in the Patten Report read,  
I hereby do solemnly and sincerely and truly declare and affirm that I will 
faithfully discharge the duties of the office of constable, and that in so doing I will 
act with fairness, integrity, diligence and impartiality, uphold fundamental human 
rights and accord equal respect to all individuals and their traditions and 
beliefs.292 
 
The Commission recommended this oath be taken by all new and existing officers to 
affirm that “the importance of human rights as the very purpose of policing … be 
instilled in every officer from the start.”293 The removal of the language around officer 
involvement in “any association, society, or confederacy formed for or engaged in any 
seditious purpose, or any purpose tending to disturb the public peace, or in any way 
disloyal to our Sovereign Lady the Queen” was also an important change. This language 
was problematic most obviously because many potential Catholic officers would be 
unwilling to pledge an oath of loyalty to the Queen.  Removing this language was a 
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subtle, but important way to retrain officers to see their job as serving the community as 
opposed to serving the state or the Queen. 
The recommendations of the Patten Report also included incorporating the 
European Convention on Human rights into a new Code of Ethics,294 including an 
assessment of awareness of human rights in execution of duties in officer evaluations,295 
and appointing a human rights attorney to the staff of the police legal services296 among 
others.  
In addition to this reorientation toward a focus on human rights in policing, the 
Patten Report dedicated an entire chapter to retraining the police. The Commission did 
not lay out a detailed new training program, but rather recommended that such a program 
should be created and centered on the goals and recommendations of the Patten Report. 
They recommended that there be considerable community input in the final training for 
new recruits,297 that problem-solving and partnership with the community be central to 
training,298 that community awareness training be incorporated into every aspect of police 
training and that representatives from all cultural and religious traditions be consulted in 
that training,299 and that the curricula for training be publicly available and easily 
accessible.300 So while the specific curricula of the training was left to further 
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consultation, the Commission made clear that the training should be focused on 
community policing and human rights.  
Ongoing Community Consultation 
 In addition to the suggested new oath and reorientation of policing around the 
idea of human rights and community policing, the Patten Report also included 
recommendations for ensuring that human rights violations by the police be addressed, 
corrected, and punished if necessary. These recommendations can generally be 
understood under the heading of accountability. Accountability of the police was given 
two chapters in the Patten Report – one examining the state of and arrangements for 
accountability under the RUC and one on recommendations for the future. The 
Commission argued that democratic policing must be based on consent from the 
community if it is to be effective, and consent depends on accountability.301 They 
examined several different kinds of accountability including democratic accountability, 
transparency, legal accountability, financial accountability, and internal accountability.302 
The way in which the Commission envisioned the delivery of this accountability was 
focused around the ideals of community policing. Whenever possible, accountability 
would come in the form of community consultation and participation.  
First among these recommendations was the creation of the new Policing Board, 
discussed in the previous chapter for their role in selecting the new emblem of the PSNI, 
whose primary function would be to “hold the Chief Constable and the police service 
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publicly to account.”303 Among its many functions, the Board would be responsible for 
setting medium-term (3-5 year) goals for the PSNI and monitoring police performance 
with an eye to whether the PSNI is achieving those goals.  
The Commission made clear that the Board should be the primary institution of 
accountability, but that, “an important theme of this Report is that policing should be 
decentralized, and that there should be constant dialogue at local levels between the 
police and the community.”304 Therefore, in addition to the Board, the Patten Report 
recommended creating District Policing Partnership Boards (DPPBs) that would facilitate 
communication between the police and the communities they serve directly. These would 
provide a space for the community to voice concerns and for the police to present 
information about their activities and take questions from the community. The DPPBs 
would “represent the consumer, voice the concerns of citizens, and monitor the 
performance of the police in their districts.”305 The Patten Report recommended that both 
the Board and the various DPPBs should meet in public once a month to encourage 
transparency.306 To address legal accountability of the police, the Patten Report 
recommended the creation of a Police Ombudsman whose role would be to both hear and 
respond to complaints about the police as well as to seek out and investigate problems in 
policing when there had been no formal complaint.307  
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Again, the set of recommendations surrounding accountability harken back to the 
principles of community policing discussed in Chapter I of this dissertation. As the 
Commission directly stated in the Patten Report, good policing relies on the consent of 
the community and consent requires accountability. As I argued, this is a phenomenon 
specific to policing in democratic societies. Nevertheless, taking for granted that 
Northern Ireland sought democratic political solutions to the conflict, this is still 
important in that the Commission emphasized that accountability comes, at least in part, 
from community participation in the policing process. The recommendation to institute 
DPPBs and for their activities to be ongoing on an at least monthly basis is a clear 
example of the implementation of ongoing community input in policing. The make-up of 
these accountability institutions and their mandates directly reflect community policing 
principles.  
Decentralizing Decision Making 
 The most overt reference to community policing in the Patten Report falls under 
the heading of ‘policing with the community.’ This set of recommendations was prefaced 
in the Patten Report with the stipulation that, while many of the recommendations could 
and should be implemented immediately, the implementation of many of the other 
recommendations would be dependent on the ‘security situation.’308  In other words, the 
level of violence experienced in the community and by the police would necessarily set 
limits on what kinds of changes could be implemented and when. At the same time, the 
recommended changes were intended to improve the security situation, so there was a 
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degree to which some changes would be made on faith that the community would 
respond positively, making the security situation more stable, and enabling further 
change. 
 The phrase ‘policing with the community’ came out of the desire to clarify the 
often called for, but at this point ill-defined concept of community policing. The 
Commission believed that what most proponents of community policing were calling for 
was a system in which the police participate with and respond to the needs of the 
community and where the community actively communicates with and supports the 
police. Or, as they put it,  
What we do mean is: the police working in partnership with the community; the 
community thereby participating in its own policing; and the two working 
together, mobilizing resources to solve problems affecting public safety over the 
longer term rather than the police, alone, reacting short term to incidents as they 
occur.309  
 
To facilitate this style of policing, the Patten Report made several recommendations 
regarding decentralized policing including the institution of the DPPBs mentioned in the 
previous section.  
In addition, the Patten Report recommended that neighborhood policing be the 
core of police work.310 In their investigation of the RUC, the Commission found a 
consistent complaint that the hierarchy and bureaucracy of the RUC made it nearly 
impossible for officers to get their work done in the most efficient manner. The 
Commission found that there was little to no consultation of on-the-ground officers when 
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it came to policy changes and implementation. The structure of police was more in the 
style of ‘command’ than ‘management.’311  
A Superintendent commanding a sub-division answers to the Chief 
Superintendent commanding a division, who have another Superintendent as a 
Deputy Divisional Commander. Above him there is a regional headquarters, with 
an Assistant Chief Constable and another Chief Superintendent as Deputy Chief 
Constable. Only at this point for the line of management lead to central police 
headquarters.312  
 
Importantly, this led to the basic recommendation that managers be allowed to manage. 
The Commission found that this level of hierarchy made it impossible for those with 
experiential knowledge of policing on the ground to make any decisions that might 
improve the delivery of policing.313  
The Patten Report took this information and developed the neighborhood policing 
system in which managers would be allowed to manage their teams, control their budgets 
to an extent, and allow for the knowledge of those closest to the community to inform 
minor changes in policing practice on the ground. In this system, the neighborhood teams 
work directly with the community daily, forming relationships and building trust. Police 
are known to the community by face and name and are considered a part of those 
communities. To that end, the Patten Report recommended that police should patrol on 
foot whenever possible in terms of the security situation.314 Through these methods, the 
neighborhood officers become much more intimately familiar with both the problems 
they see in the neighborhood and those issues that are most on the minds of the people in 
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those communities. They should then use this knowledge to make their own suggestions 
and set their own policing priorities in their neighborhoods.315 These teams then would be 
supported by all other specialized teams within the police, rather than being a minor unit 
working independent from the other units of the police.316 To this end, the Patten Report 
included a graphic, depicted in Figure 12 below, of how they thought the organizational 
chart of the new police would look. This structure emphasized the concept that those 
closest to the community and in the most direct contact with citizens would be considered 
the highest authority on what the community needed from the police (as opposed to the 
traditional structure with the Chief as the head and highest authority in the police).  
317 
Figure 12. Recommended Command Structure 
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Implementation 
 The brief analysis above highlights some of the important ways in which the 
Commission embraced the principles of community policing and worked to incorporate 
those principles into the 175 recommendations of the Patten Report. Their 
recommendations focused on changing the culture of the police themselves to be oriented 
toward working with and respecting the community, creating accountability mechanisms 
that directly engaged the public, and reorganizing the command structure of the police to 
allowed decentralized decision-making. However, the success of community policing 
relies not just on the initial assessment of the police, but in the ongoing community 
consultation and engagement with the policing process. In other words, the Patten Report 
was a set of non-binding recommendations for reforming the police in Northern Ireland 
and while within the first two to three years of the PSNI, “almost every last word of what 
Patten recommended [had] been implemented,”318 this did not necessarily mean that 
community policing was embraced fully or was immediately successful. The culture of 
human rights was embraced by the leadership of the PSNI and was becoming more and 
more embedded in the language and culture of the PSNI. Accountability mechanisms 
were adopted and immediately put into practice. The DPPBs (adopted under the slightly 
less cumbersome name of District Policing Partnerships – DPPs), were formed and began 
regularly meeting and consulting with the community. The Policing Board and the Police 
Ombudsman’s office were also instituted and immediately began working. Policing with 
the community became the mantra of the PSNI and neighborhood policing teams became 
the focus of interaction with the community. The transition was not seamless, however, 
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and the institution of the policies associated with the guiding principles often met bumps 
on the ground. This section explores some of the specific policies that were implemented 
with the new PSNI and how those policies were experienced by the community.  
 Embedding the culture of human rights within the police force became an 
embraced policy. In my interviews, almost all the officers I spoke with mentioned the 
words ‘human rights’ at least once during the interview. As one officer I spoke with put 
it, “Human rights is… I mean everything we do is looking first and foremost at people’s 
protection of Article II right of life, privacy. And all our actions that we take, that forms 
the basis of it.”319 Later in the interview, he asserted that, while it was a difficult concept 
to grasp at the beginning, as time went on the concept of human rights became 
fundamental to the thought process of policing. In every decision, the first thought 
became “How do I protect the human rights of the people I am interacting with?” Their 
thought process became centered on seeing other people’s points of view and doing their 
best to protect those rights.320  
Certainly, the idea and words of ‘human rights’ seem to be everywhere in the 
PSNI. For example, the oath taken by officers adopted whole the language recommended 
in the Patten Report, adding an additional line, “and that while I continue to hold the said 
office I will to the best of my skill and knowledge discharge all the duties thereof 
according to law.”321 The PSNI also produces an annual ‘Human Rights Programme of 
Action,’ a document that describes the ways in which the PSNI is currently or plans to 
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better address human rights within the work of the PSNI each year, with regard to the 
Policing Board’s annual Human Rights Report (produced yearly since 2005).   
 Accountability was also a concept that was embraced in the implementation of the 
PSNI. Specifically, the Ombudsman’s office and the DPPs were set up, funded with the 
start of the PSNI, and made great efforts to reach out to the community to ensure 
knowledge of these organisms of accountability and how to access and participate in 
them. For example, the Ombudsman’s office began compiling regular publicly available 
reports with information about the public perception of the police, community awareness 
of the Police Ombudsman, community perception of the independence of the 
Ombudsman, and knowledge of how to make complaints about the police among other 
information.322 These reports, which the office began publishing in late 2000, provide 
information to the public about the complaints that have been made against the police and 
how those complaints have been resolved through the office. It can be argued that this 
office has been successful in making the community aware of its presence and function 
with 84% of respondents saying they had heard of the Police Ombudsman’s office in 
October 2011323 compared to only 57% of respondents in 2001.324 Importantly, the public 
has been consistently aware that the Ombudsman is independent of the PSNI with 81% 
and 83% of respondents saying they thought the Ombudsman to be independent in 2000 
and 2011 respectively.  
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The Police Ombudsman’s office is another accountability mechanism that 
embraces the principles of community policing. While there is no specific provision in its 
mandate requiring consultation with the community or the police in how they investigate 
complaints, the whole purpose of the Ombudsman’s office is to be responsive to the 
needs and specifically the complaints of the community. In this way, the Ombudsman’s 
office is the arm of policing in Northern Ireland that is most directly responsive to the 
community. At a conference on policing in Northern Ireland held in November 2016, the 
then sitting Police Ombudsman, Chief Executive Adrian McAllister, argued that the 
reason the Police Ombudsman Northern Ireland office has been successful is due to the 
policies surrounding the authority of the office.325 The Ombudsman is responsible for 
every complaint made against a police officer from ‘this officer was rude to me’ to in-
custody deaths. To accomplish proper investigations for all complaints, they also have 
free and total access to all PSNI records. The PSNI may not withhold records requests 
from the Ombudsman’s office. Further, the Ombudsman is not limited to waiting on 
complaints from the public to pursue investigations. They have the power to ‘call 
themselves in’ if they think there is a matter worth investigating. In this way, they can act 
on behalf of the community even without specific community complaint. All these 
policies, in addition to the transparency provided by the regular reports mentioned above, 
have resulted in community confidence in the Police Ombudsman, and therefore 
confidence in the accountability of the police themselves.326  
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The DPPs created a new space for the community to communicate directly with 
the officers that serve them and for police to hear the specific concerns and needs of the 
community. The implementation of the DPPs was dictated in the Police (Northern 
Ireland) Act 2000 which stated the role of the DPPs to obtain and present the views of the 
community on policing to the District Commander and to provide a general forum for 
discussion and consultation on policing matters in the district, among other duties.327 In 
all, 26 DPPs were established, corresponding with the already existing District Councils. 
The different DPPs had varying levels of membership, seven had the minimum 15 
people, five had 17 representatives, and 14 had the maximum of 19 members. All DPPs 
membership had a simple majority of elected officials, with the remainder Independent 
Representatives selected through an application process to be broadly representative of 
the community. The Policing Board had final say on appointments. When the first set of 
appointees were announced, they ranged in age from 22 to 75, came from all walks of 
life, and were gender and culturally representative.328  
The DPPs were very quickly successful in engaging the community in the 
policing process. The first DPPs began meeting in April 2003,329 and the first Omnibus 
survey conducted after this in October 2003 showed that 65% of the population (63% of 
Catholics and 69% of Protestants) had heard of the DPPs and 64% of the population 
(57% of Catholics and 68% of Protestants) said they were prepared to contact their local 
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DPP to raise issues/questions about the police.330 I spoke with several individuals who 
have served or currently serve on their local DPPs (now called Policing and Community 
Safety Partnerships – PCSPs) as well as several officers who all stated that the 
communication facilitated by the DPP/PCSPs was an important step in building 
community confidence in the police. One interviewee who joined his local DPP after the 
tragic death of a friend stated that he had no relationship with the police, RUC or PSNI, 
until that time. Because of his involvement, he told me, he was able to not only 
communicate with the police about the issues he and his community were facing, but was 
also able to hear, learn about, and comment on the strategies the PSNI were using to try 
to combat the issues he raised. As a staunch Republican from a working-class 
neighborhood, this was the first time he was able to develop confidence in, if not the 
entire PSNI, the individual officers he met and worked with through the DPP.331 
Similarly, many officers and other community leaders stated that the DPPs 
shortened the pipeline of information between the community and the police. For 
example, one community leader said that prior to the institution of the DPPs, if a crime 
happened that needed to be investigated by the police someone within the area affected 
would call a community leader, such as this individual, who would then call the police to 
let them know what needed doing and where. Then the community leaders would arrange 
for protection for the police within that space for the time they needed it. With the 
introduction of the DPPs, community activists within those same communities had direct 
                                                 
330 Northern Ireland Policing Board and Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, "Public 
Perceptions of the Police and the Northern Ireland Policing Board October 2003," (Belfast2003). 
331 Belfast Civilian 1. 
141 
 
contact with the police and were able to ensure safety without having to go through an 
intermediary.332 
The DPPs are one of the most obvious examples of community policing at work 
in Northern Ireland. The organizations provide forums for community members and the 
police to speak directly to one another in a setting that is intended to facilitate such 
conversation. The institution of neighborhood policing teams was the way in which the 
PSNI worked to build relationships with the community in a less formal and more 
everyday way than the DPP/PCSPs could provide. Following very closely the 
recommendations of the Patten Report, the PSNI invested heavily in and arranged the 
work of the police primarily around neighborhood teams who worked and patrolled in 
relatively small, defined areas. These officers worked to know the people in the 
neighborhoods they were assigned to, developed relationships, and acted as 
intermediaries whenever other branches of the PSNI needed to operate within their 
assigned neighborhoods. The personal relationships these officers were able to foster 
humanized the police in many areas where there had been little to no interaction with the 
police or at least little positive interaction. As one officer demonstrated in the following 
anecdote, one major obstacle to the community having confidence in the police was the 
belief that the officers were not real people, but just arms of the state.  
I remember standing on the city walls here, in a blue suit, which was public order. 
And I was a normal cop, but I, [had on] some protective gear, and [a] young guy 
came up. And he started giving a bit of abuse. So, I was chatting to him … and 
after a while he sort of settled down. [He says] ‘I, I hate all Protestants. You 
know they taught me that in St. Joe’s’ which is a local school. I says ‘I’m sure 
they didn’t teach you that. You may have learnt that when you were there, but I’m 
sure St. Joe’s did not teach you to hate Catholics, or to hate Protestants.’ And he 
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says, ‘I hate all Protestants, I hate all cops.’ I said, well do you hate me? ‘Oh no, 
you’re all right.’ But I was all right because he’d engaged with me and I’d talked 
to him and spoke with him.333 
 
This officer found that simply interacting with the boy in this situation tore down a wall 
that had been built through social conditioning and isolation from the police. Through 
this one interaction, the officer may not have wholly changed the boy’s mind, but he was 
able to point out to him that his ‘hatred of all Protestants and cops’ was not absolute. This 
was the theory behind the PSNI’s focus on neighborhood policing in action.  
A different officer highlighted how the various arms of community policing 
discussed in this dissertation did not work in isolation from one another, but instead 
mutually reinforced the work each was doing. For example, he said that in the early years 
of the PSNI new recruits were required to first train with the neighborhood teams for 3-4 
weeks before going out into the field. This, he argued, led to better interactions between 
‘regular’ (or non-neighborhood) officers and the community. He argued that because the 
neighborhood teams have specific skills when it comes to talking and de-escalation, they 
had the ability to impart at least the basics of these skills in new recruits to help things go 
more smoothly in other divisions.334 For example, he said that most new recruits go into 
Response, the teams assigned to be the first to arrive at the scene of a crime. Because 
Response officers are the first to interact with citizens who are often in distress, in these 
situations, the skills they learned from their training with the neighborhood teams helps 
them to be more sensitive and communicate better with the civilians with which they 
interact. Even though they are not able to spend as much time with each victim as a 
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neighborhood officer would given the parameters of their job, they are able to utilize their 
additional training to improve their interactions with the community. 
Results: Successes and Failures 
In the highly charged atmosphere of post-Troubles Northern Ireland, there were 
essentially two forms of policing the community monitored closely: public-order policing 
at events such as demonstrations or parades, and day-to-day policing including the 
handling of common crimes such as murder and burglary on down to vandalism and other 
anti-social behavior. The ways in which the PSNI handled policing in these situations has 
largely shaped how the community views not just the competence of the police, but also 
the level of bias in policing. Public order policing was often the source of much scrutiny 
due in part to its very public performance in highly publicized and political atmospheres. 
In particular, the policing of parades during the summer ‘parade season’ was and remains 
highly politically charged.  
 Parading has been a large part of the culture of Northern Ireland since at least the 
eighteenth century. Many consider these annual parades a display of culture and 
celebration of history. However, of the 2722 parades in 2001, 2218 of those were labeled 
loyalist while only 133 of them were nationalist (with the remaining categorized as 
‘other’),335 so it is understandable that the parades season is often seen as a time for 
loyalist celebrations, upsetting the nationalist community. In that same year, 29 of the 
parades experienced disorder. While the statistics do not provide specific information on 
what the nature of the disorder was or who, if anyone, was arrested, there has been a 
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history of clashes over the routes the parades take, some of them marching directly 
through the middle of primarily CNR communities antagonizing the residents.336 
 With the history of the parades season as a catalyst for clashes between the CNR 
and PUL community, it is not surprising that the PSNI’s approach to policing these 
events was under the microscope from the beginning. The Public Processions (Northern 
Ireland) Act of 1998 created a new body that would remove the responsibility of deciding 
the legality of certain parades and their approved routes from the police.337 Instead, the 
Parades Commission made these decisions and the police were charged with enforcing 
their rulings. This provided some minimal cushion in how police were perceived when 
policing these events. However, even though the Parades Commission was helpful in 
separating the police from decisions about parading in the eyes of the community,338 
“they had to give advice on the impact of a parade and to give effect to any determination 
by the Parades Commission which had the force of law.”339 In other words, as one 
community member presented it, even with the advent of the Parades Commission, if the 
police are enforcing decisions that are considered illegitimate by a portion of the 
community, they will be blamed.340 Therefore, it became that much more important to 
communicate and work with the community on how policing would be done at parades.  
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One interviewee told me the following story to demonstrate how important 
ongoing communication between the police and the community is to gaining community 
confidence in the police over time. 
The PSNI used to police the annual parades with their backs to the people 
marching (usually Protestants) and facing the protesters (usually Catholics 
objecting to the routes or time of the parade). The CNR community interpreted 
this body language as a sign that the police assumed Catholics would be the 
source of any trouble and the police were there to protect the Protestant marchers. 
When clashes between the protesters and marchers occurred in which the police 
arrested Catholics but not Protestants, the Catholic community interpreted this as 
discrimination by the police. After a series of violent clashes in the early 2000s, 
and with consultation with community leaders, the police changed their methods 
so that when lining up to police a parade route, every other officer faced the 
paraders and the protesters/observers in turn. This simple change in policing 
procedure made a huge difference in how the community in that neighborhood 
interpreted the role of the police. They were there to maintain order, de-escalate 
problems when they arose, and protect whomever needed protecting from 
whomever became an aggressor.341  
 
Due to the success of this change in tactics, the interviewee claimed, the PSNI 
were able to make further inroads in some communities that had been historically 
difficult to police during parading. For example, certain community leaders would come 
to the parades and be on hand to calm members of their communities in moments of high 
tension. An officer could flag down a known leader to point out a community member 
who was causing trouble and de-escalate the situation before police intervention and/or 
an arrest would be necessary.342 In a separate interview, another community leader also 
independently mentioned this same example as one in which the lived experiences of 
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those who were present at the parades and saw the change in police practice led to 
internalized positive feelings about the PSNI.343 
This example of change in parading policing tactics was the direct result of 
experience and communication between the police and the community. It is also a 
demonstration of the decentralized decision-making that the introduction of 
neighborhood policing teams allowed in the PSNI. This change was localized and 
specific to certain areas with highly contentious parades. In areas where the parades were 
smaller or not as contentious, the officers have not necessarily made these same changes. 
For example, in one station in Belfast where I conducted a series of interviews, the 
officers were consistent in stating that the parades that happen within their jurisdiction 
are not particularly contentious because the traditional routes do not run through 
neighborhoods or in areas where communities would clash. For these officers, parades 
have not historically needed special policing. Instead, the neighborhood in East Belfast 
that is in their jurisdiction has one specific interface area (a street where a heavily or 
exclusively CNR neighborhood borders a predominately or exclusively PUL 
neighborhood) where they face the most difficult challenges to community policing.344 
It is easy to understand why interface areas present difficulties for the police in 
Northern Ireland. Many of these interface areas have what have been termed ‘peace 
walls,’ like the one shown in Figure 13, erected to separate the two communities and 
reduce violence.  
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Figure 13. Peace Wall in Belfast 
However, these walls also work to retrench the divisions in the community and can be 
difficult to remove once erected. As one government official stated, the places where 
peace walls have been successfully removed since the end of the Troubles are the areas 
where the community had already developed good relationships with the PSNI officers 
covering their area.346 Again, this demonstrates the importance of community policing 
both in developing neighborhood specific policies, but also generally building 
relationships between the community and the neighborhood officers in an area. The 
success of eliminating sometimes 90-foot walls with barbed wire can depend on how 
much the community trusts that the police will be present and fair if and when 
contentious moments arise.  
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 While public order policing is by its nature very public, and therefore easily 
monitored and publicized, most people still have their only interactions with the police in 
the course of day-to-day policing of common crime. Therefore, it was just as important 
for the PSNI to listen to the community and work with them to improve relationships 
through positive interactions in these situations as in public order policing situations, if 
not more so. Like with parading, the most important advancements in this area also came 
from listening to and learning from the reactions of the community. For example, the 
community can generally agree that there will be times when the police need to search 
homes of suspected criminals. Even during the Troubles, there were times when the CNR 
community accepted the role of the RUC in performing searches. One officer gave the 
example of a child-abuse investigation in the heart of a CNR estate in Derry city during 
the Troubles. Sinn Féin worked with the RUC to ensure the community was willing to let 
the police into the estate “unfettered and deal with it” because the issue of child abuse 
within their community was so toxic to the political work they were doing, it was better 
for them to allow the RUC to take care of the situation.347  
The way in which searches are performed makes a huge difference in whether the 
community finds a particular search legitimate, however. One officer explained that 
during the Troubles, when he was sent to search one or two homes in a CNR estate, the 
entire estate would be shut down, blocked at every entrance and exit by armed officers 
with military back up. Understandably, he said, the community was turned off by this 
practice and blamed the police for being placed essentially under siege.  
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Everybody was basically being tarred with the same stick because you maybe 
were not involved at all, but you’re still getting caught maybe taking the kids to 
school. You’re being stopped at a vehicle check-point. There’s military standing 
about. There’s police standing about. We’re all armed to the teeth.348  
The same officer said that when the PSNI needs to perform a search now  
We avoid around school time. We avoid around tea time. We avoid around when 
school’s getting out. We avoid doing early house searches, like 5 or 6 o’clock in 
the morning, unless there is a critical reason as to why we need to do that. If 
there’s children in the house, we will try and do the search after the kids go to 
school, and so on.349  
In addition, when it is possible and appropriate, they will call community 
representatives ahead of time to let them know that a search is going to happen and why, 
and then will let them know when the police have cleared the area. In this way, the 
community feels they are being respected and not randomly targeted.350 Over time, this 
policy has also allowed the police to perform surprise searches with the general support 
of the community. Where in the past community members would throw rocks and other 
projectiles at the police when they performed a search,351 now the odd surprise search is 
seen as more legitimate because the PSNI have been so thorough about communication. 
The community is more willing to accept the necessity of a surprise search when they are 
warned about most searches.352  
 On an even more individual level, the practices of neighborhood policing actively 
changed individual people’s minds about the PSNI. As one community member put it, 
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neighborhood teams were the medium through which the community experienced the 
police ‘delivering on policing.’ “These teams led to personal relationships, one-on-one 
conversations, and personal contacts with the police.”353 The policy of developing 
relationships with activists and members of the community was truly taken to heart by 
every neighborhood officer I interviewed; and, conversely, every community activist and 
most other individuals I interviewed had the phone number of at least one officer they 
could contact personally. All five of the neighborhood team leaders I interviewed had 
multiple mobile phones and my interviews were interrupted more than once to answer 
calls coming in from the community. This level of engagement makes it that much easier 
for officers to build relationships in the community. As one officer put it,  
I do think people like the fact that you have a mobile telephone and they can ring 
you. And if they do have a concern, they’re not going through to the switchboard, 
they’re ringing the officer. Even though they know you’re not always on duty, but 
they’ll leave a message now and they’ll know, ‘Oh, aye, they will ring me back.’ 
And I think all that has helped. Whereas before, you know, there was no personal 
contact like that. They were just ringing in and possibly getting anybody.354  
When I asked the officer if this meant they are never really off duty, she responded that it 
is not policy for officers to take their work mobile phones home with them, but many do 
because, 
Sometimes you’re wondering, you know, depending on who, who is doing the 
ringing, you think ‘well, maybe if they ring me and I’m… and they don’t get 
answer, they’ll be vulnerable.’ So, you take your phone just in case. You know you 
find yourself, maybe, doing that more and more. But then, I think that also helps 
because people then know you sort of care. So, I think that helps, you know, gain 
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the trust too. You know, because we’re human too, so of course you care. You 
know you want the best for people.355 
This level of engagement and commitment from neighborhood officers has built 
relationships that would have seemed impossible during the Troubles. One officer told a 
story of a friend of his, who had won ‘officer of the year’ shortly after the institution of 
the PSNI saying,  
Now he was a guy who was in the RUC, but the community knew him, they trusted 
him, they built that relationship with him, and that I think has been sort of the 
greatest success. That engagement with people. That genuine engagement with 
people. That honesty with people has been the change. Policies are good, you 
know, but it comes down to personal attitude and people’s willingness to engage 
on a real genuine level.356 
Another pointed out that he had received an email addressed ‘A Chara’, which is Irish for 
‘Dear.’357 That an individual in the community would feel comfortable sending an email 
with that greeting to an officer demonstrates a level of comfort not experienced under the 
RUC.  
 The community members I interviewed were also insistent that the individual 
interactions with the police were the most important factors in gaining confidence in the 
PSNI as a whole. As one community member stated, “Experience is what makes 
individuals come to trust the police; day to day living.”358 Yet another stated, “Trust 
comes from the policies plus the experience while waiting to see outcomes.”359 “In the 
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end,” another community interviewee stated, “good policing is what determines 
legitimacy. We should always be questioning and improving. This is a burden for the 
police, but it’s what they signed up for.”360 
Tempering Expectations 
 The information provided here seems to provide good evidence that community 
policing has been implemented as close to in line with the principles discussed in Chapter 
I of this dissertation as possible. The results discussed in Chapter II also seem to tell us 
that community policing in Northern Ireland has succeeded in its goal of building 
community confidence in the police. However, it is important not to be overly starry-eyed 
about the successes of community policing in Northern Ireland. It was not an automatic 
nor easy switch from the CNR community deeply distrusting the RUC to embracing the 
PSNI. Similarly, it was not an easy transition for the members of the police to make the 
switch from the RUC to the PSNI.  
 In Chapter II, I demonstrated that there was a significant increase in community 
confidence in the police in the first ten years of the PSNI, specifically within the CNR 
community who had been deeply distrustful of the RUC. However, what those statistics 
do not demonstrate well is that this shift was not linear. For example, in the first 5 years 
of the PSNI from 2001-2006, the omnibus survey was conducted twice a year, usually in 
April and September. In that time, Catholic community confidence in the police seemed 
to consistently waiver with the percentage of Catholics who rated the overall performance 
of the police as ‘very/fairly good’ tending to slowly increase from around 50% to 55% in 
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April, but always dropping to below or about 50% in September.361 This pattern indicates 
that the summer months in Northern Ireland tended to create more tension between the 
Catholic community and the police. This is not surprising given that the marching season 
described above begins in July and runs through September. Even while issues with 
policing parades were worked on regularly over time, this season clearly continued to 
create hard feelings between the Catholic community and the PSNI in its early years. 
However, beginning with the survey conducted in October 2007, notably the first survey 
after Sinn Féin endorsed the PSNI, Catholic community confidence jumped to 62% and 
actually increased over the next several surveys coming in at 65% in April 2008, 66% in 
September 2008, and a high of 67% in April 2009.362 However, following some 
particularly violent parades protests in July 2009 where the police used water cannons 
and baton rounds to disperse rioters,363 overall confidence in the police dropped a few 
points in the Catholic community to 61% in September 2009 and stayed fairly level at 
62% in September 2010 and 63% in January 2012.364 Importantly, what these last series 
of numbers show is that the level of confidence the Catholic community has in the police 
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may be affected by one particularly negative incident, but it tends to stay relatively 
constant, even with some small gains, otherwise.  
The pattern of gains and losses in the CNR community’s confidence in the police 
described above is worth emphasizing. The large dip in the CNR community’s 
confidence in the police following the 2009 parade season reflects the importance of 
individual interactions with the police as highlighted in many of the interviews I 
conducted and brought up throughout this dissertation. One community leader stated, 
“Trust still comes down to individual actions within the police. Good cops lead to good 
interactions lead to trust.” That same community leader went on to say that interactions in 
any situation, whether high tension like parading or low tension like traffic stops, will 
affect how the community views the whole of the PSNI. He said, “[The police] could 
explain themselves better, be more personable. One bad interaction with the police can 
ruin the community’s view of the whole PSNI.”365 The incremental gains in community 
confidence made from 2001-2008 were damaged, at least temporarily, because of the 
perceived harsh tactics used by the police during the 2009 parading season. This is the 
burden of the police, to balance the need for public order and safety with the rights of 
those protesting. As another community leader put it, “In the end, good policing is what 
determines legitimacy. We should always be questioning and improving. This is a burden 
for the police, but it’s what they signed up for.”366 
 In addition to the early cycle of making some gains in Catholic community 
confidence in the PSNI only to lose those gains every summer, the police themselves had 
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difficulties with the transition. I spoke with one family member of an RUC officer who 
said that while she and her family embraced the peace process, it was a difficult transition 
to become a part of the community again. She explained that, especially during the 
Troubles, RUC officers and their families often felt like a community apart from the rest 
of Northern Ireland, including separate from other non-police Protestants. For her family, 
the transition from isolationism within the world of the police and police families to 
becoming a part of the larger community was extremely difficult.367 This feeling of 
separation is still felt by some officers today. When asked if he was comfortable sharing 
his ethnic/religious affiliation for an interview, one officer answered that he was 
Protestant but would consider himself an officer if discussing community divisions. He 
said that his experience had been that the conflict had three sides: Catholics, Protestants, 
and the police. He did not feel he was a ‘part’ of the Protestant community, but rather a 
separate community of officers.368  
 Possibly, it was the lack of understanding of this dynamic among those making 
recommendations for police reform that resulted in what some saw as inadequate 
consideration of the police themselves in the reform process. Several of the officers I 
interviewed who had been a part of both the RUC and PSNI and had lived through the 
transition expressed frustration at what they saw as a lack of consultation with officers in 
how the transition should proceed. One officer articulated it this way, 
The way the British government handled it in terms of the police was, ‘We’re your 
employer. Like it or lump it.’ And that caused untold psychological hurt and 
damage to the officers. And it was so disjointed and so confused and so 
frustrating. Em, for example, I can remember that they issued this decree that 
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said, ‘Nowhere in any police station will there be anything relating to the Royal 
Ulster Constabulary. It will not be.’ Police officers who had been through so 
much, who had, who had lost so much. Who had lost colleagues, who had had 
horrendous psychological experiences were told, “Shut up. Shh. Don’t. Don’t 
talk. You’ll offend somebody.”369  
This seeming lack of care or attention to the needs of the officers staying on from the 
RUC to feel like they had a say in how the transition moved forward may also be 
responsible in part for why the transition was slow and trust between the police and the 
CNR community was difficult to achieve. If the police do not fully buy into the ethos of 
community policing, it will not work. However, it is tough to get real buy in from officers 
if they are simply told what to do instead of feeling like they were consulted and 
considered in reform.  
The slow buildup of confidence between the police and the community is 
reflected in the stories relayed above. The negative reactions to police tactics at parades, 
for example, were not easily or quickly solved. Instead, the ultimate change to the new 
tactics described in the anecdote above was the result of multiple meetings between the 
police and the community, innumerable bad feelings, and a deep struggle to overcome the 
distrust between the police and those members of the CNR community who had their 
misgivings about the PSNI cemented by early bad experiences.370 However, what these 
statistics backed up by the stories relayed above do show is that the principle of ongoing 
communication and collaboration between the community and the police was embraced 
and maintained even through serious struggles in Northern Ireland and, in the end 
                                                 
369 Derry Officer 2. 
370 Belfast Civilian 2. 
157 
 
produced the kind of community confidence in the police promised by proponents of 
community policing.  
Conclusion 
 Police reform in Northern Ireland after the Troubles was largely shaped by the 
principles of community policing as laid out in Chapter I of this dissertation. The 
Independent Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland emphasized the importance of 
community confidence for the police to have legitimacy in the Patten Report. Their many 
recommendations for reforming the police in Northern Ireland focused on the goal of 
gaining legitimacy through community confidence in the police and sought to do this 
through embracing community policing.  
 In this chapter, I have demonstrated how well police reform in Northern Ireland 
mapped onto the second set of expectations laid out in Chapter I of this dissertation 
regarding the structures of institutions and practices of community policing. First, there 
were specific changes to the training of the police in Northern Ireland meant to refocus 
policing philosophy around the concept of policing with the community. This was 
demonstrated through the changed to the oath of office for police in the new PSNI as well 
as the changes in training that required new officers to spend time training with 
neighborhood teams. Second, there was clear involvement of the community at every 
stage of the reform process, and importantly, there exist permanent institutions and 
mechanisms for the ongoing input of the community in policing. The Police 
Ombudsman’s Office, the Policing Board, and the DPP/PCSPs provide avenues for the 
community to not just complain about the police, but to also provide innovative ideas and 
solutions for their own community’s problems. Third, police reform in Northern Ireland 
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involved a decentralization in some decision-making so that neighborhood teams were 
able to creatively solve the problems they faced through working with the communities 
they serve. In other words, officers are able to work within the general rules of the police 
while still allowing the localized knowledge they gain through regular interactions with 
the public to guide final decision making. The examples given of different neighborhood 
teams focusing on different issues such as parading or interface areas demonstrates this 
flexibility.  
 Importantly, I do not want to paint the picture that this transition was easy or 
perfectly executed. There were several bumps in the road to implementing community 
policing in Northern Ireland after the Troubles. There could have been more outreach 
done to the members of the police who chose to stay on during the transition from the 
RUC to the PSNI. There were also several specific incidents over the years that inflamed 
tensions and, at least temporarily, diminished community confidence in the police. 
However, the success of the community policing initiative in Northern Ireland can be 
seen in the significant increase in community confidence in the PSNI over its first ten 
years of existence.  
 These changes did not happen in a vacuum. However, this and the previous 
chapter have demonstrated how community policing was implemented in the context of 
post-ethnic civil conflict Northern Ireland. This process involved both symbolic and 
practical changes to the structure and delivery of policing. In the next chapter, I will 
explore how Kenya attempted to follow a very similar model for implementing police 
reform following their extremely violent 2007 national elections. I will lay out the brief 
history of ethnic conflict in Kenya and how it erupted in 2007. Then I will then look at 
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the specific reforms they undertook and how, despite consultation with many proponents 
of community policing and specific reference to Northern Ireland’s process, Kenya seems 
to have failed to implement community policing.  
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CHAPTER V 
KENYA 
Introduction 
 The story of how Northern Ireland implemented community policing and moved 
from a 30-plus year violent ethnic conflict to state-stability and high levels of community 
confidence in the police is important in its own right. However, it is also important to 
examine the degree to which the lessons of Northern Ireland’s approach to community 
policing can be applied to other instances of state rebuilding after violent ethnic conflict. 
Northern Ireland is often held up as an example for other ethnically divided communities 
of how to reform policing and build community confidence in the police.371 Several of 
the officers and community members I interviewed had been invited to speak in other 
regions of the world, including Israel and Palestine and South Africa, on their 
experiences with police reform.372 One group I met was organizing training on policing 
in ethnically divided communities that they were planning to export to police around the 
world, starting with the Chicago Police Department.373 One country that explicitly 
examined the experiences of Northern Ireland when reforming their own police was 
Kenya in the aftermath of their 2007 election violence.   
Following a particularly ethnically divisive presidential race in 2007, Kenya 
experienced an outbreak of violence that left 1,133 dead and 350,000 internally displaced 
people, according to the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election 
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Violence (commonly referred to as the Waki Report for its chairperson, Justice Philip 
Waki).374 In this chapter, I will first briefly explore the ethnic tensions that led to the 
outbreak of violence prior to, during, and following the 2007 presidential election and 
will then look at how Kenya responded to this violence. Like Northern Ireland, Kenya 
has a history of distrust between the police and community and therefore there was a 
specific focus on reforming the police in the aftermath of violence. I discuss the shape 
these reforms took, noting the specific influence of the experiences of Northern Ireland, 
and discuss how their implementation was approached. Finally, I provide an initial 
discussion of how the Kenyan community has responded to these reforms and make some 
suggestions for why this response has been so different from that in Northern Ireland.  
Historical Setting 
 Kenya, much like Northern Ireland, has a long history in which interactions 
between the authorities and the community have been fraught. It makes the most sense to 
start the story of Kenya’s history of ethnic tensions and distrust of the police with 
colonization. In 1895, the British government claimed the land of modern-day Kenya as a 
colony and a protectorate and set up a formal British administration.375 Much like 
colonialism in other parts of Africa, the Kenyan colonial experience was shaped largely 
by policies of racism. For example, large portions of land that cut through the modern-
day provinces of the Rift Valley, Nyanza, Western, and Central were reserved for white 
European settlers and became known as the ‘White Highlands.’376 Other policies were 
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also put in place to force Africans to work for low wages on public works projects or on 
settler farms.377  
It was during the colonial period that the British also used tribal distinctions 
among the Africans to divide and control the local population. The Kenyan people 
represent a wide variety of ethnicities that could be divided into more than 70 distinct 
groups. The largest ethnic group, the Kikuyu, make up about 20% of the overall 
population (about 7 million people) with the next largest group (the Luo) making up just 
under 14%, while the smallest ethnic groups such as the El Molo account for only 500 
people. The five largest ethnic groups in Kenya include the Kikuyu, Luo, Luhya, Kamba, 
and Kalenjin and together account for about 70% of the Kenyan population. There are 
many other smaller and well-known groups including the Maasai, and many groups have 
shared linguistic traits such as those who speak variations of Bantu or Niolitic 
languages.378  
While there were several tribal identities in Kenya at the time of colonization, 
they had regularly intermixed and intermarried.379 Under British colonial rule, these 
identities were solidified and politicized. For example, the Kikuyu people were forced to 
become tenant farmers while the Maasai were defined as herders by the British and were 
confined to specific areas. The Kikuyu and Maasai were not allowed to enter each other’s 
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territory, and so the ethnic divisions that had previously been very fluid became fixed.380 
These divisions were enforced for all the ethnic groups in Kenya.381 
 The influence of colonialism on the importance and prominence of ethnicity 
cannot be overstated. The lasting effects of colonialism in Kenya can be seen in the form 
of government and structure of the constitution, the laws surrounding the allocation of 
land, and in the continued political relevance of ethnicity and ethnic identification.  
At the time of independence, the form and structure of Kenya’s government was 
strongly debated. One side of the debate, a political coalition of two of the largest ethnic 
groups, the Kikuyu and Luo, preferred a strong central government with large powers 
resting with the president.382 This essentially would be a copy of the colonial 
government, with Africans at the head instead of the British, and would create a weak 
legislature and judicial branch that had little independence from the executive and, 
therefore, no real checks on the executive’s powers.383 A coalition of smaller ethnic 
groups opposed this structure of government, fearing that the rights of smaller ethnic 
groups (specifically land rights) would be overrun by such a strong central government 
and instead preferred a kind of ethnic federalism (majimboism in Swahili) where semi-
autonomous regions based on ethnicity would have more control supplemented by a 
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much weaker central government.384 Opponents of majimboism claimed this kind of 
decentralized and tribalistic government structure would be destabilizing to the fledgling 
independent Kenya.385 When Jomo Kenyatta (an ethnic Kikuyu) and the strong central 
government coalition won the first election in 1964, most regional powers were abolished 
and Kenya’s first constitution had a strong central government.386  
In addition to winning the argument over the form of government, Kenyatta also 
convinced his main political rival, Daniel arap Moi (an ethnic Kalenjin), that it was better 
for the country to present a united government and Moi agreed to merge his Kenya 
African Democratic Union (KANU) party with Kenyatta’s Kenya African National 
Union (KANU). The remaining major opposition party, the Kenya People’s Party (KPU) 
was banned,387 and Kenya became a de facto one-party state with no effective opposition 
parties.388 Some have argued that this was necessary to suppress the more extreme 
political elements in the newly independent Kenya, emphasizing peace and stability in 
order to address economic and political legacies of colonialism.389 However, it is 
important to note that this was a step away from the democratic institutions initially 
promised for independent Kenya.  
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 President Moi succeeded President Kenyatta upon his death and in 1982 made 
Kenya an official one-party state, amending the constitution to reflect this.390 However, 
under intense international pressures to democratize, multi-party elections were 
reintroduced in 1991. The re-introduction of multi-party elections naturally led to a 
resurgence of the debate over majimboism.391 Because Moi was Kalenjin, one of the 
smaller of the major ethnic groups with just under 11% of the population,392 he was able 
to use the resurgence of the majimboism debate to his advantage and managed to win his 
elections in 1992 and 1997. However, both elections were marked by extreme violence 
and ethnic tensions.393 For example, to shore up his support in the Rift Valley among 
ethnic minorities, President Moi tried to incite hatred toward the Kikuyu to drive them 
out of the area. He was successful in promoting clashes that led to up to 1,500 people 
dead and 300,000 displaced.394  
When the hybrid party of the National Rainbow Coalition and their presidential 
candidate Mwai Kibaki (an ethnic Kikuyu) ran for office in 2002, they promised a new 
constitution within 100 days that would end corruption in government.395 The various 
parties that made up the Coalition signed a Memorandum of Understanding in which they 
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agreed to a general formation of government under the unified coalition.396 
Unfortunately, when they won, the Coalition almost immediately fractured over how to 
reform the constitution with particular contention over the powers of the president and 
many of the promised reforms were lost or watered down in the process of negotiations. 
When this weak reform proposal was put to a national vote, the factions within the 
National Rainbow Coalition split with several groups supporting the “no” campaign. The 
referendum ultimately failed with 57% of Kenyans voting “no”,397 leaving Kenya with 
the same constitutional issues from before.398  
Issues of land are intimately related to the constitutional issues Kenya has 
experienced. When Kenya became independent in 1963, the British handed over most of 
the approximately 20 percent of Kenyan land they had claimed for themselves during 
colonialism.399 However, rather than handing the land over to the people or tribes from 
whom the land had been taken, it was given to the new Kenyan government.400 The new 
government, as already noted, had been formed with the help of the British as a reflection 
of the colonial government before it and therefore did not include any provisions for 
collective land rights. Instead, the new government maintained the system of private 
ownership of land, which upset many of the indigenous people who had maintained 
agreements for the collective use of land under colonialism. While under colonialism, 
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they had not been allowed to own the land (it was held in ‘trust’ for them by the 
government), they had been allowed to use it according to their traditional communal 
practices.401  
 In the new independent Kenya, President Kenyatta did not acknowledge 
traditional land use and instead sold the land as private property to any willing buyer with 
the ability to pay. This policy led to much of the land being sold to members of 
Kenyatta’s own Kikuyu ethnic group instead of to those who had traditionally used the 
land.402 The policy of selling historically common-use land to individuals continued 
under Kenyatta’s successor, President Moi. Moi publicly villainized the ‘land grabs’ of 
the Kikuyu while continuing the sales quietly, arguably because it was the Kikuyu who 
had the money to purchase the land. These actions throughout the Moi presidency from 
1979-2002 increased the amount of contested land as well as the animosity of other 
minority ethnic groups toward the Kikuyu.403 The 2002 campaign of Kibaki’s National 
Rainbow Coalition focused heavily on the unjust distribution of land in Kenya and 
promised to rectify the disparities that had been introduced under colonialism and 
reinforced under the administrations of Presidents Kenyatta and Moi.404 When he was 
elected, Kibaki created the Ndung’u Commission to examine the history and current 
patterns of corruption and favoritism in land allocation. Ultimately, the report produced 
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by the Commission was deemed too controversial and the Kibaki government chose not 
the implement its recommendations.405 
 To reiterate, ethnicity is tied closely to both the political and land debates in 
Kenya. As such, ethnicity has been a common tool used to manipulate the electorate and 
garner support for politicians. As mentioned earlier, the debates over constitutional form 
and the election of Jomo Kenyatta were organized along ethnic lines with the larger 
ethnic groups of the Kikuyu and Luo supporting Kenyatta and a strong centralized 
government and most minority ethnic groups preferring federalism based on majimboism. 
With the reintroduction of a multi-party system under President Moi, ethnicity was again 
activated to garner support for Moi while creating an ‘enemy’ in the Kikuyu against 
which smaller ethnic groups in Kenya could direct their frustrations.406 Ethnic tensions 
and violent clashes were associated with the 1997 elections and several investigations 
concluded that the violence was incited and organized by politicians.407 Despite these 
accusations and some examples of specific evidence against individuals, no one has been 
prosecuted for these crimes.408 Similarly, in the 2002 elections, even though Kibaki 
himself was Kikuyu, his support of a new constitution and the possibility of the 
institutionalization of majimboism was a large reason for his successful run.409  
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Election Violence 
 The preceding sections highlight the continuously shifting alliances among ethnic 
groups and political parties throughout Kenya’s independent history. After the National 
Rainbow Coalition fell apart over the constitutional debates of 2002, Kibaki dissolved the 
cabinet and reformed the government under the new heading of the Party of National 
Unity (PNU) which included those factions of the National Rainbow Coalition which had 
supported his “yes” campaign for constitutional reform.410 The 2007 Kenyan elections 
were marked by much of the same ethnically divisive rhetoric and ethnically based 
violence of elections past. The candidates all had substantive platforms, but also leaned 
heavily on ethnic divisions in their campaigning.411 The PNU was accused by the 
opposition of ruling in favor of President Kibaki’s ethnic group, the Kikuyu. The 
opposition party, the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), was led by Raila Odinga, an 
ethnic Luo, and was therefore seen to be associated with the Luo. This was reinforced by 
the PNU’s focus on Luo traditions, claiming that an uncircumcised man could not be 
president.412 This rhetoric led to at least 41 election-linked deaths prior to the official 
election in December.413 However, while it is true that this violence had been building for 
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some time, the immediate trigger of the violence of the election was the perceived rigging 
of the election.414  
 Voting during the 2007 election proceeded relatively smoothly and without 
incident with a record number of Kenyans registering and turning out to vote.415 The 
problems began to arise two days later when the results started to come in and despite 
major losses to the ruling PNU party in the legislature, the incumbent Kibaki was pulling 
ahead in presidential votes. Even before the official vote count was announced, violence 
broke out all over the country in reaction to this perceived election rigging.416 The 
following day, 30 December, Kibaki was officially announced the winner of the 
presidential election.417 According to Human Rights Watch, in the last few hours of 
tabulating votes, a more than one million vote lead for opposition candidate Raila Odinga 
disappeared and resulted in a slim victory for Kibaki, a result made all the more 
unbelievable by the parliamentary vote in which Mr. Odinga’s ODM won 99 seats to the 
PNU’s 43.418 These discrepancies in addition to the months of heightened ethnic rhetoric 
and increasing inter-ethnic violence led to the start of one of the most violent periods of 
ethnic violence in Kenya’s independent history.  
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 The election-triggered violence was primarily concentrated in the Rift Valley 
where both the PNU and ODM had large numbers of supporters, though incidents of 
violence were reported from all parts of the country.419 In the immediate aftermath of the 
election, violence was mostly targeted against members of President Kibaki’s ethnic 
group, the Kikuyu. However, this quickly led to reprisal attacks by Kikuyu attacking 
other ethnic minorities who were (or were assumed to be) supportive of the opposition. In 
all, more than 1,000 people were killed and over 500,000 displaced during two months of 
violence.420  
 The violence in most cities and towns in the Rift Valley began under similar 
circumstances. Ethnically-based campaigning had convinced many minority ethnic 
groups that a victory for the opposition ODM party would result in the redistribution of 
Kikuyu land to them. On top of this, they were told that if ODM were to lose the election, 
that in itself would be proof of election tampering. Therefore, when Human Rights Watch 
(HRW) interviewed residents in the areas with the worst violence, they were told several 
times that the non-Kikuyus were “merely doing by force what they had been denied a 
chance to do at the ballot box.”421 In several areas, meetings were called in the days prior 
to the election. At these meetings, leaders riled up the communities, especially the young 
men, and prepared them for violence in the event of an ODM loss. Community members 
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who were reluctant to attend such meetings were met with threats of violence and 
property destruction.422 
Faced with this level of violence targeting Kikuyu communities, it is easy to 
understand how Kikuyu could justify reprisal attacks throughout the country. However, 
the meetings that were held in ethnic minority communities were not unique to them. 
Several Kikuyu interviewed by HRW stated that there were similar meetings in other 
places where Kikuyu leaders incited the Kikuyu youth to participate in violence against 
any ethnic minority they assumed supported the PNU.423 This manipulation of ethnic 
identity to justify violence against others was the hallmark of the post 2007 election 
violence.  
There are several well-publicized individual incidents of extreme violence 
including a horrifying attack on a church in Kimbaa where many Kikuyu were seeking 
refuge. Attackers barricaded the church with petrol-soaked mattresses and set them on 
fire. In total, more than 30 people were killed in the attack, including children and a 
handicapped woman in a wheelchair.424 However, with a few notable exceptions, most of 
the violence was random and unpredictable. Individuals might be killed by a gang of 
young boys in the street or by a stray bullet shot by the police. In some areas, regular 
citizens turned on their neighbors and killed, mutilated, or burned the homes of those they 
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had interacted with regularly before. In other areas, it was claimed that ‘people with 
money’ came in and paid the jobless to kill or harm others.425 
Peace Agreement 
On 28 February 2008 President Kibaki and the ODM’s Odinga signed the 
National Accord and Reconciliation Act (the Accord).426 The Accord would create a new 
position of Prime Minister who would be an elected member of parliament and the head 
of the majority party in the National Assembly and would have the power to “coordinate 
and supervise the execution of government functions.”427 The Accord would also provide 
for the division of several important executive cabinet positions based on the relative 
strengths of the parties in the National Assembly. Kibaki convened the National 
Assembly on 6 March to make the necessary constitutional changes to implement the 
agreement and they were passed in the National Accord and Reconciliation Act.428 
It took several weeks to implement the Accord in full, as several details had not 
been worked out in the initial agreement such as the number of cabinet positions and the 
process for the writing of a new constitution.429 However, on 17 April 2008, Odinga and 
the Cabinet were sworn in. The new coalition government eventually produced a new 
draft constitution, which was passed in a national referendum by 67 percent on 4 August 
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2010, more than two years after the initial Peace Accord was signed.430 The new 
constitution addressed issues of human rights, a level of federalism in power sharing 
between the national and county governments, the creation of a National Land 
Commission, and reforms to the police. It also created greater checks on the power of the 
president, allowing impeachment for the first time and eliminated the position of Prime 
Minister.431  
Policing in Kenya 
 The origins of the police in Kenya stem, once again, from colonialism. As in other 
places in the world, colonial rule in Kenya “was illegitimate, and being so, it relied on 
oppression, repression and brutal force to sustain itself.”432 The police were the enforcers 
of the policy of conquer and control, and therefore developed relationships with the 
Kenyan people that were violent, aggressive, and oppressive. This history has also 
strongly shaped the way the police in independent Kenya have operated. The Kenyatta 
and Moi governments used the institution of the police to shore up political support and 
harass anyone who was suspected or known to oppose the regime.433 
 The police were first established in Kenya in 1887 as an instrument of colonial 
power to assist in the accomplishment of colonial aims.434 From the beginning, there was 
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an ethnic element to the police force. Much like they had labeled the Maasai as herders 
and the Kikuyu as tenant farmers, the British believed that the Kamba and Kalenjin 
ethnic groups had the most soldierly qualities.435 The force was primarily used to protect 
the white areas of Kenya and to suppress protests and rebellions by Africans.436 The 
mobilization of the police against the Africans in Kenya in the name of ‘upholding the 
law’ (regardless of how undemocratic those laws), came to mark a constant in the 
behavior of the police. Rather than serving the community, the police were acting to 
serve the political elite and their supporters. As David Bayley argues, when the police use 
their “authority primarily to serve the interests of the government, they belie the 
democratic promise of government for the people. The most dramatic contribution police 
can make to democracy is to become responsive to the needs of individual citizens.”437 In 
the 1940s and 1950s, African soldiers returning from World War 2 started demanding 
more democratic rights and the police were enlisted to vet public gatherings and issue 
permits for events that met the requirements for ‘public order,’ a move which further 
politicized the police.438  
The police became even more militarized in response to the Mau Mau Rebellion 
from 1952-1964, in which a large group of Africans (largely of Kikuyu ethnicity) 
instituted a guerilla war against the colonial occupiers of Kenya in an attempt to expel 
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colonizers and take back the land for native Kenyans.439 In response to the rebellion, 
emergency powers were invoked and the police were given powers to arrest anyone 
without cause, declare certain areas under quarantine, and to shoot to kill anyone they 
deemed to violate these rules.440 However, after the rebellion and with independence 
seemingly on the horizon, the first attempts to address the ethnic composition of the 
police to bring it in line with that of the general population were made.441  
 Under the first independent Kenyan regime of Jomo Kenyatta, promises to deal 
with issues surrounding the oppressive police force went unfulfilled. Instead of pursuing 
democratic institutions, Kenyatta’s government concentrated almost all power in the 
president, which allowed him to manipulate the police to control the people and violently 
suppress political opposition.442 Kenyatta, who relied heavily on ethnic loyalties and 
patronage within all aspects of government, appointed ethnic Kikuyu to nearly every 
leadership position in government, including the many branches of the police.443 It is 
widely accepted that Kenyatta then commissioned the police to arrest and carry out 
assassinations of some political opponents and to illegally detain others for many 
years.444  
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Upon the death of Kenyatta and the subsequent ascension of Moi, Moi’s co-
ethnics, the Kalenjin, were appointed to many of these same positions and oppression and 
abuses by the police in Kenya were taken to new heights.445 As Edwin Gimode states, 
“Moi governed through violence, harassment, intimidation and increased use of organs of 
state security for self-preservation.”446 He vigorously pursued any person who dared to 
speak against him including students and professors, lawyers, journalists, and any 
political opposition. He also strongly defended the ‘right’ of the police to use force to 
maintain order and quell dissent.447  
 The use of the police to repress political opposition, and therefore to protect the 
administration rather than citizens, was the context in which the 2007 election violence 
erupted. It is not surprising that some felt the response of the police during the violence to 
be unevenly distributed and simultaneously inadequate and excessive in the use of force. 
Unfortunately, there is not data available on the ethnic makeup of the police during this 
time, but there was a general understanding that the police were not representative of the 
community in ethnic or gender composition.448 
 When Kibaki declared victory in the election, he also issued a ban on all public 
demonstrations, which he justified as necessary to prevent violence.449 As they had in the 
past, the police enforced this ban vigorously in opposition areas, and less so in pro-
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government areas, which resulted in many hundreds of Kenyans dead at the hands of the 
police. For example, in Nairobi, several protests erupted in the slums where ODM had 
high levels of support. The police used live ammunition to quell protests which evolved 
into riots and to prevent new demonstrators in the slums from joining those who had 
made it to city center. HRW conducted interviews with several witnesses to and victims 
of the police violence in the slums and heard stories of police shooting to kill any person 
they saw on the streets, regardless of whether that individual was participating in protests. 
They also recounted innocent bystanders being shot by stray bullets on the tightly packed, 
narrow streets of the slums.450 Similar scenes were reported in Kisumu and Eldoret. In 
Kisumu, the local police admitted to using live ammunition, but claimed it was necessary 
to prevent looting, even though the protesters were unarmed and the majority of the 
victims of police shootings were in the slums where there were no shops to loot.451 This 
led to the deaths of 50 people by the police in the initial round of violence in Kisumu, 
with an additional 25 dead in the second day. At least 30 of the victims were shot in the 
back, according to post-mortem reports.452  
 A second major grievance arose from these police shootings, namely that the 
police seemed to resort to deadly force only in areas where pro-opposition protests were 
occurring such as the slums of Nairobi and Kisumu where officers were ordered to use 
live ammunition and some officers felt there was an ‘unofficial shoot-to kill policy’ in 
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place.453 Alternatively, when pro-government mobs were burning homes and killing 
minority ethnics in Naivasha and Nakuru, the police did little to nothing to intervene.454 
In other areas such as Eldoret and Molo/Kuresi, the police were accused of siding with 
Kalenjin militias, allowing unacceptable violence against Kikuyu.455  
This difference in application of the law may be attributed to several factors. First, 
the legacy of colonial policing included a distribution of officers that was drastically 
uneven throughout Kenya. Under colonialism, the police were primarily located in urban 
commercial areas and traditional European residential areas while rural Kenya remains 
drastically underserved.456 Therefore, the more rural Naivasha and Nakuru had fewer 
officers who may have felt incapable of successfully intervening to stop violence given 
their relatively few numbers and equipment. Second, a similar legacy exists surrounding 
where police are stationed. Regulations from 1957 stated that not more than 45% of 
officers could be from the area where they serve, meaning that primarily co-ethnics are 
not policing one another.457 This also may account for why the police were seen as 
simultaneously backing the Kikuyu in some areas while also backing Kalenjin militias in 
others. The drastically different responses to the violence in different areas led to a host 
of questions about the police’s capacity to protect the people, the political nature of the 
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orders meted out in certain areas, and the bias of the police themselves.458 As the police 
are the most direct arm of the state with which the public interacts,459 the brutal 
repression of Kenyans in mostly opposition areas coupled with the lack of adequate 
protection elsewhere functioned to cement many Kenyans’ lack of confidence in the 
police.  
National Taskforce on Police Reforms 
It was in the context of all this history that the Accord was negotiated. Among 
other priorities including addressing ethnic representation in government, the Accord 
prioritized the reformation of law enforcement institutions. In response to this, the 
government set up the National Taskforce on Police Reforms (NTPR) in May of 2009, 
headed by retired Judge Philip Ransley.460 In the course of its work, the NTPR reviewed 
research and police-related academic literature, received submissions from stakeholders, 
visited the eight provinces of Kenya conducting interviews and listening sessions, and 
visited several other countries that had engaged in police reform, including Northern 
Ireland.461 However, unlike the Independent Commission on Policing for Northern 
Ireland, the NTPR consisted entirely of Kenyans and did not include any person with 
specific expertise in community policing.  
In October 2009, the NTPR released a report of its findings, commonly referred to 
as the Ransley Report in reference to the Taskforce Chair and included 200 
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recommendations for police reform. The Ransley Report identified several areas of 
concern for citizens, the police, and government. Specifically, they found there was a 
perception that the two police forces in Kenya (the Kenya Police and the Administration 
Police) were competing and had overlapping duties. There was also a perception of an 
increase in crime and complicity of the police in these crimes, as well as a perception of 
police corruption, a clear lack of resources for the police to perform their duties, low 
police morale, and an unacceptably high tolerance for corruption among the police.462 To 
address these issues, the recommendations of the Ransley Report focused on the concept 
of community policing in Kenya.463  
The Police Reform Implementation Committee (PRIC) was established to 
coordinate and monitor the implementation of the Ransley Report’s recommendations 
and was composed of policing experts, government officials, members of the police, and 
civilians.464 The recommendations could be broken down into roughly four categories, all 
touching on aspects of community policing discussed in Chapter I of this dissertation – 
restructuring and decentralizing the police, focusing on police accountability and 
transparency, improving working conditions and training of the police, and improving 
police-community relations. Some of the specific recommendations included merging the 
Kenya Police with the Administration Police under one new National Police Service 
(NPS), creating a new National Police Service Commission tasked with developing 
                                                 
462 Ibid., 3-4. 
463 Omeje and Mwangi Githigaro,  65-66; Charles Otieno et al., "Joint Response to the Cic on the National 
Police Service Proposed Regulations," (London: Usalama Reforms Forum, 2015). 
464 Gastrow,  15. 
182 
 
training policies among other duties, and establishing a body charged with dealing with 
complaints against the new NPS.465   
It is worth briefly highlighting the parallels between the process of police reform 
in Northern Ireland and Kenya up to and including the issuing of recommendations for 
reform. In both states, the approach to reform was participatory in nature. While there 
were relatively small teams of experts in the respective groups responsible for assessing 
the police prior to reform, in both states the community was actively engaged and 
encouraged to participate in the initial assessment. The Northern Ireland Commission 
included specialists in community policing who clearly influenced the specific 
recommendations made to meet the ideals of community policing. Kenya’s Taskforce did 
not have the same level of expertise, but they did specifically consult with Northern 
Ireland and reference their reforms in the analysis of Kenya’s police. And the 
recommendations themselves fall into similar categories that address those areas we 
would expect in community policing – retraining the police around policing with the 
community, devolving decision-making powers as much as is practicable, and 
community involvement in policing.  
In addition to these parallels, it is also important to highlight the differences 
between the circumstances of Northern Ireland and Kenya up to the point of police 
reform. Specifically, the tone of perceived police bias was different across these contexts. 
In Northern Ireland, the police were seen as biased in favor of the PUL community as 
demonstrated through the extreme imbalance between PUL and CNR police officers and 
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through the enforcement of discriminatory laws. In Kenya, the police were seen as 
corrupt, unprofessional, and biased in favor of the state as opposed to any specific ethnic 
group. The difference here is subtle, but important for police-community relations. In 
Kenya, the police have been an organization associated with the ruling entity of the state 
and enforcing the corrupt intent of those rulers. Since independence, this has translated 
into the police working to enforce the will of the government, regardless of the person in 
charge. In practice, this has led to a general bias in favor of the Kikuyu, though during 
Moi’s presidency there was also favoritism toward Kalenjin. This has led to ethnically 
biased policing in Kenya. While the police in Kenya and Northern Ireland were both 
accused of ethnically biased policing, the bias in Northern Ireland was consistently one 
against the Catholic minority. In Kenya the bias was more fluid and shifted depending on 
who was in power, though in practice this was usually the Kikuyu.  
This subtle difference in perceived bias may be the result of the historical 
structure of government, or regime type, in Northern Ireland and Kenya. Northern Ireland 
has consistently had a democratic form of government since its formation, even if that 
democracy was flawed. Kenya, on the other hand, could not really claim to be democratic 
until at least 1991 with the reintroduction of multi-party elections. Even then, the Kenyan 
government continued to be rated as a hybrid regime by the Economist Intelligence 
Unit’s Democracy Index. The form of government strongly affects the role of the police, 
as discussed in Chapter I of this dissertation. Importantly, in democracies, the legitimacy 
of the police is dependent upon community confidence in the police. In Northern Ireland, 
the PUL community had strong confidence in the police and saw the police as working 
for the people. In Kenya, where the police were created and developed under a colonial 
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then authoritarian regime, the police never gained legitimacy in the eyes of the people. 
Therefore, the police were not seen as serving the people, but the whims of the 
government. The police were not professionalized with clear duties and rules, but rather 
random enforcers of the governments’ wishes. In Northern Ireland, while the CNR 
community viewed the police to be biased arms of a biased state, the police were more 
professional in their duties. While both these situations called for reform of the 
government and the police to stop the ethnic violence, the possibility of reform without 
the need to address the deep corruption of the state and the police in Northern Ireland was 
far more plausible than in Kenya. That is, both states needed to address ethnic bias in 
government and in policing, but Kenya had the additional task of addressing the other 
forms of pervasive corruption that made the police essentially play things of whomever 
was in power.  
Restructuring and Decentralizing the Police 
 The original recommendation to merge the two police forces of Kenya, the Kenya 
Police Force (Kenya Police) and the Administration Police, came from the Waki 
Commission Report on the investigation into the post-election violence. The report 
stated, “the Commission believes that developing a world class police service for Kenya 
would be best achieved through the creation of a single police agency. This means 
integrating the current two police organs.”466 The NTPR considered this 
recommendation, but also conducted a large number of interviews with various 
stakeholders including citizens and police officers who strongly opposed the complete 
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merger of the two forces. They ultimately recommended maintaining the two-police force 
structure under a single organizational umbrella called the National Police Service (NPS) 
because they found that the Administration Police had built relationships and were trusted 
particularly in rural communities, and the NTPR did not want to alienate these areas in 
the restructuring.467 They found many people they interviewed thought the 
Administration Police were “friendly, less bureaucratic in dealing with complaints, more 
accessible to the people, among other positive attributes.”468 This, it was argued, made 
the Administration Police more able to ‘police with the community.’ Logistically, the 
Ransley Report argued, it simply did not make sense to merge fully the two police forces 
as they had different mandates, training, and specialties and needed different reforms. For 
example, they were established under different laws: the Kenya Police Force and Kenya 
Police Reserve were created by the Police Act, CAP 84 Laws of Kenya in 1961 and the 
Administrative Police by the Administrative Police Act, CAP 85 in 1958. Both 
institutions had also been addressed in various constitutional reforms over the years, and 
each time the reforms maintained the two separate forces.469 It did not make sense, they 
argued, to create a brand new police service, or to merge the two, when their structures 
and officers had such disparate reform needs.470 Instead of a full merger, the Ransley 
Report recommended passing a new policing bill that would clearly demarcate the duties 
                                                 
467 Gastrow,  4. 
468 National Task Force on Police Reforms (Kenya), "Report of the National Task Force on Police 
Reforms," (Nairobi, Kenya2009), 37. 
469 Ibid., 13-23. 
470 Ibid., 38. 
186 
 
of the two police services to avoid overlap, and create a new National Policing Council to 
oversee and coordinate both services.471  
 The Ransley Report also recommended the creation of a Police Service 
Commission whose duties would include recruitment, appointment, and promotion of 
officers, reviewing standards and qualifications for all members of both forces, and 
maintaining disciplinary control of the police, among others.472 This new Commission 
would help to create and maintain standards of professionalism that had been lacking in 
the police in Kenya as well as boost police morale. This proposed independent 
commission would be separate from the police and composed of persons of ‘high moral 
character’ including civilians, retired officers, and government officials.  
 Additionally, the NTPR recommended that the hierarchy of the police be 
decentralized. They found that the highly centralized nature of the Kenya Police had led 
to a system of minimal accountability that also eroded the powers of provincial and local 
police.473 Other systems of policing the NTPR observed in their work had more 
decentralized systems, a change they argued Kenya needed to make if there was to be any 
improvement in the service of the police.474 One recommendation was the institution of 
Provincial Policing Authorities (PPAs) in each province to create support and trust from 
the people the police serve directly, as well as to increase accountability.475 These 
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civilian groups would create a space for the police to consult with the members of the 
PPA on provincial policing priorities476 as well as to monitor the progress on 
achievement of set goals and compliance with policing standards.477 The PPAs would 
also provide some legitimacy for the police through direct consultation with members of 
the community about community needs and concerns. 
Police Accountability and Transparency 
 Accountability necessarily includes a lack of corruption. Issues of corruption and 
misuse of police authority have been historical problems for the police in Kenya. Police 
corruption can be understood, narrowly, as police “who use their position and authority 
for personal rather than public benefit. More broadly, corruption applies to any violation 
of rules even when there is no personal gain, as in perjury, physical abuse of prisoners, 
sexual misconduct, robbery, and racial profiling.”478 According to Kempe Hope, Sr., “by 
any measure or indicator, Kenya is regarded as one of the most corrupt countries in the 
world.”479 It is not surprising then that the Ransley Report made several 
recommendations aimed at reducing the presence and appearance of corruption in the 
police. 
The first of these was the recommendation to develop a new code of ethics that 
would highlight the ‘key values and principles’ of the police.480 This new code of ethics 
                                                 
476 Gastrow,  7. 
477 National Task Force on Police Reforms (Kenya),  48. 
478 Bayley and Perito,  3. 
479 Hope, 89. 
480 National Task Force on Police Reforms (Kenya),  69. 
188 
 
should center around the principles of Justice, Equality, Accountability, and Efficiency. 
While the NTPR left the specifics of the code of ethics up to the two police services to 
create, they named several key components including professional conduct, self-control, 
and avoidance of conflicts of interest.481 Many traffic officers, for example, owned or had 
stakes in matatus (small buses and minivans used for public transportation) which 
constitutes a clear conflict of interest.482 The Report specifically highlighted this common 
conflict of interest and recommended that all police should have to declare and have 
approved all business interests outside of policing and specifically that they should be 
prohibited from having any share of interest in public transport, towing services, private 
security, and weigh bridges.483  
To address external oversight of the police, the NTPR recommended the creation 
of an Independent Policing Oversight Authority (IPOA) composed of civilians who had 
the power to monitor and investigate police activities.484 The IPOA would have far-
reaching authority to investigate reports of police misconduct and to compel attendance at 
hearings. This arrangement, the NTPR argued, would create public confidence that police 
misconduct would be investigated impartially and that guilty parties would be held to 
account – building public confidence in the police in the long term.485 Specifically, the 
IPOA would have the authority to investigate allegations of misconduct by individual 
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officers or the police as a whole, taking complaints from the public or officers 
themselves, or they could initiate an investigation without an initial complaint if they saw 
fit.486 Though, importantly, they were only empowered to recommend punishment but 
not enforce these suggestions.  
Police Working Conditions and Training 
 It was clear to the NTPR that a major issue with policing in Kenya was low 
morale among officers. The police themselves had stated in various reports and surveys 
that they wanted to work for a police service they could be proud of, that cares about 
them, that rewards good work and promotes people fairly and impartially, and provides 
adequate pay and equipment to do the job well.487 The NTPR, therefore, made 
recommendations focused on balancing these requests from the police with the public’s 
expectation that the police would be impartial, friendly, and respectful.  
 One issue they focused on was the distribution of resources within the police. The 
Ransley Report noted that there was an unnecessary number of officers in the combined 
forces of the Kenya Police and Administration Police. In 2009, this number was at 73,956 
according to the Kenya Police and Administration Police.488 This is a ratio of 1 officer to 
every 522 Kenyans.489 At the time, neighboring Tanzania had 1 officer for every 1,298 
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citizens.490 In addition to the significantly larger force in Kenya, the police were also 
severely underequipped. Therefore, the Ransley Report recommended a temporary 
moratorium on police recruiting and that funds allocated for recruitment be redistributed 
to cover other important problems. They also recommended, when recruiting resumed, 
the standards should be raised for admittance to the police to include a requirement for 
more education and that training time should be increased in length from the then 9-
month standard to a 15-month process with an end-of-training evaluation before 
admittance.491  
 Finally, lower ranking police in Kenya are required to reside in specified police 
housing in the station grounds for ease of deployment, while officers of higher ranks may 
receive a stipend to rent outside the stations. However, there is not sufficient housing 
provided for the police and their families, the housing provided is dilapidated and 
unsanitary, and the housing allowance provided to the higher-ranking officers is 
insufficient to rent decent accommodations.492 Therefore, it was recommended that the 
government prioritize improved housing for the police and increase housing allowances 
for the higher-ranking officers so they can afford to live in the communities they are 
serving.493 In addition to these recommendations, the NTPR recommended providing 
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adequate life and medical insurance, developing a system for leave accrual and use, and 
increased salaries, among other improvements.494  
Police-Community Relations 
 The final category of recommendations dealt with improving police-community 
relations. While the above recommendations all serve to improve service and reduce 
barriers between the police and the community, the NTPR made recommendations 
related to the perceptions of the police “by many Kenyans as a coercive instrument of the 
state that serves the narrow interest of the elite.”495 Specifically, the NTPR focused on the 
idea of community policing as presented by Amnesty International, where community 
policing is defined as  
A collaborative effort by the police and the community that identifies problems of 
crime and disorder and involves all elements of the community in the search for a 
solution of these problems. This approach to policing is based on the assumption 
that the police alone cannot control crime, but require the active support of the 
community, to prevent, detect crime, reduce fear and crime and improve 
communication between the community and the police.496 
 
Keeping this definition in mind, the Ransley Report recommended the 
development of Community Police Committees (CPCs) at several different levels of the 
community from district level down to the block level of 5-10 households.497 The need to 
reform the police was not a new idea in reaction to the post-election violence, but 
something that had been discussed for some time. The results of some of these 
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discussions was a push to experiment with the concept of community policing and the 
first experiment in community policing was launched in Ruai in 2005. Since that initial 
experiment in April 2005, the Kenyan government had been committed to developing 
better policing through community involvement.498 The Ransley report, noting this 
commitment, recommended that the National Policy on Community Policing be fast-
tracked and include the community in its development process.499 
Implementation 
 The Ransley Report, much like the Patten Report in Northern Ireland, was the 
primary driver of police reforms in Kenya. Like the Patten Report, it also did not have the 
weight or force of law and required legislative action to ensure the recommendations 
were adopted in part or in whole. The 2010 Constitution laid out the legal framework for 
the restructuring of the police. Specifically, Article 243 of the 2010 Constitution 
established the new National Police Service (NPS), which included the Kenya Police 
Service (KPS) and Administrative Police Service (APS) under the authority of one 
Inspector-General (IG) and two Deputy Inspector-Generals responsible for the day-to-day 
operations of the two services. In addition to the 2010 Constitution, the National Police 
Service Act, 2011 (NPS Act 2011) effectively gave the power to the new NPS and the IG 
to implement the new structure and rules of the NPS.  
 Under the NPS Act 2011, the IG was given a variety of powers and 
responsibilities. These included the responsibility to implement policy decisions and to 
coordinate and audit all police operations. The IG was also required to keep the 
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government informed on policing matters and provide advice when called for. The IG 
was responsible for the organization and maintenance of police stations as well as the 
structure and distribution of the police force. The IG was tasked with implementing and 
monitoring the success of community policing initiatives as well as implementing the 
decisions of the IPOA, including compensating victims of police misconduct when 
appropriate. The IG was to establish the internal affairs unit to investigate internal matters 
of police misconduct. In addition to these and many other duties, the IG was also 
responsible for compiling data and statistics relevant to the police including statistics on 
crime, public perceptions of the police, and demographic statistics.500 
It is worth highlighting the creation of the internal affairs unit (IAU) under the 
IG’s authority. The IAU was required to be separated physically from the rest of the NPS 
in different buildings. They had the authority to investigate complaints received from 
members of the public of from police officers. They were also to conduct investigations 
at the request of a senior officer, the IG, or at the recommendation of the IPOA. It has the 
power to recommend disciplinary actions from reprimands, to suspensions, to firings to 
the IG. They are also tasked with maintaining records of all complaints received.501  
In addition to this internal, though independent, oversight group, the 2010 
Constitution also created the IPOA, which was effected through the Independent Police 
Oversight Act, 2011.502 The IPOA was intended as a mechanism to hold the police 
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publicly accountable as well as create transparency.503 Essentially, this agency was 
created to ensure that the work of the IAU was transparent to the public, and not just the 
NPS. This is why the IPOA has the power to conduct its own investigations, whether as 
the result of a specific complaint received by the IPOA or through their own initiative. 
They are also empowered to make disciplinary recommendations based on their 
investigations and to make both those recommendations and their responses public. They 
are also empowered to maintain their own records of any investigations that IAU 
undertakes as well as make recommendations to other government agencies, including 
the judiciary.504 
 The NPS Act 2011 also specified the distinct roles of the KPS and the APS. These 
distinctions are minor, but important. Like the differences between federal and local 
police in the United States, both forces have the responsibility to serve and protect the 
public, but they have slightly different emphasis in how they do this. The KPS was 
assigned the duties of protection of the public, prevention and investigation of crime, 
general maintenance of law and order, and the apprehension of suspects. The APS – akin 
to a United States federal police force – while also tasked with the general maintenance 
of law and order and protection of the public, was given the additional duties of border 
patrol and security, protection of government property, special stock theft protection, and 
coordination with other government agencies in conflict-management.505 These duties, 
while defined as distinct by the language of the Act, do overlap somewhat in reality. In 
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general, any officer whether NPS or APS is expected to help maintain the general sense 
of law and order. However, the distinction between the two is similar to that of the 
difference between federal and local police in the United States. The APS is tasked with 
protecting the border, protecting government property, supporting government agencies 
in the enforcement of regulations, and coordinating with other government agencies in 
peace building and conflict management. The KPS, on the other hand, is more locally 
focused, with their duties concentrated on preventing and prosecuting regular crimes 
within the populace.506   
 To address some of the morale issues highlighted in the Ransley Report, the 2010 
Constitution also created the structure of the National Police Service Commission 
(NPSC), officially given power through the National Police Service Commission Act, 
2011.507 The NPSC is charged with developing the basic standards for evaluating police 
officers, evaluating and determining promotions within the NPS, and recruitment of new 
officers.508   
 It is important to note that while the NPS Act 2011 created and laid out the 
specific organizational structure and duties of the PPAs, eventually renamed County 
Policing Authorities (CPAs), these were never formed. These structures, arguably the 
reform that most specifically adhered to the ideals of community policing through 
                                                 
506 Kempe Ronald Hope, Sr., "In Pursuit of Democratic Policing: An Analytical Review and Assessment of 
Police Reforms in Kenya," International Journal of Police Science & Management 17, no. 2 (2015): 93. 
507 Republic of Kenya, "The National Police Service Commission Act, 2011," (Nairobi, Kenya: Republic of 
Kenya, 2011). 
508 Ibid. 
196 
 
community input, were never embraced, and therefore never fully understood by the 
community. This will be discussed further below.  
Results 
An initial assessment of the state of policing in Kenya shows that the reforms 
implemented in the past few years have not been successful in engendering a greater 
degree of community confidence in the police. This is not to say that they have been 
completely unsuccessful in accomplishing some of the other goals highlighted in the 
Ransley Report. In the first five years since the implementation of the NPS Act 2011, the 
NPS structure was established. This included many important updates such as creating a 
centralized set of emergency numbers for the public to contact the police, the 
development of strategic plans for the many different structures in the NPS, and the 
development of a better communications strategy.509 Theoretically, these updates should 
have improved community relations as they were built to make communication between 
the police and the community easier and more transparent. Other changes included 
several new policies including some relating to gender and respect for human rights in 
policing. The Police Code of Conduct and Ethics was also revised and included several 
clauses on professionalism and impartiality in policing. Specifically, police are barred 
from showing their political affiliation through actions in favor of a specific candidate or 
political party.510 Similarly, there was a specific focus on conflicts of interest and a series 
of rules were developed to prevent police from owning side-businesses and accepting 
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graft.511 Police training has been updated to include anticorruption and ethics, and the 
welfare of officers has been improved through new housing and comprehensive life and 
health insurance programs.512 
However, despite these achievements, according to the 2014/2015 Afrobarometer 
survey only 36% of Kenyan’s said they trust the police ‘a lot’ or ‘somewhat,’ an 
assessment of the police which is not universal in East Africa where on average 57% of 
East Africans say they trust the police ‘a lot’ or ‘somewhat.’513 Why do Kenyans have a 
particularly low opinion of the police, especially given the amount of time, money, and 
effort that was expended on reforming the police? Comparing the police reform 
implementation process in Northern Ireland and Kenya suggests several possible 
answers.  
The Kenya case highlights the importance of police professionalism, and 
specifically addressing police corruption. The history of the deep corruption and lack of 
professionalism of the police in Kenya made it particularly difficult for the people of 
Kenya to be convinced that police reforms would lead to real changes in the competence 
and trustworthiness of the police. Harkening back to the discussion of the definition of 
democracy in Chapter I of this dissertation, I asserted that democracy as it is defined for 
the purposes of this dissertation includes the procedural definition of democracy 
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(elections, suffrage, and some civil rights) plus accountability. While the CNR 
community in Northern Ireland prior to and during the Troubles would likely have argued 
that the police were biased in their application of the law, the United Kingdom and 
Northern Irish governments were not accused of the more blatant forms of corruption 
such as bribery and graft. The Kenyan government has a history of and reputation for 
extreme corruption including favoritism and patronage in government as well as a long 
history of graft and extortion by the police. Therefore, Kenya needs to demonstrate 
accountability and reduced or eliminated corruption before community policing can be 
effective. This will be discussed further in the conclusion chapter of this dissertation.  
I would also argue that Kenya struggled to make the kind of gains seen in 
Northern Ireland’s community confidence in the police because they did not actually 
implement community policing. As the Usalama Reforms Forum noted in 2015, “a major 
problem with the reform process is that none of the strategies employed so far have 
aimed at critically transforming or altering the fundamental principles of policing in 
Kenya.”514 In other words, the police experimented with the concept of community 
policing but never fully implemented it. There was no change to the structure and form of 
the police to reflect a community policing service. This can best be understood by 
looking at the expectations of community policing laid out in Chapter I of this 
dissertation.  
First, symbolic change has been at best non-existent, and at worst a cause for 
distrust rather than an opening for new relationships. While the Kenya Police and 
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Administration Police were nominally merged under the new NPS, the people of Kenya, 
and the police themselves, have maintained the old names and have not adopted this new 
name in their day-to-day interactions. Further, the uniforms of the KPS and APS have 
remained the same since the change. Additionally, there was no change in the people who 
were either KPS officers or APS officers. The names, appearance, and individuals 
involved in the police all remained the same. This may be part of the reason why the 
“service has struggled to transform its image and overcome the factors that constrain its 
improvement and development.”515 There was no visible signal that things ever changed 
for the average Kenyan.  
There are other examples to suggest the lack of symbolic change in the police has 
amplified the negative perception the community has of the police. In their interviews 
with the public, the NTPR identified a widespread perception, and much evidence, of 
corruption of the police. Specifically, it was clear that the police used roadblocks to extort 
bribes from motorists and the citizens of Kenya. During their investigative stage, the 
NPTR issued an initial report that suggested all roadblocks in Kenya be removed unless 
they served a specific safety or traffic control purpose.516 The police did remove a 
significant number of those roadblocks by the time the final report was issued.517 
However, when I traveled to Kenya in winter of 2016/2017, I observed many roadblocks 
all over the capital city of Nairobi and was told in casual conversation with the locals that 
the police regularly used these roadblocks to extort money from the people. The 
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resurgence of roadblocks as a source of extortion by the police would certainly signal to 
the community that the ‘new’ police is no different from the old. Further, police officers 
owning matatus continues to be an issue, at least within Nairobi. When I was riding these 
matatus to get around the city, I had several locals advise me to ride certain matatus over 
others. They told me that certain companies were owned in whole or in part by members 
of the police and those matatus were guaranteed uninterrupted passage through the city. 
On the other matatus, the drivers had to pay off the police early in the morning, an 
important ritual to ensure that the matatus could run the remainder of the day without the 
police boarding and extorting money from the passengers.  
The second set of expectations around community policing involve the changes to 
the institutions and practices of policing. Many of the reforms suggested in the Ransley 
Report for Kenya that seem to parallel those in Northern Ireland lack important 
components that make them community policing. For example, the CPAs in Kenya seem 
very similar to the DPPs in Northern Ireland in form. CPAs are supposed to have several 
police representatives and at least six citizens appointed by the Governor of the County. 
These CPAs are supposed to be tasked with monitoring the local police and providing 
quarterly reports to the IG on the compliance of the local police with stated goals and 
police rules.518 However, as mentioned above, even though CPAs were created by the 
NPS Act 2011, they were never enacted. In 2016, President Uhuru Kenyatta, Kenya’s 
fourth president and son of the first President Jomo Kenyatta, announced that he wanted 
to ‘activate’ the CPAs to help assess and address local issues of security, but nothing has 
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yet happened.519 The idea of CPAs as forums for community input into policing also 
seems to have been lost in the years since the Ransley Report was issued. Many 
communities and officers are afraid that the CPAs would overlap duties with the police 
and interfere in the provision of security.520 If the original purpose of CPAs was 
community engagement and oversight of the police, it has been lost in translation.  
 Similarly, the oversight mechanisms of the NPS are independent in name, but not 
in function. The IPOA is empowered to investigate the police and make 
recommendations for discipline, but those recommendations do not have any force and 
are made to the IG. In other words, while the investigations may be independent, the 
ultimate responsibility for enforcing discipline remains internal to the NPS. Further, 
legislative updates to the NPS Act 2011 have worked to weaken the independence of the 
IG, who is now considerably more dependent on the executive for his recruitment and 
retention. This, as well as actions by acting IGs have led to very low community 
confidence in the IG. Only 12% of respondents in a March 2014 survey said they had 
confidence in the IG.521  
In addition to the lack of confidence in the independence of the IPOA and the IG, 
the community has also seen little to no improvement in the day-to-day actions of the 
police themselves. As Anneke Osse stated, “police are still ineffective, unjust in their 
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operations, actions and decisions, and lacking in accountability.”522 Despite the overtures 
to community policing, the NPS is still a reactive force, focused on punishing crime 
rather than working with the community to prevent it. Crime is underreported and there 
remains a general lack of confidence in the police from the community.523 Police 
continue to be accused of actively committing (rather than preventing) crime, using 
excessive force, and lacking general competence in providing security.524  
There are several other reasons that police reforms have not taken hold or 
translated into community confidence in Kenya that are unrelated to the lessons from 
Northern Ireland. In the same Afrobarometer survey from 2014/2015, 86 percent of 
Kenyans said they trust the armed forces ‘a lot’ or ‘somewhat.’525 So there is not a 
general distrust of the government or security services, but something specific about the 
police that Kenyan’s do not trust. Why? The most glaring answer seems to be corruption. 
In the same survey, 69 percent of Kenyans said they thought ‘most’ or ‘all’ of the police 
were corrupt.526 From the above examples of extortion of motorists and matatu 
operations, this explanation seems compelling. While there was a general distrust of the 
police in Northern Ireland by the CNR community, the corruption allegations primarily 
stemmed from accusations of colluding with or covering up for loyalist paramilitary 
actions, and not from accusations of extortion. The Kenyan police faced similar 
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accusations of bias and even collusion surrounding the 2007 post-election violence, but 
this was compounded with the additional history of petty corruption in the form of 
extortion. It seems that addressing additional forms of corruption outside assumed ethnic 
bias is an important factor in building community confidence after ethnic conflict.  
It was apparent in my limited conversations with Kenyans and through my own 
observations that there is a deep mistrust of the police in Kenya and that many locals do 
their best to avoid any and all interactions with the police whenever possible. When 
interactions with the police cannot be avoided, the default position is to expect extortion 
and hope that it is affordable. According to Transparency International Kenya, from 
2010-2014 the police were the most bribery prone institution in Kenya.527 Corruption in 
the police is a huge problem that may be the biggest barrier to building community 
confidence in the police in Kenya. Hope has done considerable and convincing work on 
the role and pervasiveness of corruption in the police in Kenya. He argues that, though 
the reforms that have been put in place have been successful in many respects (the 
formation of NPS created a centralized command for the police, new codes of conduct 
were developed, an anti-corruption strategy has been developed, community policing 
strategies were developed, conditions of police officers have improved, and there is 
greater representation of women in the police, among many other reforms),528 corruption 
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remains one of, if not the biggest impediment to building community confidence in the 
police.529  
There are several other reasons that may explain why the police in Kenya have 
been unsuccessful in engendering public trust. It is important to acknowledge the variety 
of other variables that make the situations in Northern Ireland and Kenya drastically 
different. First, Northern Ireland, while a separate and unique political entity, is still a 
part of the United Kingdom and therefore has the pressures and resources associated with 
the wealthy nation. Kenya, as an independent former colony of the United Kingdom, has 
many of the same political institutions of Northern Ireland, but does not have the 
economic resources or same political pressures as Northern Ireland. Which is not to say 
that they do not face strong political pressure from other nations in Africa, especially its 
neighbors and partners in the East African Community – just that those pressures are 
different. There are a great many other differences between the countries including ethnic 
diversity. Northern Ireland has two primary ethnic groups and a small number of other 
minorities whereas Kenya has 23 acknowledged ethnic groups and up to 47 more that 
people identify with in the country. In his seminal work on ethnic conflict, Donald 
Horowitz argues that highly homogenous and highly heterogeneous societies are less 
violent, whereas states experience more violence when large ethnic minorities compete 
with an ethnic majority.530 From this basic assertion, Jose Montavalo and Marta Reynal-
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Querol (2005) and Reynal-Querol (2002)531 develop a measure of ethnic polarization 
which they use to measure the ethnic distribution in a society – focusing not just on the 
number of ethnic groups represented in a state, but their relative size within society. They 
find this measure important in determining both civil war onset532 and civil war 
duration.533 It is reasonable to extrapolate from this that the effectiveness of post-war 
settlements may also be affected by ethnic polarization. It may be that the highly 
polarized Northern Ireland is more likely to be successful in establishing post-war 
stability because the negotiating parties represent such a large portion of the people of the 
country where in the highly fractionalized Kenya, negotiators will be representing a far 
smaller percentage of the ethnic minorities in the country. It could be that the 
demographic make-up of Kenya is such that implementation of any changes is going to 
be more difficult because of the need to navigate the different needs and perceptions of a 
far greater number of relatively small ethnic groups than most other countries recovering 
from ethnically based violent conflict.  
Another factor may be the level of commitment the government has made to 
support the changes to the police. In Northern Ireland, there has been consistent and 
increasing support for the changes to the police shown through legislation and 
participation in policing institutions by all the major political parties. In Kenya, however, 
there has been some erosion of the support for the changes. For example, in 2014 and 
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2015 several amendments were made to key pieces of legislation including the National 
Police Service Amendment Act (2014), the National Police Service Commission 
Amendment Act (2014), and the miscellaneous Amendment Bill 2015 which reduced the 
independence of the IPOA, made appointments dependent on the president, and eroded 
the independence of other portions of the police service.534 When the changes were given 
little time or support to take effect and genuinely alter the relationship between the 
community and the police, it is not surprising that they failed.  
Further research is necessary to understand the relationships between the factors 
described here. Developing a deeper understanding of the lack of progress in building 
community confidence in the police in Kenya would require extensive interviews with 
the people and police officers of Kenya. This is a project I hope to attend to in the near 
future.  
Conclusion 
Northern Ireland’s implementation of community policing has been held up as an 
example of how cities and countries experiencing violent ethnic conflict can build 
community confidence in the police. Kenya following their 2007 post-election violence is 
an example of a country that specifically looked to the experiences of Northern Ireland 
for inspiration and guidance in their own police reforms. Despite the many similarities in 
the structure and form of the police reforms between Northern Ireland and Kenya and the 
explicit focus on community policing in both cases, the success of those changes has 
been drastically different. Northern Ireland significantly enhanced the level of 
community confidence in the police overall and specifically within the 
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Catholic/Nationalist/Republican community while Kenya has one of the lowest levels of 
confidence in the police of any African nation, and the absolute lowest in East Africa.535  
A closer examination of the changes that were recommended and enacted in 
Kenya reveals some significant differences from Northern Ireland. Though the Kenyan 
reforms were explicit in their intent to engage community policing, they did not do this. 
There was little attention paid to issues of the symbolism of the Kenyan police. This 
meant that the people of Kenya did not have any visual clues that the police before and 
after the changes were any different. The same people were officers, wearing the same 
uniforms and badges, with a name so insignificantly different from before that most 
people including the police themselves never adopted the new name in everyday 
conversation. The structure of the police and the practice of policing in Kenya also did 
not see significant changes. The reorganization of the police created some superficial 
places for citizen input and oversight, but it appears these changes were not seen or felt 
by the average Kenyan citizen. The CPAs were never enacted, and the people who were 
recommended to serve on the IPOA were all people of prominence in the community, 
immediately excluding access to average citizens. Additionally, while Northern Ireland 
took the extra step of ensuring public access to some portion of these groups’ meetings, 
the same step was not taken in Kenya. So rather than inspiring confidence that the IPOA 
was promoting the interests of the community and holding deviant officers to account, 
there is the appearance of yet another group that can be corrupted since their operations 
are not open to public observation. Maybe the biggest difference between Northern 
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Ireland and Kenya is the widespread perception of the police as a corrupt institution with 
corrupt people at every level. If the institution and the people in it are all irredeemably 
corrupt, it is not hard to understand why the Kenyan people would be unable to learn to 
trust the police.   
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
Introduction 
 This dissertation has combined the literature on post-ethnic conflict state 
rebuilding with the literature on community policing to assess how community policing 
can work to build community confidence in the police in post-ethnic conflict societies. In 
bringing the logic of community policing to post-ethnic conflict rebuilding, I highlighted 
the ideals of community policing and how these can be especially useful in building 
relationships between previously marginalized communities and the police after conflict. 
I examined the implementation of community policing in Northern Ireland after the 
Troubles and showed how the commitment to the ideals of community policing led to 
significant increases in community confidence in the police. I also highlighted the 
importance of implementing community policing in a holistic manner through a first-look 
analysis of Kenya after the 2007 post-election violence where community policing was 
not implemented in full.  
The post-conflict literature often identifies personal safety in the aftermath of 
ethnic conflict as the primary concern for individuals. This security can be provided in 
several ways: through international peacekeeping forces, domestic militaries, or civilian 
police. Those that focus specifically on post-ethnic conflict security tend to emphasize 
the importance of democratic policing and building community confidence in the police, 
but they do not tell us how this is accomplished. Policing literature, however, suggests 
that community policing is designed specifically to build relationships between the police 
and the communities they serve. This method of policing, then, may be the specific 
solution that is missing in the post-ethnic conflict rebuilding literature.  
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After their more than 30-year violent ethnic conflict known as the Troubles, 
Northern Ireland focused on police reform as an important step in their rebuilding 
process. The Belfast/Good Friday Agreement included a provision that created the 
Independent Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland, a group assembled to assess 
the state of the police in Northern Ireland and make recommendations for reform. The 
Commission included two prominent experts on community policing who clearly had a 
strong influence on the shape of police reform. The recommendations focused on several 
areas of reform that we expect in community policing: reorganizing the police to allow 
more decentralized decision-making processes; introduction of structures to encourage 
community involvement in identifying and deterring problems; and changes to the 
symbolism and make-up of the police force among others. These changes and the 
continued commitment to the ideals of community policing in Northern Ireland led to a 
significant increase in marginalized community confidence in the police in the first ten 
years of the new service that have continued to improve into the second decade of the 
service.  
The success of community policing in Northern Ireland has encouraged other 
states to embrace community policing after violent ethnic conflict. Kenya specifically 
examined the experiences of Northern Ireland when looking to reform their own police 
after the 2007 post-election violence. On the surface, at least, Kenya’s process of reform 
looked remarkably like Northern Ireland’s process. They commissioned a National 
Taskforce on Police Reforms like Northern Ireland’s Commission and studied the police 
and made recommendations for reform which emphasized community policing. 
However, despite the explicit focus in the recommendations, Kenya did not fully 
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implement community policing and was unable to do so because of the deep history of 
corruption in the police. I agree with Hope, Sr. and others that Kenya needs to address 
this underlying problem of corruption and lack of accountability in the police before 
community policing efforts can be successful in engendering community confidence. 
Examining this additional hypothesis will require further research.  
 The remainder of this chapter explores the usefulness of my argument. I discuss 
some possible cases where community policing might be applied to build community 
confidence in the police in ethnically divided societies, including those where ethnic-civil 
war has not yet arisen. I also address the limitations of community policing in solving the 
problems of ethnic tensions. Finally, I discuss my agenda for further research and next 
steps for this project.  
Extensions and Practical Implications 
 In Chapter I, I explained that I specifically address policing reform as a way to 
build confidence in the state in in post-ethnic conflict societies that choose democratic 
forms of government where democracy is defined as ‘procedural plus accountability.’ In 
other words, the scope of my argument is limited to post-conflict democracies. There are 
two primary reasons to focus on such democratic states. First, authoritarian states have 
other options for ensuring safety and security of its citizens after ethnic conflict outside of 
a civilian police force. Many states, including the Democratic Republic of Congo, have 
relied on some combination of state military and international peacekeeping forces in 
establishing and maintaining peace.536 In these situations, it is not necessary for 
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individuals and civilians to have ‘confidence’ in the capabilities and lack of bias in the 
police; it is enough that people believe the threat of force credible to prevent new 
outbreaks of violence. Democracies that at least meet the minimal definition of 
‘procedural plus’ used in this dissertation do not have this option. Instead, they face the 
difficult work of developing systems of policing that require community confidence to 
function effectively. Groups and individuals in society must believe in the ability of the 
police to apply the law fairly and without bias across ethnic groups if the police are to be 
effective.  
 This may be an important, and to this point not fully explored, explanation for the 
lack of success of community policing in Kenya. As discussed in the results section of the 
Chapter V of this dissertation, Kenya did not really enact community policing. They did 
not engage with symbolic reform and did little to change police practice to conform to the 
ideals of community policing. Community confidence in the police also requires 
accountability and a lack of corruption. Meeting the definition of ‘procedural plus’ 
democracy used here would then be an additional necessary condition for the success of 
community confidence in the police. Many scholars would argue that Kenya should be 
defined as either a hybrid regime, along the lines of a competitive authoritarian regime or 
a clientalistic regime. The examination of Kenya provided in this dissertation seems to 
show that, at the very least, it does not meet the definition of ‘procedural plus’ democracy 
as I have explained it. Kenya does not have a history of accountability and much of that 
was left unaddressed in the reforms of the 2010 Constitution. Kenya has been marked by 
clientalistic behavior since independence. The use of land sales to purchase the political 
loyalty of wealthy Kikuyu has been a trademark of every government in Kenya since 
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independence. In this setting, the police were charged with protecting the property rights 
of the wealthy and did not have nor need the confidence of the community to do this 
effectively. Further, at the time of the writing of this dissertation, some have accused the 
current government of Kenya of sliding back in to authoritarianism due to crackdowns on 
the media and judiciary.537 As I have emphasized several times in this dissertation, one 
key component to the success of community policing is time for the changes to take 
effect and be experienced by the community. If community policing efforts are stalled or 
reversed because of regime instability, then they are likely to fail.  
 This, however, does not make the examination of Kenya less important, but rather 
better demonstrates why democracy may be a precondition for the success of community 
policing, and therefore appropriately narrows the scope of my argument here. In Chapter 
I, I argued that I did not want to overly limit the scope of my argument so that there were 
too few cases to which it applied. However, the first-glance at Kenya given in Chapter V 
makes the case that my scope needs to be more limited. It is not enough to be a 
procedural democracy with elections and some civil rights. The Kenyan case, instead, 
suggests that there are some additional criteria that imply a deeper democracy than is 
present in Kenya for community policing to succeed. 
 The second reason to focus on democratic states is that there is a normative 
preference for democracy in the international community. Diplomatic and military 
pressure has regularly been employed, specifically by western powers, to encourage or 
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demand democratic reforms in non-democratic states. While attempting to stay out of the 
debate on the normative preference for democracy, this trend indicates that democracies 
are likely to be attempted in states that are reorganizing post-ethnic conflict. If this is the 
case, then it is important to understand how these states can and should reform policing to 
gain community confidence and function effectively in a democracy.  
 Community policing, then, should work to build community confidence in the 
police in other cases where states are attempting to rebuild democracies after violent 
ethnic conflict. For example, Sri Lanka experienced a long and violent civil war from 
1983 until the ceasefire in 2009 between the Tamil minority population and the Sinhalese 
majority population.538 Similar to the case of Northern Ireland, this conflict ended with 
no changes to the borders of Sri Lanka and a democratic government.539 The grievances 
of the Tamil also sound similar to those of the CNR community in Northern Ireland prior 
to the outbreak of war. There was a dispute over the legal status of Indian Tamils in Sri 
Lanka as well as grievances over Sinhala being declared the official language of 
independent Sri Lanka, leaving Tamil-speaking minorities out.540 Other policies that were 
considered discriminatory against the Tamil population including some relating to access 
to education all contributed to the outbreak of civil war.541 During the war, the military 
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was accused of participating in extra-legal violence against the Tamils,542 which led to 
great distrust of the security forces in the aftermath of war.543 The similarity of these 
circumstances to those of Northern Ireland make Sri Lanka an excellent case to test my 
arguments about community policing further, especially as we approach the ten-year 
anniversary of the ceasefire that ended the violence.  
The most important implication of this study and the arguments developed here 
are the practical applications of the lessons learned. If good and successful police reform 
comes from a focus on community policing, then individuals charged with developing 
plans for post-conflict state rebuilding will know where to focus their efforts in police 
reform. Similarly, international sponsors of reform and international organizations that 
lend expertise to such efforts will have something to guide their efforts as well.  
For example, Cyprus has made recent strides in working toward a peace process 
and a unified government between Greek-Cypriots who currently hold power in the 
southern part of the island and Turkish-Cypriots who declared independence in 1983 
(though it has only ever been acknowledged as independent by Turkey). In the past few 
years, several rounds of negotiations have been held to attempt to politically unify the 
island.544 If the Cypriots succeed in forming a new, unified and internationally 
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recognized government, police reform will surely be a priority for the new state. Reform 
should focus on community policing which would include creating new police symbols 
that are culturally sensitive and inclusive of the major ethnic groups on the island, 
developing programs for community involvement in the police, and decentralizing police 
command structures to allow for local expertise in decision-making.  
 Since all democracies require community confidence in the police for the police 
to maintain legitimacy and function effectively, it follows that any democracy 
experiencing a lack of community confidence in the police could benefit from embracing 
community policing – even without extreme violent ethnic conflict. For example, in the 
past few years, several police forces across the United States have experienced a severe 
lack of community confidence, especially among the African American population.545 In 
cities like Chicago, Baltimore, and St. Louis where there have been several high-profile 
incidents of the police killing African American men, communities have protested and 
made clear that there is deep distrust of the police by the community. This is also 
evidenced by the Black Lives Matter movement, which began in 2013 in response to the 
acquittal of George Zimmerman in the murder of Trayvon Martin. This movement seeks 
to raise awareness of the disproportionate number of African American people who are 
pulled over, arrested, and prosecuted by the police.546  
This situation clearly fits a similar model to the one we have seen in Northern 
Ireland. The police are perceived as biased against one community (African Americans), 
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a different portion of the community sees the police as ‘protecting’ them (see the Blue 
Lives Matter Movement),547 and the result is a portion of the community that has lost 
confidence in the police. The police face a difficult situation in that it is not possible to be 
truly effective if a portion of the community does not have confidence in you. They will 
be less likely to call the police when issues arise in the neighborhood and may even turn 
to extralegal ways of addressing crime. In Northern Ireland, the CNR community would 
often turn to paramilitary groups to handle issues of crime rather than the police. It is 
possible that people in the African American community in Chicago, Baltimore, and St. 
Louis would feel more comfortable turning to local gangs to handle issues. Even if they 
do not take this extreme step, the police are unable to do their job when the community 
does not feel comfortable calling for help when they otherwise would.  
The circumstances of these communities seem like a good fit for implementing 
community policing. And, indeed, many of the original experiments in community 
policing began in places like Chicago. However, those experiments were small and many 
lost funding after a short time. The success of a long-term commitment to community 
policing in Northern Ireland should encourage new and larger community policing 
initiatives elsewhere. It is reasonable to think that reforms to the Chicago and St. Louis 
police forces that focus on developing better relationships with the community could 
make major inroads into building African American community confidence in the police 
as they have in the past.  
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The specifics of what those reforms look like will need to be tailored to the 
experiences and needs of those communities, but a focus on ideals of community policing 
should open the space for the community to be willing to accept reform as genuine. For 
example, it may not be necessary to change the badge of the Chicago police, but it may 
be worth exploring the level of militarization of their uniforms or vehicles. Would it be 
possible to wear gear that is less militaristic while also maintaining officer safety? When 
performing police activities in African American neighborhoods, could they ensure that 
code names are less militaristic? One civilian in Belfast, Northern Ireland specifically 
mentioned the alienation he experienced when he heard an officer refer to a set of 
wellness checks in his neighborhood as an ‘Operation.’ He thought the term ‘Operation 
X’ sounded like a military endeavor, not a police initiative.548 There are any number of 
symbolic changes that might be made in these U.S. cities that could signal to the African 
American community that reform is real. Undoubtedly, there are also police structures 
and practices that would help to build community confidence if enacted. Again, without 
presuming to prescribe the necessary changes without expertise in the area in question, 
one could imagine that regular and open forums for the community to present their 
problems and help develop solutions in conjunction with the officers in their 
neighborhoods could help to build community confidence in the police. When the 
community feels heard and sees the police attempting to work with them to solve 
problems in their neighborhoods, they are more likely to develop confidence in the police 
overall.    
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Limitations 
 While there are many situations where my arguments about the effectiveness of 
community policing building confidence in the police and the state would be useful, it is 
also important to note their limitations. As should be clear from the preceding section, for 
instance, states with authoritarian or hybrid governments would not provide good 
candidates for my argument. These states do not face the same constraints as democratic 
states and, therefore do not require community confidence for successful policing, only 
the credible fear of the security force or continued appeasement of the police force to 
continue its support and protection of the regime. However, there are other, non-
authoritarian situations where my arguments may not be as useful.  
 Community policing may be less effective in building state legitimacy after ethnic 
conflict when two circumstances exist: ethnic homogeneity in a geographic region and 
devolved policing. This set of circumstances exists in certain countries facing separatist 
movements like that in the Spanish Basque Country. In this situation, the minority ethnic 
group, the Basque, lives almost entirely separately from the rest of the population in the 
country and has its own independent police force, the Ertzaintza. The ethnic conflict is 
between the Basque on the Spanish side of the border (a portion of the Basque country 
also exists in France) and the larger Spanish government from whom they desire 
complete independence. This case has a distinct feature that separates it from other 
incidents of ethnic conflict. Namely, the police are not considered biased because they 
are independent from the rest of the Spanish police. If the police are not considered to be 
a part of the problem during conflict (a rare, but not unique situation), then reform of the 
police will likely not affect community perception of the legitimacy of the state. In the 
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case of separatist movements that wish to siphon off an ethnically distinct portion of the 
community into an independent state, police reform may do little to address the 
underlying issues of ethnic conflict, and therefore post-conflict rebuilding. In fact, 
reforming an existing independent police force into an integrated state police force might 
lead to more tensions and new episodes of violence rather than new confidence in the 
police.  
Scotland is another example of a separatist movement that fits into this category. 
In this case, an identity group which is relative homogeneous and geographically distinct 
from the rest of the existing state wishes to be siphoned off and declared independent and 
sovereign. Working under the premise that I began this dissertation with, the difficulty of 
establishing and having new states recognized internationally, failed separatist 
movements will require state rebuilding. In this situation, again, the police in Scotland are 
already devolved, and are not considered biased against an ethnic community in Scotland. 
Community policing may be enacted and received well in Scotland, but if one goal of 
police reform is to translate community confidence in the police into community 
confidence in the state overall, it does not seem likely that community policing will have 
this effect in this situation.  
 It should be noted that some may argue that Northern Ireland’s conflict was, in 
essence, similar to that of Basque and Catalonia. Northern Ireland, as has been well 
established, had its own independent police force. However, and importantly, the police 
were perceived by both communities to side with the PUL community and actively to 
discriminate against the CNR community during the Troubles. This put the police 
directly in the middle of the conflict in a way that the Ertzaintza and the Scottish police 
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were not. If the police are seen as impartial or uninvolved in conflict, then employing 
community policing might very well build good relationships between the community 
and the police after conflict characterized like that in Basque and Scotland, but it is not 
likely to affect confidence in the state.  
Important Caveats 
 In addition to the limitations mentioned above, it is important to note there are 
some other important variables that may affect policing and post-conflict state stability 
that I did not incorporate into my analysis. These include, but may not be limited to 
economic status, geopolitical importance and international pressures, and post-colonial 
legacies. Each of these variables may influence both the direction of post-ethnic conflict 
state rebuilding efforts and their success.  
 The economic status of post-ethnic conflict states seeking to implement police 
reform is possibly one of the most important factors not included in this study. A state’s 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has been included in dozens of studies as a statistically 
significant predictor of the probability of the onset,549 duration,550 and long-term effects 
of civil war.551 The logic here is easy to understand – states with more resources will 
have more incentives to prevent war, as they have more to lose through war. Moreover, 
war will be more likely to end in a decisive military victory because the resources of the 
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state make winning more probable.552 Wealth is an important factor in determining both 
the incentives and capabilities of combatants and the state in a conflict, and therefore is 
important to consider. However, in this case, my question does not address why a conflict 
starts, lasts, or ends, but rather what reform of the police should look like after conflict.  
That said, however, it is important to note that reform, and especially good 
reform, takes time and capital. Therefore, in future analysis of this question it will be 
important for me to include the resources available to states after conflict as one 
important factor in the success of police reform. In my research in Northern Ireland, one 
major theme that continued to arise in interviews with police and civilians alike was the 
reduction in financial support for police reforms after the initial 10-years of the PSNI. 
Many interviewees opined that the greatest threat to the long-term success of police 
reform programs was the reduction in funds and officers for community policing 
initiatives. Many feared that the progress achieved in building good relationships between 
the community and the police will fade as community officers spend less and less time on 
the streets in regular patrol and are forced to limit their time to responding to calls.553  
 Another variable which I did not give a lot of attention was the idea of the geo-
political importance of the state and international pressures. Inevitably, some states hold 
great importance in the world while the international community has sadly ignored 
others. The importance of a state in the eyes of the international community may vary 
through the years and may increase based on the type or intensity of conflict experienced 
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(i.e. Rwanda gained considerable international attention after the 1994 genocide due to 
the extremity and severity of the violence). However, states like Northern Ireland have 
received much more international attention than many conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa 
due largely to their geographic placement in the global west, diaspora of citizens to other 
western countries, and its position within the United Kingdom. Northern Ireland 
experienced great pressure from the outside world to end the conflict, and subsequently 
received enormous support in its recovery efforts from states like the United States and 
Canada that have large numbers of Irish immigrants and descendants. Conversely, while 
Kenya holds considerable importance in East Africa and on the continent in general, they 
received far less international pressure to settle grievances from the global west, as well 
as less assistance after the violence. Many African countries offered assistance, but with 
far fewer resources than were made available to Northern Ireland.  
 These differences in pressure and support from the international community 
clearly influence the type and success of reforms after conflict. While Kenya undoubtedly 
borrowed from Northern Ireland’s experiences and reform efforts, they did not have the 
continued international scrutiny and support that Northern Ireland experienced. Small but 
important legislative changes to the NPS Act 2011 in the years after its initial passage 
went largely unnoticed in the international community. One could easily assume that 
similar changes to Northern Ireland’s reform efforts would have seen much more 
scrutiny. In my continued work on this subject, this issue should be studied more and 
emphasized as an important factor in the overall success of post-conflict police reform 
and state stability.  
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 Finally, the issue of post-colonial legacies is one that I briefly mentioned in the 
assessment of Kenya but deserves further attention in later research. Colonialism created 
special issues, especially in Africa and South America, which western countries do not 
have to deal with on the same level. Everything from the organization of the government, 
to the physical borders of states, to the languages spoken and the crops grown in these 
states can be tied back to the legacies of colonialism. Future research should include an 
analysis of how these legacies shape the current politics of states with ethnic conflict and 
the likelihood of reform success.  
 All the variables mentioned here, and several more, may influence the success of 
community policing and rebuilding in post-ethnic conflict states. Undoubtedly, more 
research needs to be done that incorporates these factors and accounts for the effects they 
have on success.  
Corruption  
In Chapter I of this dissertation I asserted that democracy for the purposes of this 
dissertation includes the minimal procedural aspects of democracy plus accountability. 
Accountability includes the absence of corruption. Corruption is often associated with 
illiberal democracies, but it is separable and so deserves special attention. For example, 
Singapore is consistently ranked in the top 10 least corrupt countries in the world 
according to Transparency International’s Corruptions Perceptions Index (ahead of many 
famous liberal democracies including the United States, United Kingdom, and 
Australia),554 but is considered an illiberal democracy because its media is not free and 
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elections are severely restricted.555 Police corruption is therefore important to highlight as 
an important piece of accountability. Police forces with deep histories of corruption and 
bribery may implement community policing programs all they like but will likely fail to 
gain community confidence if corruption is not addressed directly. 
The International Police Executive Symposium (IPES) held in Poland in 2001 had 
the theme “Corruption: A Threat to World Order.”556 In composing a book based on the 
presentations at the conference, the authors of Policing Corruption: International 
Perspectives place the pervasive problem of corruption in the police in perspective. This 
collection of works addresses issues of corruption in the police from some of the world’s 
least corrupt countries such as the United Kingdom (ranked 2) to the most corrupt 
country in the world, Nigeria (ranked 168) according to 2001 world rankings.557 In the 
book the authors discuss different levels of corruption – from low-level bribes of food 
and small amounts of money to grand-scale million dollar pay offs. They also describe 
other forms of corruption such as tampering with crime scenes and the use of excessive 
force. The authors discuss the different consequences of police corruption for society. 
Police corruption makes the job of policing difficult because victims of and witnesses to 
crimes will be less willing to cooperate with the police if they suspect that the police may 
be corrupt. Good police cannot rely on the participation of the community in the pursuit 
                                                 
555  
556 Sarre, Das, and Albrecht, 1. 
557 George T. Kurian, The Illustrated Book of World Rankings, 8th ed. (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc, 
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of justice under the cloud of corruption. Corruption in the police leads to a lack of 
community confidence in the police and an erosion of the moral stature of the police.558  
The pervasiveness of police corruption is something that needs to be addressed in 
concert with, or likely before the implementation of, community policing in the aftermath 
of violent ethnic conflict. In ethnically divided societies, the corruption of the police may 
primarily be seen as bias in application and enforcement of the law, as was largely the 
case in Northern Ireland. However, if other forms of corruption such as bribery, excessive 
force, or other forms of police misconduct are also associated with the police in a given 
state, post-conflict reform will need to include addressing issues of corruption directly to 
be successful. Clearly, this needs further research.  
In future work, I plan to incorporate a specific analysis of police corruption into 
my arguments through the deeper analysis of the Kenyan police, a re-evaluation of the 
Police Service of Northern Ireland, and additional police forces not included in this 
project.  
Future Research 
 This project has made some progress evaluating the dynamics of policing in post-
ethnic conflict societies and its influence on community confidence in the police. I would 
like to expand this project further by performing in-depth interviews with police and 
civilians in Kenya – like those performed in Northern Ireland. Additional fieldwork and 
interviews will provide a better understanding of why community policing failed in 
Kenya. Following on the previous section, corruption may be a serious component of 
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what is missing in my current analysis and more work in Kenya could help to better 
operationalize this.  
This project originated in the desire to analyze how policing interacts and 
sequences with other strategies for post-ethnic conflict state stability – namely 
community reconciliation and ethnic representation in government. Northern Ireland has 
had a volatile history with establishing and maintaining a functioning parliament. In the 
first ten years following the signing of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement, the Northern 
Ireland Assembly (commonly called Stormont) was established and suspended four times 
before a relatively stable Assembly was formed in 2007. At the time of this writing, 
Stormont has been suspended once again for more than a year due to an inability to form 
a coalition government. An analysis of how the forming and suspension of Stormont 
corresponded with changes and reforms in policing and with major community 
reconciliation initiatives could provide important information about how societies recover 
from violent ethnic conflict. I plan to begin work on such a project in the near future.  
 This dissertation has also sparked a deep interest for me in the special role that 
civilian police forces play in democratic societies. Officers are, by definition, both 
citizens of the state and an enforcement arm of the state. Straddling the divide between 
civilian and government official is unique to this kind of work and creates unique 
problems. I plan to continue my study of civilian police forces in ethnically divided 
societies at different levels. This study has concentrated on police forces organized at the 
national level. I would like to further this study by looking at more federalized forms of 
police forces, such as city and county police in the United States. How does working 
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separate from, but to a degree in concert with, other police forces change how the police 
approach their work in deeply divided societies, if at all? 
 Finally, one more extension of this project I would like to pursue is an analysis of 
how the PSNI work with the Garda Síochána of the Republic of Ireland in policing the 
border between Northern Ireland and the Republic. How do different state police forces 
work together to police international borders in the aftermath of violent conflict? How do 
issues of border policing affect matters of internal policing in one or more of the 
bordering states? I would like to work to identify the set of issues specific to policing 
borders between states where ethno-nationalist ties cross political boundaries by 
examining policing the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. 
Specifically, I would like to examine how the two police forces approached coordination 
after the end of the Troubles and focus on how the extensive policing reforms in Northern 
Ireland affected the relationship with the Garda Síochána of the Republic of Ireland. I 
would also like to include an exploration of the negotiations related to the impending exit 
of the United Kingdom from the European Union and how this move will affect issues of 
policing the border in the future. 
Conclusion 
 After violent ethnic conflict, personal security is vital for citizens of a state to 
move forward and build confidence in the state. In democratic societies, security is 
provided by a civilian police force. Unfortunately, the police are often perceived to have 
taken sides during ethnic conflict such that marginalized groups feel alienated and 
unprotected by the police. For policing to be successful, it requires the confidence of the 
community that the police will competently and fairly apply and enforce the law. 
229 
 
Building that confidence following ethnic conflict requires reform that is tailored to the 
context in which it is implemented. Policing literature suggests that implementation of 
community policing will achieve this goal.  
Community policing is designed to build community confidence in the police 
through involving the community in policing at all stages including problem 
identification, idea formation, implementation, and evaluation. Community policing also 
emphasizes decentralized decision making in the police to encourage those with 
specialized knowledge to help develop creative solutions to community problems. When 
implemented well, these principles lead us to expect decentralization in the organizational 
structure of the police, retraining of the police to be oriented to working with the 
community, and institutionalized forums for community engagement with policing. 
Additionally, community policing implies there should be special attention to symbolic 
changes in the police from badges and emblems, to the make-up of the police force, to the 
physical appearance of police buildings and vehicles that will work to open up the police 
to positive interactions with the community. When states commit to fully embracing 
community policing in the aftermath of ethnic conflict, they should see increased 
community confidence in the police.  
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